


JPRS-WER-85-044

1 May 1985

# West Europe Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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1 May 1985

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

BRUSSELS POLLED ON ELECTIONS, PARTIES, FUTURE OF AREA

Brussels LE SOIR in French 12, 13 Mar 85

[12 Mar 85 pp 11-12]

[Text] Brussels-Wallonia = Brussels-Flanders

Concerning the Flemish and the Walloons, which of the following statements is closer to your opinion?

	<u>French</u>	<u>Dutch</u>	<u>Total</u>
Between the Flemish and the Walloons, there are great differences in ways of thinking and living.	54.5	51.1	53.4
Between the Flemish and the Walloons, there are minor differences in ways of thinking and living.	44.0	46.5	44.9
No response	1.5	2.4	1.8

There are different opinions on the financial resources of the region. Which of the following statements most truly reflects your opinion?

	<u>French</u>	<u>Dutch</u>	<u>Total</u>
Some believe that the Walloon region and the Flemish region should help one another financially (in other words, Wallonia would give money to Flanders and vice versa).	69.4	47.7	63.1
Others believe that each of the regions should be responsible for finding its own financial resources (in other words, Wallonia would not give money to Flanders and vice versa).	27.6	49.3	33.9
No response	3.0	3.0	2.9

The Flemish and Walloons are relatively different, but they have common interests, especially economic, and it is therefore logical for them to

practice true mutual financial aid. The majority of all Brussels natives appreciate the way in which the two major communities must co-exist in Belgium, which does not prevent them from having a critical eye of one another.

That is what emerges from the tables published here, tables that deserve a careful reading.

1 -- The Flemish and Walloons are different: That is the opinion of 1 out of 2 Brussels natives, a trend a little more marked among French-speakers than Dutch-speakers, if one excepts the Volksunie [Flemish National Party, VNP] voters who, in a proportion similar to that of the FDF [Francophone Democratic Front] voters (68 percent), deem these differences to be very great. Voters of the other Flemish parties tend to minimize these differences, especially if they are SP voters (55 percent).

2 -- These differences are illustrated anecdotally by the way in which both groups define the other. We proposed to the Francophones and the Dutch to choose, from a list of positive and negative adjectives, those which best describe the three Belgian "types." The verdict is both brutal and comical. In the general opinion, the Brussels natives are bon vivants, talkative and optimistic, but the Dutch-speakers accuse them of arrogance as well. The Flemish appear to be hard-working, conservative and religious. Serious, the French-speakers add. As for the Walloons, opinions differ. They are contradictory and bon vivants, the French-speakers say. They are above all lazy and talkative, accuse the Dutch-speakers, who also deem them to be deliberately contrary.

3 -- But these labels do not stand in the way of cohabitation. Thus, 75 percent of the Brussels residents -- more Francophone than Dutch-speaking (table not published) -- deem that the common economic interests link Brussels with Wallonia. The same proportion think that the same economic interests bring Brussels and Flanders closer together.

4 -- This community of interests has a financial corollary. Some 63 percent of the Brussels inhabitants believe that the two communities must help one another. This is naturally a mainly Francophone opinion and shared by some three-fourths of the PS, PRL [Reform and Freedom Party of Wallonia] and PSC [Christian Social Party] voters, as well as 6 out of 10 FDF voters. Concerning the Flemish, only the socialist voters want that mutual aid for the most part (56 percent). Elsewhere, it is the desire for autonomy that prevails, with a logical peak for VU [Volksunie, VNP] voters.

Most Persecuted?

Do you believe that the Brussels residents are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Flemish and Walloons regarding:

	Francophones			
	Yes	No	Unsure	No resp.
Political decisions	49.6	33.8	15.8	0.8
Economic decisions	49.1	31.9	18.0	1.0

	Dutch-speakers			
	Yes	No	Unsure	No resp.
Political decisions	15.1	64.9	19.2	0.8
Economic decisions	14.2	64.9	20.2	0.7

	Total			
	Yes	No	Unsure	No resp.
Political decisions	39.3	43.2	16.6	0.8
Economic decisions	38.9	41.7	18.5	1.0

In your opinion, what is the main attitude: 1) of the Flemish toward Brussels; and 2) of the Walloons toward Brussels?

	Flemish		
	French	Dutch	Total
Indifferent to the fate of Brussels	14.6	30.4	19.3
Mainly want to defend the Brussels residents who speak their language	64.1	72.1	66.4
Want to make Brussels a region like the others	22.1	30.2	24.9
Want to take control of Brussels	75.2	32.9	62.2

	Walloons		
	French	Dutch	Total
Indifferent to the fate of Brussels	38.3	31.7	36.0
Mainly want to defend the Brussels residents who speak their language	54.0	72.2	59.6
Want to make Brussels a region like the others	43.9	34.8	41.4
Want to take control of Brussels	29.0	51.1	35.5

Totals of over 100: several possible responses.

If there are poor cousins in Belgium, it is the Brussels residents! This general diagnosis is made by 1 out of 2 Francophones. It becomes much more acute when one takes up, not the big issues, but daily life in the capital. Right in Brussels, Francophones feel at a disadvantage regarding employment, both public and private. Dutch-speakers feel scorned in mass transportation and the hospitals. On the periphery, these frustrations are also noted, but

are not the majority and are essentially shared by those who do not live there! The inequalities are partially explained by the attitude of the Flemish, accused by a French-speaking majority of trying to colonize Brussels. And, as a remedy, one sees the institution of integral bilingualism, of political personnel, communal employees, and so on.

One should take a closer look at the picture.

In Brussels (unpublished tables), a majority of the French-speakers say they are at a disadvantage compared with the Flemish with respect to obtaining jobs in the private sector (53 percent) and public sector (66 percent). A majority of the Dutch-speakers feel linguistically disadvantaged in their contacts with hospitals (52 percent) and mass transportation (58 percent). These disadvantages are not perceived by the other community. Only 10 percent of the Flemish deem, for example, that the Francophones are at a disadvantage regarding employment and, at the other end of the scale, 33 percent of the French-speakers -- a record -- recognize the cultural discrimination against Dutch-speakers in Brussels.

#### Schools

On the periphery, the situation is particularly disconcerting. A majority of the French-speakers believe that the French-speakers in the six communes with facilities are disadvantaged regarding private employment (50 percent) and public employment (60 percent). But the residents of the periphery themselves perceive this discrimination much less than Brussels residents from the core city and even less than the inhabitants of the suburbs.

One example: It is especially in Brussels (37.6 percent) and in the suburbs (21 percent) that one deems that the French-speakers in the communes with facilities are disadvantaged regarding nursery schools and schools open to them. Locally, the disadvantage is apparent only to 15.6 percent of the inhabitants! This does not even represent half of the French-speakers!

Nevertheless, Brussels is definitely a land of imbalances, as confirmed by the responses to another question (see above table) dealing with the feeling of discrimination of Brussels residents, the Flemish and the Wallons in the Belgian Government. It is the Brussels residents who generally appear to be in the most frequent minority in political and economic decisions. This conviction is shared by a majority of French-speakers and especially by socialist, PRL and FDF voters.

As for the Dutch-speakers (unpublished table), nearly 1 out of 2 believe that Flanders is at a disadvantage compared with other regions. It is an opinion which the French-speakers absolutely do not share. As for the Walloons, their position is judged more objectively, but with puzzlement. It is recognized that they are more an economic rather than political minority and a minority of Dutch-speakers willing to pity the Walloons is clearly larger than that of the French-speakers perceiving discrimination against Flanders.

## Colonialism

How is one to explain such unequal treatment? The start of a response to this question can be found in the image which the Brussels residents have of the intentions of the two communities toward them. Above all, the Flemish want, say those questioned, to defend the Flemish of Brussels (66.4 percent) and take control of the capital. The Walloons, anxious to defend the Francophones, also intend to make Brussels a complete region. Flemish "imperialism" is definitely essentially perceived by a large majority of French-speakers, upper-level personnel, independents and more PS than FDF voters, while Walloon "imperialism" strikes only 1 out of 2 Flemish, especially skilled workers and lower-level government employees. It will also be noticed that while a large part of the French-speakers feel "abandoned" by the Walloons, it is the feeling of only 1 out of 3 Dutch-speakers with regard to his community. Finally, in the eyes of those questioned, it was the Walloons (41.4 percent) who, much more than the Flemish (24.9 percent), want to play the game of three-handed federalism in Brussels.

## Technical Side to Our Poll

### Why Our Brussels Emerges From Yoke

How did we draw "our" map of Brussels? First of all, we had to foil a trap. Were we to poll only the 19 communes of the city or a larger area, made up of those 19 communes and another 6 with facilities? In both cases, it was a relatively easy and not very costly solution. But in both cases, it implied a political choice that we did not want to make.

Were we to limit Brussels to the 19 communes? Then we would have implicitly accepted the "containment" of the capital. Were we to extend it to the communes with facilities only? Then we would have been considering a political situation that remains controversial as a fact. Above all, more than that political trap that we wanted to avoid, it was the journalistic frustration that we feared and rejected. After all, was one of the exciting aspects of the poll that of outlining that greater "natural, spontaneous" Brussels that no vote, no study, had ever defined? Did we not have to go very far, get the larger picture, choosing the broadest, most "international" definition of our capital?

We therefore decided to break down the "political" walls of the city, give priority to the social, economic and geographic data, in exchange for re-designing, following the study, of a narrow, different Brussels than we had imagined at first.

### Geographic Brussels

It was the geographers and sociologists who helped us make the choice. Josette Dawance and Francoise Noel, research fellows at the Free University

of Brussels, consulted different studies, the list of which is appended for purists. Their common goal: to define the communes of the city of Brussels in the larger sense, in terms of various demographic, socioeconomic, statistical and morphological criteria. Such as, for example, the proportion of inhabitants of these entities born in the 19 communes, the proportion of workers with jobs in the capital Brussels, the rate of activity of women, but also different features of the housing, the residential size of the communes, and so on.

In a sense, these different studies are summarized in the study of the Brabant Regional Economic Council. It is that study that was used by Dawance and Notel to define, in an initial analysis, a "Brussels metropolitan center" made up of a core -- the 19 communes -- and two rings: the 6 communes with facilities, on the one hand, and the suburbs made up of 24 communes. "Our" Brussels therefore had 49 communes.

And yet, the choice was not definitive. The "pre-poll" made for reasons we give elsewhere caused us to eliminate some of the peripheral communes that we had initially chosen, either because too small of a percentage of their inhabitants considered themselves as Brussels residents or because the percentage of active persons in that commune working in Brussels was clearly under 40 percent, or because the commune considered had no common border with a commune of Brussels.

On the basis of these combined criteria, Halle, Liedekerke, Kortenberg, Braine-le-Chateau and Ottignies were eliminated. The second -- the real -- survey could then begin, in a Brussels of 44 communes.

Our Brussels includes:

The 19 communes of the district of the capital city Brussels; the 6 communes of the district of Hal-Vivvorde, so-called "with facilities": Drogenbos, Kraainem, Linkebeek, Rhode-Saint-Genese, Wemmel, Wezembeek-Oppeem; the 19 communes of the Flemish and Walloon suburbs: The Flemish suburb: Asse, Beersel, Dilbeek, Grimbergen, Hoeilaert, Machelen, Meise, Overijse, Sint-Pieters-Leeuw, Steenokkerzeel, Ternat, Vilvorde, Zaventem, Tervueren. The Walloon suburb: Braine-l'Alleud, La Hulpe, Lasne, Rixensart, Waterloo.

#### 14 Percent Dutch-speakers

In order to validly question 3,000 inhabitants of "greater Brussels," we questioned 6,000. Was that a joke? Not completely. To make up a valid sampling for the "real" poll, we in fact had to conduct a pre-survey, quickly but precisely, of 3,000 persons from the same geographic zone.

No official statistics show the exact proportion of French- and Dutch-speakers in the Brussels metropolitan area. This is the direct result of the elimination, starting in 1960, of the linguistic aspect of the national

census. The Flemish community at that time feared that the figures might show too precisely and undeniably its minority presence in certain regions of contact between communities.

Our goal was to question, grosso modo, as many French-speakers as Dutch-speakers, in order to find a sufficiently broad and reliable sampling of all "types" of Brussels residents. But we also wanted, for each question, to be able to determine the choices of the "average Brussels resident," combining Dutch- and French-speakers. To do so, we had to find the exact proportion of each community in the overall population. And we had to know how many Francophones and Flemish lived in the 19 communes and the communes with facilities, as well as in the main suburbs. Therefore, in November, we submitted a quick questionnaire made up of 12 questions to 2,892 inhabitants of our greater Brussels, chosen at random from the election lists. The questions had to do with the socioeconomic characteristics of the persons questioned, but also their linguistic affiliation: In what language do you prefer to respond to this questionnaire? Do you consider yourself as a Brussels native, Flemish, Walloon, a Brussels native and Flemish, a Brussels native and Walloon? Do you consider yourself to be French-speaking or Dutch-speaking? It was based on the answers to these three questions that Dawance and Noel made up the "linguistic status" of those questioned, a status shown on the table below. On definite geographic and sociological bases, we could indicate -- with minimal risk of error -- the proportion of French-speakers and Dutch-speakers in the "three rings" of our metropolis.

	<u>Brussels</u>	<u>With Facilities</u>	<u>Flemish Suburb</u>	<u>Walloon Suburb</u>	<u>Total</u>
French-speaking	84.2	52.3	15.6	96.4	66.7
Dutch-speaking	14.0	46.2	82.9	2.3	31.6
Absolutely bilingual	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.3	1.7

#### Foreigners?

Let us say so frankly: Our poll has one gap. It excludes 3 out of 10 adult Brussels residents: those not of Belgian nationality. But the gap is a deliberate choice based on very solid reasons, technical as well as sociological. And if, as one will see, the exclusion of foreigners bothers those who expect of a survey such as ours an exact, precise and exhaustive photographic study of the Brussels reality, it also offers guarantees of homogeneity of the population polled, reliability and therefore, fidelity of the image rendered.

From the technical standpoint, first of all. The inclusion of foreigners living in Brussels stems from various authorities: the commune, for those who, with a "residency permit," are naturally included in the population registries; the Ministry of Justice for those who, not in this case, figure only on the registry of foreigners. Other foreigners do not appear on the

population registries, either because they live in Brussels illegally or because they enjoy certain immunities. Such is the case of diplomats, SHAPE and NATO personnel and, to a certain extent, EEC officials. These "unregistered persons" in Brussels number 40,000, according to some sources. It was therefore impossible to set up a single file on non-Belgian Brussels residents, in which one could have had a rather broad and reliable sampling, with all the scientific guarantees required.

Recent polls have proved it: The traditional tool of the poll is scarcely effective when it is a matter of questioning persons living in different cultural worlds on the same issues. God knows that in Brussels in particular, the worlds co-existing are definitely different.

The geographic mobility of foreigners, the frequent refusals to respond from certain nationalities would also have compromised the value of information that would have been gathered with difficulty.

For all these reasons, we finally decided to use the Brussels population of Belgian nationality for the INUSOP [expansion unknown] poll. However, this will not prevent us, as one can see, from taking up the problems and thousand and one problems of the foreign presence in Brussels.

#### Who Helped

One word on the way in which we drafted the INUSOP-LE SOIR poll.

As in previous surveys, we first of all appealed to our staff, collecting the questions that seemed interesting to the different journalists involved.

For its part, INUSOP, with the cooperation of the Institute of Sociology of the ULB, also cleared the way. The drafting of the questions, issue by issue, was done in the traditional manner by a LE SOIR-INUSOP-ULB team. But given the political importance and technically delicate nature of the questionnaire, we sought additional backing and aid. That of the CRISP (Center of Research and Sociopolitical Information), known for its competence and honesty in the analysis of all political and social questions. A team of experts from the CRISP therefore helped us throughout the preparation and drafting of the questionnaire, but also when it was necessary to determine the nature of the sampling and the geographical limits of the survey, supplying precious aid that further strengthens the interest and reliability of the poll that the reader will discover over the next 3 weeks.

#### Scientific Aid

For the conception of the sampling, the geographic area and questions of the poll:

For INUSOP-UNIOP [expansion unknown]: Camille Javeaux, director; Mark Hofmans, Dutch-speaking researcher.

For the Institute of Sociology of the ULB: Nicole Delruelle-Vosswinkel, director; Josette Dawance and Francoise Noel, in charge of research.

For the CRISP: Xavier Mabilie, deputy general director; Francis Delperee, administrator, professor at the UCL [Catholic University of Louvain]; Robert Tollet, administrator, professor at the ULB.

Rereading survey commentaries: Josette Dawance, Xavier Mabilie and Francoise Noel.

Sources: B. Jouret: "Definition Spatiale du Phenomene Urban Bruxellois." Institute of Sociology. Published by the ULB, 1972, 339 pp.

E. Van Hecke: "La Delimitation de l'Agglomeration Morphologique Bruxelloise a Partir des Secteurs Statistiques," in COURRIER HEBDOMADAIRE, No 623, CRISP, 30 November 1973, 25 pp.

H. Van der Haegen and M. Pattyn: "Les Regions Urbaines Belges," in ETUDES STATISTIQUES, No 56, 1979, INS, pp 235-249.

B. Vinikas and C. De Greef: "La Metropole Bruxelloise: Quelques Aspects de Son Evolution au Cours des Annees '70," in ECO-BRABANT, No 30, December 1981, CERB, pp 17-19.

C. Vandermotten and A. Collard: "La Periurbanisation Bruxelloise: Le Debut de la Fin?" ULB, 1984, mimeo., 11 pp and maps.

The poll was conducted in the field by the INUSOP-UNIOP between 28 November 1984 and 3 January 1985. A total of 2,818 persons were questioned, including: 1,050 in the 19 communes of the city of Brussels; 795 in the 6 peripheral communes with facilities; and 973 in the 19 communes making up the Brussels suburbs.

[13 Mar 85 pp 4-5]

[Text] Voting Choice Next Time

Whom will the Brussels residents vote for? Within the framework of a survey such as this, it was necessary to pose this catch question, realizing that its results would have to be interpreted with maximum caution and for several reasons.

In general, first of all, the reliable polling institutes -- led by INUSOP, naturally -- have learned to distrust pre- or postelection "consultations," first of all, because the rates of no response may reach peaks, thus compromising the value of the effective responses. Second, in the lapse of time separating the poll from the elections, many events may occur that would upset the election map.

Whom will you vote for in the coming elections?<sup>1</sup>

	1981, Actual Votes in Brussels Cantons	1985 Voting Intentions
FDF	22.55	7.7
PRL	15.82	13.7
PS	12.33	10.3
PSC	9.29	5.6
UDRT-RAD [expansion unknown]	8.70	0.5
CVP [Social Christian Party]	6.75	2.1
PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress]	5.68	1.7
VU	4.41	1.1
SP	3.40	2.8
Ecolo	3.09	11.8
PCB-KPB	2.1	1.5
Agalev		1
Vlaams Blok		0.1
Others (minor lists)	5.9	0.6
No response		2.6
Blank	6.91	3.1
No vote		1.7
Will not vote		2.6
Do not know		18.3
Refuse to say		13.3

<sup>1</sup> In the first column of the above table, we reprint the results, by party, of the legislative elections of November 1981, in the Brussels cantons. In addition to the 19 communes, these cantons include certain communes or parts of communes in the administrative district of Hal-Vilvorde. But it is the election division the most similar to our sampling. One must therefore take the comparison between this column of figures and the second, which indicates voting intentions in the 19 communes, with the customary reservations.

In the case at hand, the second reservation is particularly important. No one knows, at the present time, what election configuration, either traditional or revolutionary, will be engendered by the "great maneuvers" underway between and within several Brussels parties.

The quite recent thinning of the FDF and the parallel strengthening of the PS are already sufficiently important phenomena to upset the above data. But these movements will not be the first or the last of the pre-election period.

We therefore could not resist the pleasure of engaging in pre-election soeculations, giving them their rightful place -- more anecdotal than scientific -- and trying to limit damage to a minimum.

~~The table included compares voting intentions expressed by persons ques-~~  
tioned in the 19 communes with the actual results of the 1981 legislative elections observed in the cantons of Brussels, the political-administrative entity closest to these 19 communes which, electionwise, do not exist as such. Such a comparison would be hazardous if we envisaged all of our greater Brussels. The latter, as we have explained, has been outlined in terms of geographic and social criteria that in no way coincide with the political outlines of the election cantons.

### Thrilling Main Trends

The main trends emerging from this picture are exciting. One in fact observes: an impressive decline in the FDF, which, from being the leading Brussels party in 1981, has fallen to fourth place; a settling -- rather surprising, if one is to believe the mood and certain polls -- of the PRL, which is losing 2 percent of its voters, but is becoming the leading party in the 19 communes; a thundering "green thrust," with Ecolo becoming the second-ranking party in Brussels, coming out of nowhere; the very clear decline of the PSC, which no longer gains 6 percent of the Brussels voters; the decline in the PS like that of the PRL, placing the party in third place in Brussels; and the decline in all Flemish lists.

How can one explain that only one surge corresponds to all these declines and still fails to make up for them? The answer to the question is very probably to be found in the 13 percent refusals to respond and in the 18 percent unsure. They are the ones who will make the difference on election day. In the meantime, they, along with other things already mentioned, compromise the predictive value of the poll table.

### Satisfied Voters Choose the CVP, PRL, PSC

How is the party for which you voted in 1981 now defending your interests?

<u>1981 Vote</u>	<u>PSC</u>	<u>CVP</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>SP</u>	<u>PRL</u>	<u>PVV</u>	<u>FDF</u>	<u>VU</u>	<u>PC</u>	<u>UDRT</u>	<u>Ecolo</u>	<u>Agal.</u>
Well	59.7	66.9	49.7	64.1	61.7	61.8	45.7	63.5	21.9	42.8	46.2	64.5
Poorly	19.4	12.5	20.0	10.9	15.3	14.7	32.9	11.4	34.4	25.0	12.6	10.4
Depends	11.4	12.5	21.7	16.7	16.5	15.4	14.0	18.6	28.1	14.3	22.4	16.7
Do not know	9.4	8.2	8.6	8.3	6.5	8.1	7.3	6.6	15.6	17.9	18.7	10.4

More than the preceding table, which is indicative at best, another question gives one an idea of the degree of attachment of each voter to his adopted party. That is what the above table indicates. It shows the extent to which voters approve or disapprove of the current action of their chosen party.

Those who come out the best are undeniably the Flemish parties on the whole, led by the CVP and a "yellow card" for the PVV, which has 14 percent unsatisfied voters in its ranks.

On the French-speaking side, the "stars" are governmental: the PSC and the PRL. The good points of the PS, Ecolo and the FDF are less important, not exceeding 50 percent, and one notes a peak of dissatisfaction in 1 out of 3 FDF voters. It is a record beaten only by the PC, whose troops appear on our table to have a very low level of satisfaction.

Nols, Spaak, Gol: Neither Stars Nor Messiahs

Politicians who best defend Brussels (total names mentioned) (in percent).

Do not know	55.1
None	5.2
Nols, Roger	9.8
Spaak, Antoinette	9.0
Gol, Jean	5.0
Vanden Boeynants, Paul	3.6
Anciaux, Vic	3.3
Cudell, Guy	3.2
Martens, Wilfried	3.2
Desir, Georges	2.9
Thijs, Jean-Louis	2.8
Goor, Cecile	2.8
Spitaels, Guy	2.1
Brouhon, Herve	2.0
Hatry, Paul	1.9
Outers, Lucien	1.9
Simonet, Henri	1.8
Moureaux, Philippe	1.5
Moureaux (undet.)	1.5
Tindemans	1.4
Weckx, Hugo	1.3
Lagasse, Andre	1.2
Defosset, Leon	1.2
Neyts-Uyttebroeck, A.-M.	1.2
DeClercq, Willy	1.1
Demuyter, Albert	1.0
Clerfayt, Georges	0.9
Desmaret, Michel	0.9
Moureaux, Serge	0.9
DePaux, Lydia	0.7
Deprez, Gerard	0.7
Van Halteren, Pierre	0.7
Nothomb, Ch.-Ferdinand	0.6
Van Miert, Karel	0.6

Chabert, Jos	0.5
Desmaret (undet.)	0.5
Van Geyt, Louis	0.5
De Groeve, Andre	0.5
Steyaert, Rika	0.4
Vandenhoute, Jacques	0.4
De Wulf	0.4
De Donnea	0.4
Thijs (undet.)	0.4
Deleuze, Olivier	0.4
Poullet, Edouard	0.3
Schiltz, Hugo	0.3

(Total over 100 percent due to several responses possible from each person.)

Which politicians not from Brussels should participate in the coming legislative elections in Brussels?

Do not know	32.2
None	53.0
Gol, Jean	2.2
Van Miert, Karel	2.0
Spitaels, Guy	1.7
Happart, Jose	1.6
Martens, Wilfried	1.5
Tindemans, Leo	1.4
De Clercq, Willy	1.2
Deprez, Gerard	0.7
Schiltz, Hugo	0.6
Maystadt, Philippe	0.6
Claes, Willy	0.6
Tobback, Louis	0.5
Glinne, Ernest	0.5

(Total different from 100 percent due to several responses possible from each person.)

Question: Who is the political "star" of Brussels? Answer: No one. When asked which politicians best defend Brussels, 60 percent remain silent. Among the men and women who come to the top, one finds two "real" Brussels residents: Roger Nols and Antoinette Spaak, real political locomotives that one might well grab hold of in the weeks ahead.

In third place: Jean Gol, from Liege, who, if one is to believe the poll, would not do too badly if he ran in the capital! The next in line, a veteran, Paul Vanden Boeynants, barely comes ahead of a triad made up of a socialist (Cudell ahead of Spitaels and Moureaux, bound to make people jealous) and two Flemish, who are quite different: "statesman" and "father" Wilfried Martens, on the one hand, and on the other, the symbol of hard,

pure Flemish combat, Vic Anciaux, leader of the Volksunie. In addition, one should emphasize the scant popularity of the regional ministers from the different parties. The first one named, Mrs Goor, of the PSC, does not obtain 3 percent.

Along the same line of ideas, one will note that the Brussels residents are scarcely awaiting a saviour. At most, they would lean toward Jean Gol, whose previous score is confirmed here, and Karel Van Miert, the image of a certain Flanders. Jose Happart is comically sandwiched between his party president, Guy Spitaels, and the prime minister. But beyond the anecdotal, the most striking figure of the table is undoubtedly that of the 85 percent of the Brussels residents who expect nothing from anyone.

#### Flemish and Walloons Judge Brussels Residents

Even if our survey aims to reveal what Brussels residents are like to other Belgians, it seemed logical to us to try to learn the feeling of Walloons and Flemish, using certain questions put to our sampling of 3,000 persons. We therefore asked INUSOP to "test" some of the questions put to the people of Brussels by putting them to a sampling of all Belgians.

Let us state straight off: This second poll conducted by INUSOP did not have the scope of the survey done by LE SOIR and the following information was gathered from a sampling of 700 persons: 350 in Flanders and 350 in Wallonia distributed in over 150 communes in the country and questioned from 16 January to 4 February. The population questioned was representative of the Belgian population 18 and over. The results obtained were naturally pondered based on the true distribution of inhabitants in the two regions of the country.

#### Wallonia and Flanders Willing To Sacrifice Brussels?

The Flemish and Walloons feel the same emotions toward Belgian as do the Dutch- and French-speaking people of Brussels.

In general, the feeling of being Belgian prevails rather clearly, a feeling reinforced by the impression that everyone, whether from Flanders, Wallonia or Brussels, seems to live on an equal footing. There is also a unanimity for "old Belgium" and for the role to be played by Brussels as the capital.

Naturally, certain federalist feelings do appear, particularly in the models of development to be chosen for the two main regions. There is also the distrust of Wallonia for Flanders which is unilateral: In the eyes of those questioned, the northern region would tend to want to control Brussels.

## Being Belgian

To what group do you feel you mainly belong? (in percent)

	<u>Walloons</u>	<u>Flemish</u>
All Belgians	63	43
Community	8	24
Region	16	8
Province	4	3
Commune	9	20

One is more Belgian -- or Belgian-tending -- in Wallonia than in Flanders. However, on both sides -- and this is also true in Brussels -- the strongest feeling of attachment is definitely to Belgium.

The "substitutes" proposed to citizens: communities and regions, reveal their weakness, with the French community, the Flemish region, attaining scarcely 8 percent. The Flemish community and Walloon region are a little more popular.

The attraction of the commune does appear to be much stronger in Flanders than in Wallonia and than among the Flemish of Brussels.

In addition, the poll revealed the specific choices of certain socioprofessional categories, Wallonia and Flanders combined. It is worth noting that the category of independents is relatively little "Belgian-tending" and relatively municipalist (42 percent for Belgium; 23 percent for communal affiliation as the first choice). Workers choose Belgium by 53 percent (first choice) and students by 62 percent.

## Economic Policy

The Brussels residents are at a disadvantage with regard to political decisions:

	<u>Walloons</u>	<u>Flemish</u>
Yes	18	6
No	54	69
Do not know	27	19

Regarding economic decisions:

Yes	18	5
No	54	71
Do not know	26	18

The Flemish are at a disadvantage regarding political decisions:

	<u>Walloons</u>	<u>Flemish</u>
Yes	2	44
No	76	36
Do not know	21	15

Economic decisions:

Yes	3	44
No	76	36
Do not know	21	14

The Walloons are at a disadvantage regarding political decisions:

	<u>Walloons</u>	<u>Flemish</u>
Yes	55	10
No	24	64
Do not know	20	21

Economic decisions:

Yes	60	9
No	21	64
Do not know	18	21

The Walloons and Flemish are definitely convinced (64 percent) that the people of Brussels are at no disadvantage regarding political and economic decisions.

One generally tends to deny one's own privileges or to see privileges only if one's neighbor enjoys them. The Flemish seem convinced that they are at a disadvantage and so do the Walloons.

Wallonia: Flanders Wants To Absorb Brussels

What is the main attitude of the Flemish regarding Brussels?

	<u>Flanders</u>		<u>Walloon</u>	
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
They are indifferent to it.	34	61	20	76
They mainly want to defend Brussels people who speak their language.	77	18	68	28
They want Brussels as a third region.	26	63	32	61
They want to control Brussels.	25	63	74	22

What is the main attitude of the Walloons toward Brussels?

	<u>Flanders</u>		<u>Wallonia</u>	
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
They are indifferent to it.	35	55	24	72
They mainly want to defend Brussels people who speak their language.	77	14	66	29
They want Brussels as a third region.	36	50	62	31
They want to control Brussels.	45	42	28	67

In the provinces, everyone believes that "the others" are not indifferent to Brussels. It is an opinion that the Brussels residents were not far from sharing concerning the Flemish and Walloons.

One observes a solidarity of the Walloons with the Francophone Brussels people and of the Flemish with the Dutch-speaking Brussels residents. However, it is a solidarity lacking in any desire for absorption.

The Flemish do not preach the idea of a Brussels region equal to the other two regions -- far from it -- but the Walloons do favor the idea. However, they clearly reject "tripartite federalism,," which precisely implies the equality of Brussels with the other regions. It is a paradox that tends to indicate that on community matters, the Walloons do not make the connection between general ideas and their practical implications.

#### Province Not Federalist

What kind of a future would you want for Belgium?

	<u>Flemish</u>	<u>Walloons</u>
United state	59	70
Two-way federation	20	7
Three-way federation	8	10
Nine-way federation	3	7
Two states	7	3
Three states	2	3

"Old Belgium" retains the edge, even among the young (63 percent of the persons questioned between the ages of 18 and 34 look favorably upon a united future) and the working class (68 percent).

A two-way federal state would satisfy 1 out of 4 Flemish, but scarcely 7 out of 100 Walloons. As for three-way federalism, it would apparently succeed only in Brussels. Only 10 percent of the Walloons and 8 percent of the Flemish would want it, a valuable piece of political information! But, as one can see, it is partially contradicted by other tables.

## Walloons Not Consistent

What kind of a future would you want for Brussels?

	<u>Walloons</u>	<u>Flemish</u>
A territory dependent on the national government	46	64
A full region	42	13
A European city independent of the Belgian Government	10	19

Should Brussels remain the capital of Belgium?

	<u>Walloon</u>	<u>Flanders</u>
Yes	92	88
No	0	5

Surprise! The Walloons who had previously been the fervent defenders of a united Belgium and very reserved regarding three-way federalism, only desired by 10 percent of them, are now 42 percent behind a "Brussels as a third region," which is nevertheless another way of describing that three-way federalism! One has already observed among French-speaking Brussels residents that divorce between the highly present idea of a united Belgium and the contradictory claim of a status as a full region for Brussels. But the phenomenon achieves greater scope here. At most, one might risk assuming that, obsessed by their emotional desire for national unity, the Walloons are, when one speaks in specifics, much more discriminating.

The Flemish are truer to themselves, with only 13 supporting Brussels as a third region. On the other hand, they support the current hybrid situation: "Brussels as a territory dependent on the national government." One will also note that this solution is the first one chosen by the Walloons, who are definitely not in a hurry to get Brussels out of its political ghetto.

As in Brussels, the idea of a European city is scarcely enticing. It is true that public opinion does not yet have a very precise political understanding of it.

## Autonomy for Regions

Your future mainly depends on solidarity with the Brussels residents. Do you:

	<u>Walloons</u>	<u>Flemish</u>
Totally agree	23	9
Agree somewhat	35	19

(cont.)

Disagree somewhat	20	28
Totally disagree	19	40

Your future mainly depends on the autonomous development of your region.  
Do you:

	<u>Walloons</u>	<u>Flemish</u>
Agree totally	46	28
Agree somewhat	28	33
Disagree somewhat	14	19
Totally disagree	9	16

From the standpoint of the Flemish, solidarity with the Brussels residents has no decisive effect on the future and 68 percent of them do not want to hear about the idea. Inversely, solidarity with the Brussels residents carries weight in the eyes of the Walloons (as one can see by adding the "totally" and "agree somewhat": 58 percent).

Nevertheless, the future of Wallonia depends on its autonomous development, 74 percent of the Walloons think, while 61 percent of the Flemish are of the same opinion for their own regional development.

This tends to show that the Walloons are henceforth well imbued with the adage "Save yourself." And that the Flemish experience their relationship with the mother country more calmly.

#### Bilingualism

Bilingualism is our art of living! That is the message sent to us by the Brussels residents in the INUSOP tables that we are publishing below, tables that place the French-speaking parties in an unstable position with respect to their election following.

Does one not see a majority favoring overall bilingualism of public officials and of communal and even private services?

Certain data published yesterday indicate that a majority of the French-speaking people of Brussels feel deprived of private and public jobs, while a majority of the Dutch-speakers feel poorly served by the hospitals and mass transport.

Overall bilingualism appears to be a remedy to these evils. It is a famous stepping stone in the political sea.

Is there a reasonable solution to the linguistic-political malaise felt by the people of Brussels? Yes, bilingualism! At least, this is the feeling of a French- and Flemish majority.

1 -- They favor -- especially in the "communes a facilites," \* total bilingualism of communal elected officials. In this connection, one will note that only a minority of French-speakers (8.7 percent) expresses antibilingual feelings. An absolute majority of the voters in the French-speaking parties deem such bilingualism indispensable. The sole exception: FDF voters who are divided between those who deem bilingualism "desirable" (42 percent) and those who deem it indispensable (41 percent).

It will be noted that the minority of French-speakers rejecting bilingualism is not as great as that of the Flemish expressing the same attitude, all indications of a linguistic "pragmatism" that scarcely fits with the claims of certain parties.

2 -- In daily life as well, French-speakers vastly prefer to have bilingual public servants. They clearly prefer this highly practical solution to that of "bilingualism of services but unilingualism of public servants" preached by the PS and the FDF.

Only 1 out of 3 Brussels residents and French-speakers support this second solution. This proportion rises to 36 percent for PS voters and 40 percent (compared with 58 percent for bilingualism of public servants) for FDF voters.

The following table shows the choice of Brussels residents concerning relations with employees at communal offices and windows. But there is also a majority supporting bilingualism of police and gendarmes (78.5 percent), post office employees (70 percent), conductors on mass transit (78.6 percent), personnel at major stores (74.8 percent) and in hospitals (74 percent). In all cases, it is the inhabitants of the communes with facilities who say they are the most fervent supporters of overall bilingualism.

In the second part of our survey next week, we shall pay more detailed attention to the practice of bilingualism in Brussels. What language is spoken at home, at work, in the schools? What language do people want to learn? Here also, the attitudes of the Brussels residents are very interesting.

Do you believe it is indispensable, desirable but not indispensable or not at all necessary for the burgomaster, aldermen, communal council members and CPAS [Public Centers for Social Aid] advisers to be bilingual (French-Dutch) in your commune?

	French	Dutch	Brus.	Commune/ Facil.	Suburbs	Total
Indispensable	52.3	62.6	62.5	73.9	41.0	55.9
Desirable, not indis.	37.4	25.1	32.1	20.3	37.5	33.4
Not at all necessary	8.7	10.8	4.1	4.5	19.3	9.2
No response	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.4	2.2	1.6

\*[Dutch speaking communities with special provisions for the Francophone minority]

Concerning bilingualism (French-Dutch) in public and private services, there are two possible solutions: Either every employee will be bilingual, speaking French and Dutch, or every office or service will have unilingual employees (speaking either French or Dutch), but in each of the two languages.

For communal offices and windows, for example, which of these two solutions do you prefer?

	First Solution: Bilingual Employees		
	French	Dutch	Total
Communal offices and windows	62.6	81.6	68.6

	Second Solution: Bilingual Offices		
	French	Dutch	Total
Communal offices and windows	35.3	15.6	29.1

	First Solution: Bilingual Employees			
	Brussels	Com.Fac.	Suburbs	Total
Communal offices and windows	67.2	81.8	69.6	68.6

	Second Solution: Bilingual Offices			
	Brussels	Com.Fac.	Suburbs	Total
Communal offices and windows	31.1	16.6	27.2	29.1

## Brussels

For whom will Brussels vote? The question, an exciting, essential one in a poll such as ours, has in recent days taken a particular turn. The "desertion" of two leaders from the FDF: Defosset and Moureaux, and their rallying to a PS list is already enough to mix up the election cards that we had so patiently drawn. But in addition, it could serve as a detonator -- or excuse -- for a veritable political explosion in Brussels, an explosion of which, by the very force of things, our poll conducted at the end of 1984 does not bear a trace.

One must therefore read some of the following tables with a special frame of mind, remembering constantly that they describe the mental images, expectations and choices of the Brussels residents before the latest events. And seek, not the reflection of the vicissitudes, but the visible portion of icebergs, of bottom swells.

What are the main reasons for choosing a party, in the eyes of the Brussels residents? Economic, linguistic or some other? How do the people of Brussels view the parties, those for which they vote and for which they do not vote? How do they experience bilingualism? The answers to these

questions still retain the same interest they had when they were posed. They will gain more in the weeks ahead.

In the political domain, you know that there is talk of the right and the left. Where would you situate yourself?

	<u>French</u>	<u>Dutch</u>	<u>Total</u>
Left 1	3.5	3.5	3.5
2	9.7	7.0	8.9
3	13.9	10.8	12.8
Center 4	32.3	31.1	32.0
5	15.3	13.6	14.8
6	6.9	8.3	7.3
Right 7	2.7	2.8	2.7
Do not know	13.8	21.3	16.2
No response	2.0	1.7	1.8

	<u>Brussels</u>	<u>Com.Fac.</u>	<u>Suburbs</u>
Left 1	3.9	1.1	2.8
2	10.7	8.3	5.5
3	13.1	8.4	12.8
Center 4	31.4	36.6	32.4
5	15.8	16.8	12.7
6	7.0	8.9	7.8
Right 7	3.2	3.6	1.6
Do not know	13.0	15.2	22.2
No response	1.8	1.1	2.1

In the center, everyone! This is undoubtedly how one could sum up the above scale, a relatively harmonious scale, even if it is slightly tipped to the left, pushed by the French-speakers and the inhabitants of the 19 communes. It is the younger people, upper-level personnel, teachers and workers who place themselves the furthest to the left, with the merchants and liberal professions ranging themselves -- traditionally -- to the right of the political scene. As for government employees, they are the least "centrist," the least indifferent to politics, inasmuch as they have more supporters of the left and right than of the middle. Those same officials, moreover, say, in answer to another unpublished question, that they are relatively strongly interested in politics. If 10 percent of all Brussels residents say they are very interested in politics, 33 percent devote "average interest," 30 percent "slight interest" and 26 percent not interested at all. But among the committed, one mainly finds, in addition to civil servants, the upper-level personnel, liberal professions and potential voters of the SP, PSC, the Volksunie and the Communist Party. The PRL, PS and FDF voters manifest the same average interest in politics, while the declared indifferents are mainly the elderly, workers and CVP voters.

The following terms have great importance in the lives of some individuals. What is your personal reaction to them: positive, negative, neither for nor against, or do the words evoke nothing for you?

	<u>Pos.</u> <u>Reac.</u>	<u>Neg.</u> <u>Reac.</u>	<u>Neither for</u> <u>Nor against</u>	<u>Evokes</u> <u>Nothing</u>	<u>No</u> <u>Response</u>
Capitalism	30.4	31.5	27.8	7.7	2.7
Socialism	35.5	28.8	26.3	6.9	2.5
Unitarianism	33.7	22.3	19.2	21.7	3.1
Liberalism	47.0	20.4	20.0	9.9	2.7
Trade unionism	28.9	35.2	24.8	8.1	3.0
Separatism	7.0	56.8	14.7	18.7	2.9
Federalism	27.6	33.1	21.9	14.4	3.1
Leftism	8.2	53.5	18.1	17.2	3.1
Provincialism	12.6	39.7	24.0	20.3	3.4
Racism	11.0	67.9	12.7	5.5	2.9
Ecology	59.6	9.3	18.0	10.3	2.7
Pluralism	43.5	11.6	17.5	24.2	3.2
Anti-Semitism	8.9	59.6	12.5	16.2	2.8

What strikes a chord with the people of Brussels? In descending order: ecology, liberalism, pluralism. What do they abhor? Racism, anti-Semitism, separatism. However, the labels suggested give rise to a refined interest rather than outright enthusiasm.

This is sometimes a matter of concern. Nearly 24 percent of those questioned actively approve of or do not disapprove of racism and 21 percent have the same attitude toward anti-Semitism. The word "racism" is judged positively by those under 25 (13 percent), Brussels residents of the 19 communes, blue-collar workers and merchants, while it is clearly rejected by employees of the private sector, the liberal professions and teachers. Anti-Semitism is accepted by civil servants and lower-level management, but fortunately, in all these cases, it is a matter of undeniable minorities.

One might single in on other singular or revealing choices of the people of Brussels. Politically speaking and in a straight line with what was revealed above, the notion of unitarianism attracts a majority of Francophones and is rejected by a majority of Dutch-speakers, while the word "federalism" has the opposite fate. The word "liberalism" receives majority support from the French-speakers (51 percent) and the people of Brussels (49 percent). The word "ecology" attracts elderly persons and those of average means rather than the young, an indication of its strong penetration of all strata of society and its unpoliticized nature.

What makes the people of Brussels vote? Above all, economic and social interests, "class" interests, followed by ethical and moral concerns.

When you vote for a party or candidate, what are the two factors that you deem to be most important from among the following:

	<u>Total</u>
Interest for your social milieu	38.0
Positions on linguistic and community matters	22.7
Positions on moral and ethical problems (abortion, education)	29.7
Positions on economic and social matters	56.8
Positions on international issues	14.5
I do not take these factors into account; I vote, out of tradition, for the same party always.	16.3

Linguistics is a lesser motive, although it appears to be a little more important in the communes with facilities, where 28.6 percent of those questioned name it, and negligible in the eyes of Dutch-speakers, 80 percent of whom do not name it.

If economic and social positions appear to be more important to those under the age of 45, to management personnel and the liberal professions, those who have done advanced studies, blue-collar workers and merchants vote to defend their own milieu.

The elderly, the merchants and the less educated generally vote out of tradition, while voting for moral and ethical reasons mainly mobilizes those under 45, teachers and university students, a new factor on the election scene.

#### A Brussels Party?

In your opinion, is there a party that defends Brussels residents more than the others?

	<u>Brussels</u>	<u>Com./Facil.</u>	<u>Suburbs</u>	<u>Total</u>
Yes	44.4	46.6	44.3	44.4
No	50.8	47.5	51.0	50.7
No response	4.9	5.9	4.7	4.9

Is it necessary to have a party exclusively for Brussels?

	<u>French</u>	<u>Dutch</u>	<u>Total</u>
Yes	35.9	15.2	29.7
No	60.7	82.5	67.3
No response	3.4	2.2	3.0

Is there a party that particularly defends Brussels? Yes, say 45 percent of the Brussels residents, a few more among the French-speakers, management personnel and intermediate-level civil servants. It is among the FDF voters that one finds a maximum of persons (70 percent) responding affirmatively to this question. Consequently, when one asks that 45 percent what party they are thinking of, they first of all name that same group, with 63 percent designating it, compared with 8.8 percent for the PRL and 8 percent for the Volksunie. This image, "FDF = Brussels," is naturally present among voters of the party, but also those of the PS (71 percent), the PRL and the CVP (61 percent), the PVV (60 percent). It will be noted that 18 percent of the PS voters, 30 percent of the PRL voters, 26 percent of the VU voters name their party of choice as the most typically of Brussels.

There is no paradox here. In fact, a majority of the Brussels residents (67.3 percent) believe that it is not necessary to have a party exclusively for Brussels. This conviction is clearly less established in Brussels and among French-speakers than among Dutch-speakers. But if one recalls that the Brussels residents vote primarily on economic, social and ethical issues, matters that are not necessarily "typically Brussels-related," one understands that the defense of the capital is not necessarily a must in the eyes of the voters.

Most Dynamic: the PRL and the FDF

What party in Brussels seems to you to be the most dynamic?

	<u>Brussels</u>	<u>Com.Facil.</u>	<u>Suburbs</u>	<u>French</u>	<u>Dutch</u>
PSC	7.3	5.9	4.9	7.8	3.7
CVP	2.5	7.0	8.7	1.2	12.9
PS	11.2	5.7	6.1	11.5	4.6
SP	2.9	3.5	5.1	1.3	9.1
PRL	22.9	13.9	12.4	24.3	6.7
PVV	1.9	2.2	3.9	0.3	7.6
FDF	14.7	22.7	15.9	16.4	13.1
VU	1.1	5.0	6.1	0.4	8.6
PC/KP	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.1
UDRT/RAD	2.1	2.5	2.0	2.7	0.7
Ecolo	9.7	4.8	4.2	9.9	3.2
Agalev	0.7	1.1	2.0	0.2	3.2
No response	22.2	25.3	28.2	23.0	26.7

The Brussels residents seem rather inclined to grant the labels of dynamism, courage and democracy to parties for which they do not vote, as indicated by a question for which the above table supplies a sampling and which dealt with the features of the various groups present in Brussels.

Which is the most dynamic party? The party most open to the young? The party closest to the population? These questions leave 1 out of 3 Brussels residents puzzled and reveal some surprises.

The most dynamic party is undeniably the PRL (for 19 percent, 23 percent of these in Brussels), followed by the FDF (15.4 percent, 16 percent of these French-speakers, 22 percent residents of the communes with facilities and 13 percent Flemish) and the PS (9.4 percent, 11.2 percent of them in Brussels).

The Flemish choose the CVP in second place (12 percent), followed by the SP (9.1 percent).

On the other hand, it is the PS (17.6 percent) which appears to be the party closer to the population, followed by the FDF and the PRL, with 13.8 percent of the Flemish naming the SP. The PS is also in the lead as the party rallying women, followed closely by the FDF (13.3 percent compared with 13 percent): the so-called "Antoinette effect."

As for Ecolo, it is by far the one that rallies the most young people (22 percent). Its rivals: the PS and the PRL, are close behind.

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

VAN MIERT ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC ISSUES IN ELECTION

Brussels LE SOIR in French 7 Mar 85 pp 1, 2

/Article by Karel Van Miert, President of Socialist Party/

/Text/ It is obvious to everyone that the upcoming elections will be of crucial importance for us all. Neither the prime minister nor his partners in the present coalition are allowing the slightest doubt to remain in this regard; their clearly announced intention is to pursue together the same policy that they have pursued until now. This means that the policy of socially-inverted redistribution will thus be followed for a new 4-year period. In concrete terms, we can therefore expect a further reduction in the purchasing power of the great majority of the population for the benefit of a group to which the present government has given special favors and attention, such as, for example, financial amnesty. With such a prospect, impoverishment could only increase and the unemployed, sick, pensioners, handicapped persons and families would be again painfully hit in coming years.

Moreover, it is clear that there is little to be expected of the present government team with regard to its taking a realistic initiative of its own to stimulate a real detente between the East and the West. The servile attitude adopted by the government in the missile question adequately demonstrates this inability to act independently. But there it is. In order to be able to continue in office, the present majority must meet the test of elections. And the question that remains to be answered is whether the present coalition will still have, after the coming elections, a majority that will allow it to pursue its policy. This majority is weak. It is now based only on half-a-dozen seats in the Chamber and an equal number in the Senate. The European elections of June 1984 showed that this majority could easily be overturned. And such is the stake in the coming elections. Because it is only by turning the present majority into a minority that a basic change of policy will become possible. Now, such is our goal. And this makes it necessary to call for the gathering together of all our forces.

Thus, I find myself obliged to draw from the present political situation a number of conclusions affecting me personally.

The principal conclusion is that, in these circumstances, I can no longer reject the moral imperative of proposing my candidacy in the upcoming national

elections. Thus, my goal is to win a seat in the national parliament, rather than to continue to sit in the European parliament. An ever-growing number of friends, both inside and outside the socialist movement, have succeeded in convincing me that many voters would not understand my refusal to engage personally in the electoral fight at such a crucial moment. It is obvious that, as a deputy in the national parliament, I will remain faithful to my European convictions and will continue the fight for a unified, democratic and peaceful Europe by other means and in other forums. I continue to believe also that the only way to face up to the Soviet Union is to gather together all the forces of the European democracies, it being understood, however, that they should conduct themselves in a truly autonomous manner and not, as now, allow themselves to be moved about as pieces on the East-West chessboard. Meanwhile, it is logical for our people to worry first of all about things in everyday life. The majority of the population rightly wants the fight against unemployment to be conducted with greater firmness and determination. The purchasing power of modest and middle incomes must be protected again. The fight against poverty must be carried out by acts rather than words. And in cases in which there is insufficient private investment, the public sector must intervene. A selective recovery, such as we have been advocating for some time, is indispensable.

Finally, our country must find the courage to act autonomously and oppose the mad escalation in the armaments race. In this connection, we must abandon the idea of installing 48 cruise missiles--and this, moreover, would be in conformity with the wishes of the people.

As the former American secretary of defense, McNamara, said again recently: "These arms (i.e., the 572 new American intermediate-range missiles destined for Europe) will increase neither the security of Western Europe nor that of NATO. I see no military need for their installation."

Thus, the Socialist Party will continue to fight, with all the means at its disposal, against this policy of overarming. Even if the present government decides to begin deployment of the missiles, we would go back on this decision if the people gave us the mandate to do so. It can do this by expressing itself clearly in the coming elections.

It is on the basis of these overall, socioeconomic and propeace positions that I propose to lead my party, whose president I have had the honor of being for nearly 8 years.

I will therefore head the Socialist Party ticket for the Chamber of Deputies in the Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde district. It is a place where the fight will be very hard, especially given the consolidation of forces on the Right that is now taking place.

Finally, I want henceforth to give my personal attention to the task of bringing to a successful conclusion the reform of the state in such a way that Brussels will find its place and both Flemish-speakers and French-speakers will feel at home. This would be in everyone's interest.

POLITICAL

BELGIUM

# PROSPECTS FOR NEW SOLIDARITY AND PARTICIPATION PARTY

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 20 Feb 85 pp 35-36

[Article by Jose Fontaine: "Voters Sought for a New Party"]

[Text] Several thousand militants from the MOC [Christian Workers' Movement (Walloon)] have decided to present at the coming elections a new party, to be called SEP [Solidarity and Participation]. Several factors may help to explain this remarkable turn of events in a Walloon context.

The MOC is not exactly a full-blown institution in and of itself, but rather an agency that groups together the divers branches of the Christian workers' movement in general: sick-funds, trade unions and cultural associations (such as the JOC [Young Christian Workers], for example, or Vie Feminine [Woman's Life], a very dynamic women's organization). But on a political level, not only are the "Christian Democrats" of the PSC [Christian Social Party] represented within the MOC family (by whom I mean only the members of parliament who stand behind the workers, thus not all the members of the PSC), but also certain figures from the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] and the Walloon Rally (RW) (already since the early seventies).

Each of the three tendencies within the MOC is for the moment on the decline: the RW seems to have fallen into a state of lethargy, or more accurately, into a moribund condition, since its reversal at the time of the European elections. The FDF in Brussels is clearly in difficulty: in 1974 the Christian Democratic MPs of the PSC still represented 55 percent of the congressional group, but now it is scarcely 28 percent.

For that matter, can one indeed still speak of an organized leftist tendency within the PSC, for the chairman has done away with the representation in so-called "families" (Christian Democrats versus CEPIC [Political Center of Christian Independents and Cadres])? It seems doubtful. To this must be added the fact that many Christians, by crossing over to the dissident RW offshoot party, the RPW [Walloon People's Rally], have openly joined the PS, such, among others, as the chairperson of the RPW himself, Yves de Wasseige.

The chairperson of the MOC, Mrs Wynants, has also condemned in very harsh terms the current policy of the government, which had never before been implemented. From all of this it follows that the CSC [Confederation of Chris-

tian Trade Unions], which, however, is nowhere declining in Wallonia, no longer enjoys reliable political extension, while the FGTB [General Confederation of Labor of Belgium], (its socialist counterpart) indeed maintains a definite relationship with the PS.

The PS, which has managed to come up with a few Christians, seems, however, not so much to have transmitted signals of an opening toward the non-socialists, as has the Flemish Socialist Party, with its Operation Breakthrough. For a few months one has been hearing the Walloon socialists say that they would really like to get a coalition going with the liberals, to constitute the Walloon administration, if that body is no longer to be constituted proportionately, as in the current phase of regionalization.

SEP people make these analyses on the basis of the present power relationships in Wallonia. They distrust the PS, not so much because of their Christian background as because they find the party too uncommunicative, too bureaucratic, with a militant nucleus of liberals, whereby it seems out of the question for the PS to become a really pluralistic party. The Christian progressive militants are just as fearful that the PS should intervene too much in union matters and in the cultural organizations, in which they play a very dynamic role (youth movements, women's movements....), much more dynamic perhaps than the socialists.

SEP conducted a sociological study some time ago to determine whether a moderate-left, pluralistic and federalist party would have a chance of gaining the ascendancy in Wallonia. From that unpublished study it appears, for example on the ethical level, that a very broad and tolerant plurality exists concerning such matters as divorce, abortion, contraception and the fact of unmarried couples living together. The same tolerance, the same progressive propensity, seems to be there with regard to emigration, division of labor, the elimination of inequalities and the existence of two systems of education.

True, in all these areas, especially the ethical problems and the matters concerning education, a hard clerical nucleus still exists (13 percent view abortion as a crime, eight percent are opposed to divorce or premarital relationships and four percent are even against contraception), and they presumably make up the hard core of the PSC electorate, as the counterpart of the hard secular nucleus within the PS. It is the tolerant and progressive electorate that the SEP wants to win over.

When one asks them whether they are not hunting in the same preserve as the ecologists, they answer that the kind of greening that incarnates the same values of openness and progressiveness is too insensitive to the concrete social reality. (One example: certain "green" proposals on the level of agriculture give the appearance of a great deal of fantasy and are more "prophetically" than politically directed). Through the activities of SEP militants within the Christian workers' movement, the former can link their sensitivity to "green" with a more concrete "social" commitment. And on the community level, the SEP will be more "Wallingant" [rabidly pro-Walloon] than the PSC or the Ecology Movement (which is not difficult), but less than the PS or whatever remains of the specific federalist tendencies (RW).

On paper, SEP indeed represents an overall picture of aspirations that thrive in society, a picture of anxieties that are already being promoted in Flanders by the Flemish Socialist Party and the Volksunie (ever since the--in my opinion--fortunate separation from the Flemish bloc ). But will SEP be able to obtain an electorate? Do they have sufficient financial means? Will the "Christian" militants and voters not give priority to an existing "Christian" structure instead of to a newcomer whose effectiveness remains uncertain? Even with a restricted electorate, SEP does represent a heavy threat to the PSC, but not to the PS, the party that is still the strongest in Wallonia (stronger than the CVP [Social Christian Party] in Flanders) and is therefore favored by our electoral system.

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1 May 1985

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

## STRAUSS REPLIES ON AEROSPACE, SECURITY, ARMS EXPORTS ISSUES

Bonn WERTECHNIK in German Mar 85 pp 14-18

[Interview with Franz Josef Strauss; date and place not indicated: "We Need to Strengthen the European Pillar of NATO"]

[Text] Dr Franz Josef Strauss, the minister president of Bavaria has been dealing with defense policy and the defense economy for more than 20 years. While defense minister, Strauss was materially responsible for the buildup of the Bundeswehr; while serving as finance minister, he was concerned with the fiscal issues relating to defense; as chairman of the board of the German Airbus Ltd and member of the board of Messerschmitt, Boelkow, Blohm (MBB), he is particularly involved in the fortunes of the German aerospace and arms industry. Speaking very openly as he usually does, Dr Strauss remarks on the role to be played by the aerospace and defense industries in this day and age in the following interview. As far as he is concerned, the industrial potential necessary for our defense must be maintained. Arms exports, for which he stipulates four criteria, could contribute toward that end. In this context, Strauss comes out in principle in favor of exporting the Leopard 2 to Saudi-Arabia. Replying to a question on the fears that the Americans might some day pull out of Europe after all, Strauss pleads for close integration of American and European security interests and calls for strengthening the European NATO pillar.

[Question] You are a member of the board of the German Lufthansa and for a number of years have served as chairman of the board of the German Airbus Ltd and are considered the best sales promoter of this joint European undertaking. Is your strong commitment to aerospace matters based on the fact that both MBB and German Airbus are located in Munich and that you personally are an enthusiastic flier ?

[Answer] My interest in aviation generally is based on my view that this technology functions as a pacemaker for research and development as well as the economy and industry. For decades, German aviation pioneers such as Junkers, Messerschmitt, Heinkel and Focke-Wulff left their imprint on aviation and turned it into an important factor without which the modern world economy would be unthinkable. Civil aviation is one of the most important lifelines of our world and military aviation is an indispensable component of any defense system. With the expansion of air transport into space one more logical step in the utilization of this technology was achieved. When air sovereignty was restored to the FRG in 1955, our job was to catch up once again with the technological standard of the Western world with the help of small-scale innovations and larger-scale production licensing projects. Because of the "technology gap," we had to provide help to our industry to get started. This was done. Thanks to a number of international cooperation projects, the German aerospace industry has caught up once again.

The Airbus project in particular, which was begun in the mid-sixties, required a good deal of political support because it led to a reordering of the aerospace industry. The goal of the policy which was adopted was to get away from national parochialism and work toward an efficient European communal effort and Airbus' success on the world market thus far fully justifies that original approach. I assumed the chairmanship of the board of the German Airbus Ltd in Munich and the European Airbus Industry in Toulouse because I felt it was necessary—above and beyond the political coordination aspect—to come up with a basic industrial plan to help European aerospace technology retain its rightful place on the world market past the year 2000. The European aerospace industry is showing the flag in the skies. Because of my experience on the board of the Airbus companies, I was elected to the board of both MBB and the German Lufthansa.

[Question] Until a few years ago, the U.S. aerospace industry in particular because of the large space programs performed a pacemaker role for industry as a whole. But has it not given up that role in the meantime to the electronics industry?

[Answer] The aerospace industry has continued to hold on to its pacemaker role. Over the years, the electronics industry has come to assume a similar function. Historically speaking, the space program with its need for highly reliable electronic systems has virtually triggered the development of electronics. As before, the aerospace industry keeps sending out impulses to the electronics industry. In addition, it also has an impact on the development of new materials and processes—such as the use of solar cells to generate energy.

[Question] During the past several years, the German aerospace industry has built up considerable development and production capabilities as a result of the large-scale Airbus and Tornado projects. Against the background of stagnating orders for civilian aircraft and continually rarer and smaller military aircraft projects, do you believe that this industrial capacity will be fully utilized over the long term?

[Answer] Let us look at civil aviation first. It is true that sales went down as a result of the worldwide recession. But if we take a look at the airlines' current balance sheets, we find that a real recovery has taken place, enabling them to buy the equipment they need over the next few years. This will help the European aviation industry among others to expand its production capabilities once again. In 1988, the smaller A-320 will be on the market in addition to the A-300 and the A-310 and our plans for the TA-11, the European long-range version, are beginning to take shape.

On the military side, the situation is different. We are facing major capacity problems in the aviation industry by the end of this decade because the Fighter 90 will not make an impact on production until 1993. But I am sure that government and industry will work out joint plans to help bridge over the gap and/or to prevent excessive fluctuations in the labor force by issuing contracts for improving combat effectiveness of existing air force units and thereby reducing the loss of know-how to tolerable levels.

[Question] Not only the aviation industry—the Fighter 90 project appears to be a good deal less ambitious than the Tornado project—but also the tank and naval industries seem headed for bad times. New frigates will not be coming in until the mid-nineties and the Marder successor generation of vehicles is not likely to make full use of the tank industry until the time the Leopard 3 goes into production in the late nineties. Isn't there a danger that the armament industry will have to build down at least in part for lack of orders and that it will, in consequence, drop to too small a level to satisfy later Bundeswehr procurement programs? Do you think there is any way to deal with this problem?

[Answer] Large-scale procurement programs are of a cyclical nature, that is true. In other words, production capabilities must be built up over a number of years and it is then difficult to obtain additional orders because the product cycles of modern large-scale projects normally run for more than 20 years. The intervals between the different major projects are getting longer all the time. That is the main problem. On the other hand, I do think it is possible for the purchaser and the contractor to plan ahead together and so to avoid major losses in terms of development teams and production capabilities. Such planning would also include the procurement of spare parts, industrial maintenance and, above all, improvement of combat efficiency. This would create the possibility of preserving the capabilities required for maintaining the FRG's defense readiness.

[Question] The Flick organization is about to sell the Krauss-Maffei tank plant in Munich, we assume, because it cannot use it to full capacity now that the Leopard 2 production series is completed. What is the extent to which the Bavarian government is involved in this matter and has it taken any steps in any specific direction? In view of the already cited sales picture, would it not make more sense to have two tank developers and producers in Germany instead of three?

[Answer] As a result of the negotiations thus far, a group of firms—also including the Bavarian Construction Finance Office—is to acquire the Krauss-Maffei shares from the Buderus Co; but the transaction must still be approved by the Federal Cartel Office and be sanctioned by the individual firms. The Bavarian government, of course, was very much interested in having this firm whose significance extends far beyond the armament industry as such continue to be managed in a way which guarantees Bavarian interests and above all those of the FRG as a nation and which not only preserves jobs but also helps create new ones. This approach is in keeping with long-range Bavarian economic policies on the strength of which Bavaria has become the home of efficient, future-oriented industries. It is our job to secure and expand upon these achievements. The change of ownership of Krauss-Maffei, which is about to take place, is one more milestone along this road.

As for the second part of your question, all I can say from where I am sitting is that the FRG has not done badly in the past with its three tank developers and producers—the more so since this meant that the entire industry was involved in the major projects.

[Question] Most of the problems we have been talking about could surely be resolved, if the government were to liberalize German arms exports to a greater extent than heretofore. This raises the following question: How do you feel about exporting military technology? Would you be in favor of a more liberal policy than we have at present?

[Answer] Our armament industry production capabilities were established with a view to meeting our own demand. No attempt was ever made—as is the case in other countries—to create and maintain export-oriented capabilities. But I do believe that existing laws do provide us with sufficient political flexibility to enable the FRG government—in view of the political situation in the world—to approve exports of German military products such as might serve German interests.

[Question] Which criteria would a country outside the NATO community have to satisfy in order to be able to receive German military materials?

[Answer] The political guidelines governing the export of weapons of war and other military equipment which were set down on 28 April 1982 by the then SPD/FDP government also dealt with the question of supplying arms to non-NATO countries. The guideline contains two basic principles:

"Approvals for export must be guided by the vital interests of the FRG-- where vital interests is interpreted by the FRG government to mean the foreign and security policy interests of the FRG, taking into account the interests of the alliance."

"There must be an adequate guarantee that the military weapons and other quasi-military equipment are only intended for the defense of the importing nation or the region concerned."

Arms exports, to my way of thinking, must be looked at from the following point of view: the maintenance of the research and development potential; ongoing modernization of weapons systems and lowering of prices of production series; job protection; political influence in oil and raw material-producing countries; possibility of building plants in these countries.

[Question] Does that mean you would supply Leopard 2's and similar modern weapons to Saudi-Arabia ?

[Answer] In principle, yes. The question of German arms supplies to Saudi-Arabia is indissolubly connected to our relationship with Israel. For my political friends and myself this means that we cannot agree to or consider any policy which would result in an abandonment of Israel. The special responsibility which the German people bears toward the state of Israel and its citizens does not mean on the other hand that we must always and in every regard agree with the official policies of Israel. The basic goal of our political actions is and will continue to be to preserve peace for Israel because that is the only way in which the past will at long last be done with in the relationship between our two peoples.

And it is also on this political and moral basis that the issue of supplying arms to Saudi-Arabia must be decided. Israel in particular which, according to Israeli press reports, attains 20 percent of its industrial exports in the arms trade should be able to appreciate the fact that the FRG government's saying no to arms exports would not be understood by the man in the street in view of the high rate of unemployment in the FRG and in view of the fact that the armament industries of other nations stand ready to provide weapons systems of almost equal value. I would also not conceal the fact that reports according to which Israel even supplies arms to countries hostile to her are making this difficult decision no easier for the government of the FRG. At any rate, we must keep in mind that Saudi Arabia is not only one of our most important sources of oil and one of the most notable trading partners for German industry as a whole but that it also is a decisive stabilizing factor in this crisis area of

international politics. In the interest of world peace it is therefore necessary to put Saudi Arabia in a position to exercise this ordering function. Beyond that, however, I believe that explosive issues of this kind should be resolved in confidential conversations among friends and not in the marketplace of public debate.

[Question] In your view, how far should the German side go in taking certain reservations—some of them voiced rather loudly—concerning greater German arms exports into account ?

[Answer] We have already touched on the basic precepts underlying German arms export policy as well as the basic approach to a particularly sensitive issue. Beyond that, I see no need publicly to speculate about possible reactions of German policymakers to public opinion pressure from abroad—much of it based on national egotism.

[Question] Is there any politically feasible way at all of liberalizing German arms exports ? Are there not serious reservations against it—at least within the ranks of the CDU and more specifically within the ranks of the FDP, the coalition partner ?

[Answer] The arms export issue will always be the subject of debate in every democratic country in the world and as a result there will be differences of opinion. In the final analysis, however, the executive and the legislative branch of our government must orient their decisions on the vital interests of the German people according to the constitution.

[Question] Some politicians are saying that NATO should announce uniform export guidelines under which Germany would then export [arms] as their "assigned" supplier, so to speak, to particular countries. For another thing, this would cut down on competition among various NATO countries prepared to supply arms. Do you think that such a regulation has a chance of being adopted ? Would you at the very least be in favor of an agreement to prevent or at least restrict the export of high technology military equipment ?

[Answer] It would certainly be a good thing, if we could get such a uniform policy adopted; but I do not see much hope of that because within NATO, too, there is a wide variety of interests among the different countries from the point of view of economics, history and geography. In this connection I would like to call attention to the Cocom round in which the Western industrial nations are represented and in which they are working out common guidelines regulating the export of sophisticated military equipment.

[Question] The "peace movement" has not only mounted sharp attacks against arms exports but also against all production of military equipment and has been pillorying the arms industry. Scientists and engineers at the

universities and increasingly even within industry itself no longer wish to work on defense contracts. What do you think can be done about that and what arguments might the defense industry—which admittedly has often been left in the lurch by the government—employ to counter the trend?

[Answer] As I already remarked, the German arms industry takes its cue from the defense needs of the FRG. In view of the unchanged threat to our country, we cannot do without the NATO alliance, the Bundeswehr or the arms industry which works for it.

Credible deterrent capability which effectively preserves the peace is indispensable for safeguarding peace and protecting freedom in view of the Soviet arms buildup. To do this, we must be prepared on moral grounds to defend ourselves and must have the equipment to mount this defense. It is the prime task of our industry to maintain this defense capability. It thereby creates one of the preconditions for our policy thanks to which we are able to live in peace and freedom and also secures the very freedom of speech and assembly which the so-called peace movement uses—and in some instances unfortunately abuses—in such ample measure. It is our job therefore to see to it that our soldiers and technicians and the scientists of the arms industry are not placed into the same corner as the enemies of peace.

[Question] European politicians and military men both feel that the nuclear threshold must be raised over the next several years. This is to be achieved increasingly with the aid of new military technologies. Do you see any chance at all for that in view of the fact that it would call for increased expenditures for development and procurement? Can this be financed and can it be implemented politically?

[Answer] Raising the nuclear threshold means strengthening conventional deterrent capability. In view of the fact that all the European members of the alliance are faced with the low birth rate generation of draftees this goal can only be attained with the help of the next generation of "intelligent weapons systems." To do this, we will have to pool the scientific-technological know-how and the superior efficiency of the free world economic order and use both to harmonize our technologically attainable goals with our economic capabilities. But we should not harbor any illusions about one thing: in view of the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet Union in the field of conventional forces—which the West can only reduce but not remove both for domestic policy-psychological reasons and for economic ones—we will continue to rely at least for the foreseeable future on the nuclear component of our defenses.

[Question] There are many times when I cannot get over the impression that Europe expects some American troops to be withdrawn in the long run.

Can this still be prevented or should Europe take account of this by increasing its own defense efforts, e.g. by revitalizing the WEU, the Western European Union ?

[Answer] That is not the question. Europe is being given one last historical opportunity to preserve its right to self-determination and, at the same time, to secure an appropriate voice in world affairs for itself provided it is prepared to shore up the firmness and strength of the transatlantic bridge by means of a strong European pylon. As yet, Europe has not found a response to this challenge—one which would correspond to its size and the size of its population, its economic strength, its technological-scientific potential and above all its cultural heritage. The Soviet threat to the contrary notwithstanding, Europe has not been able to unite in a common and resolute approach to the vital issue of foreign and security policy and to speak with one voice to the outside world on these issues—not because of a lack of insight into the necessity for it but because of internal weakness and partisan tactics.

That is why Europe, as before, is not as yet in a position to take its fate resolutely into its own hands and to take on that degree of political responsibility and self-reliance in world affairs which the Americans would be delighted to turn over to it sooner rather than later. The very call for a withdrawal of American troops from Europe—as issued last summer by Sen Nunn, a man who has been arguing in favor of strong conventional forces in Europe for years—is an expression of the disappointment over [America's] European allies. In the American view, they are not making the kind of contribution to the defense against the common threat which may be expected of them but are continually criticizing or even raising unfounded suspicions about American policies—all the while relying on American protection. The issue of the presence of American troops in Europe, however, must not be made to depend on the quality of European-American relations. Just like the European armed forces the American troops are stationed in Europe in order to guarantee a strong and credible conventional and nuclear deterrent capability which will help prevent war in the interest both of America and Europe.

The credibility of this deterrent capability stands and falls with this concatenation of American and European security interests. That is why the red thread running through the Soviet Union's Western policy is the attempt to push the Americans out of Western Europe which would then—as a result of outside pressure and internal subversion—be unable to escape its inexorable fate of slipping into the communist empire.

That is why we need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. To be sure, Europe will not become a comparable force of equal value and equal rank in the common defense alliance until it has united politically and has integrated its national armed forces in a common European force.

A common European army such as we already tried to establish under the European Defense Community less than 10 years after the end of World War II may seem like a utopian political idea in the face of present European realities. But we know from history that a utopian political concept has very often marked the beginning of decisive developments. As outlandish as it may appear today, one should not lose sight of this goal because the unification of Europe into one state must of necessity also lead to the creation of a joint defense force. In this context one should also consider the fact that the integration of national armies in one common European force would be more effective by far than the summation of all the individual armed forces.

[Question] The French government has repeatedly stated that the French nuclear capability must remain exclusively under French command. In spite of this, can you see any chances for closer cooperation on European defense including British and French nuclear weapons ?

[Answer] Very shortly after he took office, the new French prime minister, [Laurent] Fabius, reaffirmed earlier statements according to which the French nuclear weapons were exclusively designed for the defense of France and were therefore not available for the defense against an attack on the FRG. In view of this unequivocal statement and the fact that there is no sign whatever that France will return into the integrated NATO system in the foreseeable future, I think it would be a waste of time to speculate about whether France might be prepared to have any partner share in its control of its nuclear arsenal as part of a joint European defense effort.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

# CP CHAIRMAN AALTO AGAIN OFFERS TO COOPERATE WITH SOCIALISTS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 Feb 85 p 11

[Article: "FCP's Arvo Aalto Again Offers To Cooperate with SDP"]

[Text] In a speech in Kemi on Saturday Chairman Arvo Aalto of the Communist Party once again offered the hand of cooperation to the Social Democrats. In Aalto's opinion the bourgeoisie is now doing well in Finland and the left wing is doing poorly. The advance of the bourgeoisie can only be stopped by the combined forces of the workers' movement according to Aalto.

"This presupposes concentrated work on the part of the whole workers' movement. The image of the workers' movement, its philosophy, and its objectives have become obscured in the eyes of the majority of our people. The workers' movement must demonstrate its existence in a visible manner and it must also show that it has the power to carry out its will and what it now wants," stated Aalto.

In his opinion the whole left wing could demonstrate its will and power in shortening work time. This objective could unite the left wing in the same manner as at the time of birth of the workers' movement, thinks Aalto.

"Shortening work time is a suitable, timely, and sufficiently important issue which in order to be accomplished would require the combined forces of the workers' movement already in the next round of contract talks."

Aalto pointed out that the combined support of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] and the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] is now smaller than it has been in 50 years in the workers' movement. "The SDP leadership has long held to the idea that everything is going well for themselves and poorly only for the SKDL. The recent municipal elections have provided an impetus for changing this type of thinking," stated Aalto.

## Vennamo and The Veterans

Special attention should be given to improving the position of war veterans on a pension in the government's next round of budget negotiations, demanded Pekka Vennamo, SMP [Finnish Rural Party] chairman and second finance minister, in

Turku on Saturday. Vennamo considered that an improvement could be accomplished the easiest by increasing the allowance to veterans.

If the state economy and social views do not make it possible to increase the allowance for all veterans, in Vennamo's opinion a significant increase should at least be ensured for those receiving a small pension.

Another necessary pension policy reform for veterans would be to take the years of front line service into full consideration in all pension systems.

Presently years of front line service are considered as entitlement time in public pension systems. Those who have worked in the private sector or in their own firms are denied this benefit.

The livelihood of veterans on a pension is according to Vennamo tied to how the position of low-income pensioners is generally improved. All the smallest pensions should now be increased when the major national pension reform has been completed.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

POLYNESIAN STABILITY, POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE EXAMINED

Paris LIBERATION in French 18 Mar 85 pp 19-20

[Article by Jean Guisnel: "Polynesia, an Archipelago Under Atomic Influence"]

[Text] The situation in the second French territory in the Pacific is very different from that of New Caledonia. The financial repercussions of the nuclear test center at Mururoa are not unconnected to this. And even though it may mean closing their eyes to certain practices of the local political class, Paris is anxious to maintain the current peace in the 120 islands.

Papeete --- Will the Caledonian disease one day reach French Polynesia and Tahiti, 6,000 kilometers away? Nothing is less certain... True, the "domino theory" has its followers under the Tahitian skies and certain local supporters of independence are not far from thinking that in the coming months their archipelago of 120 islands might also experience similar "movements." And yet, all indications are that the Polynesian situation is quite different from the one in the other French territory in the Pacific: Gaston Flosse, the RPR [Rally for the Republic] president of the territorial administration of Polynesia rules his country with an iron hand and, on the other hand, the supporters of independence divided into a nebula of small parties are far from representing a force comparable to that of the FLNKS [Kanak Independence Movement]. Finally, France has interests here which are much more important than those it defends in New Caledonia, because it is here that, for the last quarter of a century and since its departure from the Algerian bases, it has conducted all of its nuclear experiments.

Even though France's activities in Mururoa are regularly denounced by the independent countries of the South Pacific led by Australia and New Zealand, France does not intend to let go of its nuclear atoll which is "absolutely essential to the maintenance of our technological level and, consequently, to the coherence of our defense system," according to what General Jeanou Lacaze, chief of staff of the armed forces, said last 14 January.

It was on 6 September 1984, following the election in May 1982 of a new territorial assembly, that Polynesia attained its new status: henceforth, Gaston Flosse, leader of the Tahoeraa, local variant of the RPR, will with full powers lead the government of Polynesia which has been endowed with very broad

powers by the French parliament. As a matter of fact, Paris has kept only its "inalienable" prerogatives to itself: the issuing of currency, defense, police, diplomacy, higher education and local administration...

Since early September the 10 Polynesian ministers have been in the big building housing the government. Each one of them immediately set up highly padded staffs by hiring, for a small fortune, certain upper level metropolitan civil servants posted in Tahiti and known to be sympathetic to the opposition. They have also enticed a fair number of councillors from the Paris city hall who have made it their duty to pursue their career in the tropics. Daniel Naftalski, assistant director of Jacques Chirac's staff, was the kingpin of this "Paris-Papeete axis" and performed his tasks to the greatest satisfaction of his Polynesian friends; a few months later he went to do the same thing for Dick Ukeiwe.

Even though Tahitian politicians keep repeating that "the metropolitan political systems should not be imported here," it must be noted that relations between Paris and its far away territory are far from ignoring the politicians' concerns. Making full use of the status of partner of the central government, but also of the real powers and the broad freedom given to them by their new autonomy, Gaston Flosse and his friends do not let a single occasion go by without pointing out that the loyalty and attachment of Polynesia to France are feelings which must be cultivated by both parties... True, the government of Papeete never talks of claiming its independence because, as Alexandre Leontieff, vice president and minister of economic affairs, specified: "we have all the advantages of it without its inconveniences." This does not prevent the development of polemics, of which the Pacific Experimentation Center [CEP] is both the symbol and the stake.

In spite of the economic manna they have brought to Polynesia, some voices arose from the very beginning against the French nuclear tests. Since the beginning of underground testing about a decade ago, which is much less harmful to the environment, the opposition has become somewhat smaller, but there are always outspoken opponents of these activities. Last year, without having joined those critics, Gaston Flosse had set the cat among the pigeons by demanding the organization by France of a "popular referendum" on nuclear testing thus picking up the idea launched several years ago by the independence party "Ia Mana Te Nunaa." "It is because the CEP has been poisoning life in Polynesia for several years that President Flosse has asked for that referendum," explained Alexandre Leontieff. "The abscess must be lanced. If the people were to take a stand against its presence, then we would start negotiations to ask for its departure. On the other hand, if the voters asked that it remain, then those who protest would have to give in both inside and outside the territory."

There never was any response from Paris to this proposal, not without stressing that the current legislation does not allow Gaston Flosse to organize such a referendum on his own, which Flosse is very well aware of... In fact, there is every indication that the autonomous government was trying then as it is today to give guarantees to the very powerful Polynesian evangelical church which is opposed in principle to the experiments, but is also very sensitive to the

"Anglo-Saxon" influences of the countries participating in the South Pacific forum. By proposing an initiative which was doomed to failure from the beginning, Gaston Flosse nevertheless disassociated himself from the French state and thus satisfied, at least in part, a non-negligeable section of his electorate as the evangelists represent 55 percent of the population. If you add to that the Jehova's Witnesses and other Mormons,\*the proportion goes up to 70 percent. What politician would ignore such a force?

However, this double trigger operation allowed Gaston Flosse to raise the bidding. By half threatening to allow the development of a campaign against the presence of the CEP, he placed himself in a position of strength to demand in coin of the realm, the price of his docility, from the French state. Two years ago, the current president of the autonomous government already estimated that the Ministry of Defense would have to pay Polynesia an annual sum of 440 million francs, this sum representing "economic compensation" for the presence of the armed forces in the Pacific... As negotiations on this issue were never pursued, the customs treaty signed between the territory and the French state expired on 1 January 1984, and all imports by the CEP are henceforth taxed without special considerations.

In order to make a point of its displeasure, the autonomous government of Papeete, sole master of its customs rates which represent a significant part of its revenue, early this year imposed an additional 40 percent tax on all scientific measuring instruments and optical fibers used by the CEP. It should be noted that in 1983, the armed forces and the Atomic Energy Commission spent 216 million francs in customs duties, of which 14.8 million were for a flat rate on scientific equipment, which contributed nearly 15 percent of the territory's budget.

The financial squabbles which brought the French government and the government of Polynesia into conflict, have now given way to quarrels about the future of New Caledonia, with Gaston Flosse siding with his friend Ukeiwe, but leaving untouched the independence supporters of the "Ia Mana Te Nunaa" Party which has sent three elected officials to the territorial assembly after having won 15 percent of the votes in the 1982 elections. Even though they exclude all non-democratic means to achieve their goals, the leaders of "Ia Mana" demand no less energetically the departure, plain and simple, of CEP which in their eyes is guilty of having "destroyed everything in the Polynesian economy by producing upheavals which benefited only a tiny part of the population." Jacqui Drollet, secretary general of the party, figures that the nuclear tests will end one day anyhow, "it is in the geological nature of things" and that the only realistic position for France, "whose historical vocation it is," would be to prepare "a smooth transition toward independence." Always the Caledonian syndrome!

The appearance of numerous shanty towns in Tahiti, the depopulation of the "peripheral" islands, the increase in unemployment, the abandonment of food-producing cultivation, etcetera... are so many proofs, according to Ia Mana, of the perverse effects of the presence of CEP "which has created completely artificial needs and lifestyles. It is true that if it were to leave tomorrow we would be in a bloody mess," admitted Jacqui Drollet, "but we have trump

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\* [as published]

cards. We can profit from tourism, provided we do not transform ourselves into another Hawaii... We wouldn't want the Polynesians to leave for the mountains or to stay in the cities only to sweep the streets." In addition, he stressed, the sea is not exploited, aquaculture is still embryonic and agriculture could, if it were developed, provide for all the food needs of the people. Alone among all the others, the independence supporters are also demanding an income tax in Polynesia, in the name of "social justice."

As the sole organized opposition to Gaston Flosse, the "Ia Mana" has strongly criticized the French government for never having "cleaned house" in a Polynesian political class which sometimes does exactly as it pleases with the rules. The various rains of subsidies which water Polynesia are distributed by the territorial government, that is to say by the "Tahoeraa" Party, which is said to have the unfortunate tendency to outrageously favor those municipalities which are favorable to the party and sometimes even certain castes of businessmen in allocating public markets. Names are circulated, enormous "affairs" are alluded to, and certain elected officials, who can hardly be suspected of sympathy for the theses of the supporters of independence, privately admit that it is "too bad" that the legal consequences of such actions, which would be obvious in the home country, are never even considered in Polynesia.

In the name of the "most elementary morality" Paul Ballal, treasurer of the Ia Mana Party, said rebelliously: "We were the only party in the territory to support Mr Mitterrand in the presidential elections, and there was no change afterwards... Georges Lemoine, minister for the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments and Territories], is the objective ally of Gaston Flosse: he has made nice speeches and practices the reverse policy! We agree with the minister when he says that permanent assistantship must end. Don't forget that it is you in the home country who pay the taxes and we Polynesians who consume them..." And he quoted the case of the small municipality of Taputapuatea, in the Leeward Islands, with 2,500 inhabitants, the only one governed by a member of Ia Mana, which has an annual budget at its disposal of more than 16 million francs. "Thanks to whom? To the French taxpayers..."

In the "official" circles in Paris the broad outline of the accusations made by "Ia Mana" are confirmed, and they even admit without too much hesitation that the tranquility of Polynesia requires that one be able sometimes to close one's eyes! Nuclear testing, the policy of deterrence and the French presence in the Pacific are at that cost, they admit with a touch of cynicism. The defeat of the "traditional" Polynesian left in the 1982 elections, the division among its aging leaders, but also the consummate political art of Gaston Flosse are so many data which are taken into account in Paris. Even though the local "boss" may sometimes cause the Polynesian fiber to vibrate against France, and even though certain questionable practices have been established even if they are difficult to prove and all the more so to prosecute, all of this does not authorize France in spite of everything, we were told, to revive colonial practices "which no longer fit our times." The same source stressed that "the French government will implement the internal autonomous status completely and faithfully."

France will undoubtedly remain as long as it needs to -- as long as it is able to? -- that is to say as long as its defense policy requires that it proceed with nuclear testing. Unless the internal Polynesian situation drastically changes in the near future, which does not seem very likely, Tahiti should not become another New Caledonia. Racial antagonisms are virtually nonexistent there, and the influence of those countries in the South Pacific which are opposed to nuclear experiments is only moderately felt so far. The unsinkable French airplane carrier in the South Pacific still has good days ahead...

#### Caledonian Repercussions

Has French Caledonia been affected by the Caledonian disease? While a few non-serious incidents have already occurred in Papeete in recent months, 1,500 people demonstrated without incident on Saturday in Faaa, close to the international airport of Tahiti, to protest against the nuclear testing and in favor of independence. The demonstration, prohibited by the high commissioner, Alain Orhel, had been organized by the mayor of Faaa, Oscar Temaru, leader of the small "Front for the Liberation of Polynesia." Two leaders of the FLNKS, Messrs Yewene Yewene and Yann Celene Uregei, participated in the rally and stated that the independence of New Caledonia would "lead to the independence of Polynesia."

#### Supporters of Independence Weak and Divided

The Tahitian independence party "Ia Mana Te Nunaa" (power to the people) is the only party actually represented in the territorial assembly ruled by the Tahoeraa, party of the president of the Gaston Flosse (RPR) administration. At every election since its creation in 1975, the Ia Mana, which has three elected officials, has won approximately 15 percent of the votes and it presents itself as in favor of self-administration.

It exists together in Polynesia with five other independence parties with much smaller support:

- the Front for the Liberation of Polynesia, led by the mayor of Faaa, Oscar Temaru;
- the TTTT [expansion unknown] (president Daniel Ching);
- the Te Faateraa Tiama O Polynesia Maohi (president Vairaatoa Taiarapa);
- the Te Aratai (president Jean Baptiste Ceran-Jerusalem);
- the Te Tiamaraa O Te Nunaa Maohi (president Mai Tetua).

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POLITICAL

GREECE

## WORKERS RETURNING FROM SWEDEN OFTEN DISILLUSIONED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Apr 85 p 8

[Article: "Many Disappointed in Their Old Homeland"]

[Text] Greek immigrants move back to their homeland in much greater numbers than any other minority in Sweden.

This tendency began to be noted in 1978, and since then significantly more Greeks have left Sweden than have come here. Since 1978, 6,500 Greeks have tried to create a new life for themselves in Greece. That means that about one-third of the Greek colony in Sweden have tried to move back.

But one has to say tried, because about one-third of those who move to Greece are back in Sweden after a few years. Some of them move back and forth several times, and have become a kind of pendulum.

Until 8 years ago emigration from Greece was still greater than the return migration, but in 1977 things changed. Each year now between 15,000 and 30,000 Greeks return, mostly from West Europe. Since the fall of the junta in 1974 about 400,000 Greek emigrants have moved back to Greece.

There are probably more reasons why the return migration has increased drastically among Greeks.

Most came to Sweden at the end of the 60's and the beginning of the 70's. If they are ever to return they should do it now, before they are too old, before the children begin school or before they are so grown that they themselves can choose to remain in Sweden.

Andreas Papandreou's PASOK Government has infused new hope in many Greeks. They believe they will be welcomed, guaranteed a job and economic support if they go home. Above all they believe that they are returning to a society which is more democratic than when they left, where the administration is free from the crippling bureaucracy, nepotism and sluggishness.

### Isolated Themselves

But one-third of those who tried to return were disappointed or failed in their efforts. That could be because they were not well received, or that they had unrealistic dreams about the homeland they left 10 or 15 years ago.

Margot Ahl in the Immigration Administration has, together with Tommy Holm, studied the questions connected with return migration.

She said that the Greeks who, during their years in Sweden, participated in Swedish society have better chances at succeeding with return migration.

But those who lived here in Sweden on the fringes of Swedish society, who isolated themselves, did not learn Swedish, did not try to influence their own lives, they also seem to land on the fringes of Greek society when they move back.

These Greeks regard their stay in Sweden as temporary, as incidental. They work hard, mostly at cleaning work. They save their money so that they can return to Greece as soon as possible.

### No Education

But in their struggle for a better future life they risk losing their children, the children that the effort was made for. We are on the way to having a second generation of young Greeks who are not educated for the future which their parents dreamed of, but who are becoming a new generation of cleaners.

When they return to Greece they have no useful qualifications in their baggage, no education, no extra language, no qualifying work experience. And their children may have lost their Greek.

They return with their worn backs and have a difficult time finding a livelihood. They have only the money that they have saved.

Now that the return migration to Greece has gained momentum the Greek state realizes that measures are required if the emigrants' experiences will be of use, and if they will be able to get along in Greece after many years abroad.

Unemployment in Greece is eight percent. The returned Greeks are often seen as competition for the existing jobs.

Therefore the Greek state tries to entice the returned migrants to areas where people are needed, and away from the large overpopulated cities Athens and Thessaloniki.

## State Support

Those who are willing to take up farming or will start industries in under-developed parts of the country (but not in the tourist business) can get extensive state support and very advantageous loans, a kind of regional development support.

But few Greeks are using it. They originally left Greece because working on the land made them poor, not rich. They have hardly returned to work in agriculture again.

During recent years the state has also established so-called reception classes for Greek children who return after perhaps an entire life abroad.

Here the children get intensive education, primarily in Greek, and are prepared to enter the general school system.

## Psychological Problems

Within Greece's equivalent to the Social Welfare Board they have noticed a special problem connected with return migration: many of the returned children have psychological problems, and they are trying to find ways to help the children and their parents.

It is the so-called second generation which is paying the highest price for the migration. This generation is growing, and today the number of immigrant children in West Europe is about 7 million.

9287

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POLITICAL

NORWAY

# STANISLAV LEVCHENKO TESTIFIES AGAINST TREHOLT IN TRIAL

Oslo VERDENS GANG in Norwegian 20 Mar 85 pp 9-11

[Article by Michael Grundt Spang: "Master Spy Testifies Against Treholt"]

[Text] Former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko, who just has testified in the Treholt trial, defected to the United States in 1979 while he was serving in Tokyo.

He was in Tokyo from 1975 to 1979, under cover as a journalist for the Soviet magazine called NEW TIME [NOVAYE VREMYA], which supposedly was read by the top politicians of the Soviet Union and therefore--again supposedly--had great influence on Soviet politics.

The American KGB expert, John Barron, describes Stanislav Levchenko and his defection in depth in his latest book, "The KGB Today--The Hidden Hand." According to Barron, NEW TIME really is a front for the KGB, and its journalists in foreign countries are permanent KGB agents who use the power of a journalist in order to make contacts with people.

## Spy School

Levchenko was commissioned by the KGB as a young man and attended spy school before he became connected with NEW TIME--first, in Moscow, and after 1975, as a correspondent in Tokyo. Levchenko became one of the KGB's best officers; he commissioned one "big fish" after another in Japan and received "a gold star," but also made many enemies among the top echelon of the KGB.

## Discomfort

Levchenko felt an increasing discomfort with his job.

In part, he had a fascination for Christianity but was required to attend his church in secret.

In part, he was surprised to discover that the capitalist world was not as Moscow described it. He saw that the capitalist system was superior to the communist. Shops were bulging with goods and the long lines which he knew from Moscow did not exist.

Levchenko's abhorrence was increasing. It was his own country's system which was corrupt and deceptive. When he read in PRAVDA about supposed famine in the United States, he knew that the grain harvest had been a failure--not in the United States, but rather, in the Soviet Union itself. Levchenko knew that he would defect and it was only a question of when.

#### Caring for Contacts

Meanwhile, he took care of his contacts--Japanese scientists and politicians who he had lured into a trap, frequently by offering them space as authors in NEW TIME for good pay. He enticed them with the notion that they were writing for a group of readers which included members of the Politburo itself.

Initially, they were only ordinary articles and analyses. But later, Levchenko pressured them to obtain sensitive material. And once his contacts became dependent on the income, they were given a final test by the KGB before they were commissioned as agents and permanently established in the network.

#### Polyansky

It was one of the ironies of fate that the Soviet Union's ambassador in Tokyo at the time was Dimitri Polyansky. The Soviet Union's ambassador in Oslo today is the same Dimitri Polyansky.

Levchenko met Polyansky frequently in Tokyo. He took great care not to meet him in Oslo! Polyansky and Levchenko were in Tokyo together when an international sensation occurred: a Soviet fighter pilot flew his MIG 25 into Tokyo, landed and requested political asylum in the United States. The Soviet MIG plane was examined by Western experts before it was returned.

#### Defected

Levchenko defected by going into a restaurant complex which was frequented by American officers. He requested to meet the highest-ranking American intelligence officer possible. When a tall, distinguished person approached him, Levchenko demanded to see his credentials in order to be certain with whom he was dealing. Then he said that he was a major in the KGB and wanted to defect.

The American also wanted to assure himself about with whom he was dealing and asked:

"Who is the present resident chief of the KGB in Tokyo?"

"Guryanov."

"Who is the chief of PR Line (political espionage)?"

"Yerokhin."

"And the former chief of PR Line?"

"Promnikov."

This convinced the American that he was dealing with a KGB man.

#### Declined to Talk

In the United States, Levchenko initially refused to disclose secrets to the CIA. He had wanted to leave his country, not betray it. American psychiatrists who examined him, among other things with lie detectors, characterized him as being truthful to a nearly unheard of degree, with very high morals.

When Levchenko learned that the Soviet Union not only would not allow his wife, Natalia, to travel to the United States with their children, but also, that his wife and children were suffering, he changed his mind. He decided to do everything which he could to fight the system at home. He told the CIA everything which he knew and became one of the best informants the West has seen.

#### Hunted

Levchenko knows that he is hunted by the KGB. He told John Barron:

"Someday they may find me. But as long as there is breath in me, I will fight. If we do not resist them, they will make humanity as worthless as a grain of sand."

#### Interview with Levchenko

"The best weapon against the KGB is knowledge about the KGB." This was the comment of the Soviet defector, former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko, in this exclusive interview which he gave VG [VERDENS GANG]. Presumably this was the primary objective of his testimony in the Treholt case--to provide the court with information on the KGB and its mode of operations. Presumably, it also was the reason that he agreed to an interview with a Norwegian newspaper.

VG met Levchenko in a hotel room in Oslo. It was a serious Levchenko who greeted us, but occasionally, he thawed a bit with a smile and an occasional good laugh.

VG: "We assume that your name no longer is Stanislav Levchenko--neither in the United States nor in Norway?"

Levchenko: "My name is Levchenko and I am proud of it. But I obviously live under an alias."

VG: "Can you say where you live?"

Levchenko: "I live in the United States. I will not define it more precisely. When I leave Oslo, I will return to the United States to give a number of lectures. I cannot go into this further, among other reasons, because I know that during the course of recent years, the KGB has made several attempts to capture me."

VG: "Have you been officially condemned to death? Are you a hunted man?"

Levchenko: "Yes, I have been officially condemned to death in a trial in Moscow. Fortunately, I was not present in the court (a little smile). And I am hunted. I know of several attempts by the KGB to find me. They have attempted to track me down through postal deliveries. Mail to me goes through five layers before it ends up in my hands. The KGB has attempted to trace through these layers. They also have retained an American attorney to track me down."

VG: "We thought that the so-called 'Wet Department'--Department V, which stood for extermination--had been abandoned in the Soviet Union?"

Levchenko: "Department V, as such, has been closed down. But its activities have been absorbed by the illegal service which is included under the First Central Division of the KGB. This is located in a building complex in the area of Tjoply Stan, 40 kilometers from the center of Moscow."

VG: "Is it correct that today the KGB at any rate is exterminating people less frequently than previously?"

Levchenko: "That is difficult to say. At any rate, in order for an extermination to occur today, the KGB must have permission from the Politburo. That was not required during the Stalin era."

Wife

VG: "You have taken a clear stand against the KGB. Do you think that your former wife, Natalia, is in danger because of this, or do you think it has had a reverse effect--that they are protecting her from attack?"

Levchenko: "Unfortunately, I do not believe that they are protecting her. I know very little about her situation today. Theoretically, we could have maintained contact, but that could not serve any practical purposes. Initially, after I went to the United States, I telephoned her. It was possible to dial direct then. I advised her to cooperate 100 percent with the KGB. The last thing one should do in the Soviet Union is to attempt to resist the KGB. Whether she followed my advice, I do not know. Today, it is no longer possible to telephone direct to the Soviet Union. One must go through the national telephone operator and give one's own number, and I cannot allow myself to do that. We have no contact now."

Polyansky

VG: "While you were in Tokyo, Polyansky was the Soviet ambassador there. Did you know that he is in Oslo now?"

Levchenko: "Yes, I knew that in advance. I could read about it in American newspapers partly in connection with the fact that mines had been laid following the submarine provocations, and partly in connection with the fact that Polyansky did something as rare as to offer a Soviet excuse for the missile which deviated over Norwegian territory."

VG: "Since you knew him from Tokyo, have you considered calling him to say hello?"

Levchenko: "No. Perhaps he misses me, but I do not miss him."

Defected

VG: "Why did you defect to the United States in Tokyo in 1979?"

Levchenko: "That is a long story. But I gradually had more and more negative feelings toward the system. I must be fair: I was not pressured into becoming an officer in the KGB. I did that of my own free will. I did it at a time when I originally thought that the Soviet Union had the potential for moving in the direction of becoming a social democratic welfare society--something like that which is found in Sweden. I made a mistake. It became clear that the system in the Soviet Union had a self-defensiveness of absurd dimensions. I began to despise the system. Later, I decided to fight the system. But I could not do that within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. If one fights the system from within the boundaries of the Soviet Union, one ends up in prison or in a psychiatric asylum. Accordingly, I defected."

VG: "How have you been received in the United States and the West?"

Levchenko: "With an open heart. I have never regretted. I only have regretted that I did not do it sooner."

VG: "Svetlana Stalin obviously regretted and returned to the Soviet Union?"

Levchenko: "She did that. But her circumstances cannot be compared with anyone else's. As Stalin's daughter, she will hardly go hungry. It is substantially different with respect to Bitov, who also defected initially to the West, and thereafter returned. He literally has disappeared."

Naive West?

VG: "How would you characterize the attitude of the West toward Soviet politics. Are we naive?"

Levchenko: "I will not generalize in that fashion. We are talking about one-third of humanity. Many of them are temperate and understand. Of course others are naive and we have seen an example of this naivete in recent days: the American press compared the Soviet Union's new leader, Gorbachov, with Jack Kennedy, and his wife with Jacqueline Kennedy. This is to misinform the readers."

VG: "Gorbachov is no Kennedy?"

Levchenko: "He is a good guy in private. And his wife conducts herself well and dresses fashionably. During his spare time, Gorbachov can be a delightful man. It is only when he arrives at the office that he must do what the Politburo says. Since Stalin's time, the Soviet Union has not been a personal dictatorship, but rather, a collective dictatorship. Something else which the commentators forget is that Gorbachov is a product of Andropov. It was Andropov who brought him in as a full member of the Politburo."

"The rumors about Gorbachov are misleading."

"Another example of the misinformation is the 'sensation' which was leaked to the Western press more than 10 years ago: it was whispered among Western journalists that there were both hawks and doves within the Politburo and that the West would be very clever to be cooperative with the Soviet Union so that the doves would prevail. Misinformation typically must be simple and easy to follow. This misinformation was so simple and easy to follow that this more-than-10-year-old 'discovery' still is adhered to today."

#### Espionage

VG: "Mr Levchenko, can you say which area of espionage is the most important--military, political or technical espionage?"

Levchenko: "All three. Perhaps political espionage is the most important in our times. (It seems as if he suddenly is in doubt.) But perhaps military espionage is the most important. Industrial and technologic espionage also is extremely important for the Soviet Union which is attempting to minimize its technological inferiority compared with the United States while simultaneously saving billions of rubles on its own research."

VG: "Is it really true that the KGB maintains experts in all three areas in every single embassy in the West, including Oslo?"

Levchenko: "Yes, experts in all three areas, plus one: disinformation."

#### Agent Recruiting

VG: "Is the rumor true that a KGB agent in a foreign country is obligated to recruit at least one agent (spy) during the course of his tenure, at least if he is to have a chance for advancement?"

Levchenko: "It depends. The KGB is a very serious organization. It recognizes that in certain countries, recruiting can be very difficult. In other countries, it is easier and one had better recruit several; just a moment: in the middle of the 1970's, the chief of the First Central Division sent a top-secret memo to all KGB residents everywhere in the world. It stated that emphasis should be placed on quality agents in preference to quantity. Efforts were to be made toward people who had, or in great likelihood could obtain, access to secret information."

VG: "Is the recruiting of an agent a long process?"

Levchenko: "Yes. The KGB is an extremely patient organization. It can wait months and years for a recruiting process to be carried out."

VG: "How many did you yourself recruit during your days in Tokyo?"

Levchenko: "Three fully commissioned, and one partially."

Cannot be Stopped

VG: "Can the KGB be stopped in its efforts in the West?"

Levchenko: "No, the KGB cannot be completely stopped or restrained, but its work can be made more difficult. And that can occur through people in the West being given information about the KGB and its methods of operation. Objective knowledge, the ability to judge--this is what the media in the West must provide to the public concerning the KGB. They cannot have the opinion that KGB agents are indistinguished and clumps of people with funny hats as they are portrayed in movies and books. This is the third or fourth generation of KGB agents--extremely well trained, sophisticated people, well-versed in the culture of the country in which they are stationed. The KGB is far more dangerous in reality than on film!"

VG: "What do you mean that a KGB officer must know the country's culture?"

Levchenko: "One unfortunate comment can ruin a recruiting operation in an instant. Take the Japanese specialty, raw fish. If a KGB officer in Japan loathes this fish and makes a derogatory comment about it during a lunch with the person on whom he is working, everything can be ruined. Thus, it is correct to say that some KGB agents have great abilities at recruiting, while others are more perfect in directing an already-commissioned agent."

Under Pressure

VG: "Does an agent perform more poorly if he is under pressure from the KGB than if he is working willingly?"

Levchenko: "You can be absolutely certain that all agents work under great pressure. And why? Because the officer who directs him works under pressure and because the chief of the directing officer lives under pressure, because there is pressure at all levels all the way back to Moscow. The spy business is tough. There are many exposed nerves there."

#### KGB's Goal

VG: "What is the KGB's specific objective with its misinformation and influence in the West today?"

Levchenko: "To reduce the military programs of the United States and NATO. You recall all of the dramatic fighting which the Soviet Union put up during the middle of the 1970's against the plans for development of a neutron bomb. The KGB worked to the maximum and orders went out to the entire KGB network in the West to fight this. They succeeded in getting the American president to shelve the plans. The KGB viewed this as its greatest victory since the Second World War.

"Today, the Soviet Union has been forced back to the negotiating table by reason of the American and European weapons programs. Its objective is to get these reduced. Simultaneously, there is no one--and I repeat, no one--who has any idea what the Soviet Union is doing with its own weapons program."

This is how Stanislav Levchenko ended his conversation with VG, a few hours before he was quietly shipped out of Norway.

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POLITICAL

NORWAY

#### POLICE ESTABLISH TIGHT SECURITY AROUND TREHOLT TRIAL SCENE

Oslo VERDENS GANG in Norwegian 20 Mar 85 p 8

[Article by Olav Steimler: "Iron Ring Tightened"]

[Text] The candy notwithstanding, Arne Treholt is in safe hands. The iron ring around the Oslo courthouse is still tight. No one can say that the standby troops and national police have become more relaxed than they were at the beginning of the Treholt case.

"Kong Haakon" [a brand name candy] was a pure slip-up according to the admission of the national police who have not yet finished any poison analysis of the pieces of chocolate. The police do not think it likely that it was the candy which gave Arne Treholt stomach difficulties, but they are checking for safety's sake.

Widespread speculation was caused on Monday when the routine around the Oslo courthouse suddenly was strengthened and the barricades moved.

The clarification given the police themselves was not completely true. "Part of the security is to change the routines along the way," stated police division chief Lars Bjorn Midgaard, when the police moved forward to the outer doors on Monday morning.

#### KGB Defector

The truth is that the police were protecting the life of a witness, KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko. He defected from the KGB in 1979. This was the cause for the guards.

Yesterday, conditions around and in the courthouse were "normalized." The sensitive witness had left the country.

#### Fixed Patterns

The commuting route from Drammen district prison to the Oslo courthouse is driven according to fixed patterns with three or four variations. Two shifts divide the driving, and the route is chosen after the rush hour and with consideration that no one should be able to predict where the procession will travel on any particular day.

Norway's best- and most-guarded man is still Arne Treholt. Letters and visitors are strictly controlled. From now on, "Kong Haakon" also will be available only through the prison's strict guards.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

## EANES' DECISION REGARDING DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT

### Advisers Queried

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Pedro d'Anunciacao: "Bad Times for Eanes"]

[Excerpt] Eanist Advisers Against Dissolution

One of the questions the president of the republic has put to his (state and personal) advisers in the round of consultations in which he is engaging is, precisely, what they think of dissolution. Not that he is planning it soon.

Various international commitments assumed (among them Reagan's visit to Portugal, his trip to China and the NATO meeting in Lisbon in the beginning of June) would advise against dissolution in the very short term. Moreover, if elections will have to be held within 3 months following the dissolution, in order that they not take place in mid-summer, that dissolution should only be decreed in the beginning of June. There remains a big problem: how to manage to present a well-founded pretext so as not to affect the Eanist party electorally (which, according to a recent poll by Marktest, would now obtain 28 percent of the votes against 15 percent for the Socialist Party (PS), 15 percent for the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), 17 percent for the Social Democratic Center Party (CDS) and 20 percent for the Social Democratic Party (PSD).

Furthermore, the lack of a serious pretext is reportedly the strongest argument used by some presidential advisers (among them Nobre da Costa, Melo Antunes and Henrique de Barros) to oppose early legislative elections and to advocate that the Eanists prepare for the presidential elections with a strong candidate.

As the days go by, the problem becomes more difficult for Eanes. And we are told confidentially that the disposition displayed by the president in Belem Palace is a good sign of that. The truth is that if early legislative elections now appear to be the most comfortable solution for Eanes--beyond blocking Pintasilgo's candidacy, they would not leave the country entirely in the hands of Mario Soares after June--that option may have a costly electoral onus, the accusation of seeking to favor his own party, an onus that would be aggravated by a contrary position by the Council of State. In the meantime, Eanes has reportedly not hidden his keen interest in hearing the opinion of Mota Pinto on the political situation.

Presidential 'Suspense'

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 p 15-R

[Excerpt] The Suspense Coming From Belem

Do conditions exist or not exist for Eanes to dissolve the Assembly of the Republic? Does the president want or not want to advance legislative elections?

For the time being, the response from the Belem presidential palace comes only in the form of "suspense," while the president's men are reduced to making contradictory statements and presenting scenarios designed to try to preserve some maneuvering room for Ramalho Eanes.

The "suspense" may have increased because of the manner in which Eanes saw fit to listen individually to the members of the Council of State, his only explanation being that "he has little contact with them." Even though the opinion of this organ is of a nonbinding nature, the president has to consult it if he should decide to dissolve the Assembly of the Republic.

Added to that is the fact that Eanes has not revealed his real feelings about the recently created Democratic Renewal Party (PRD). And his silence, consequently, permits speculation.

Then there are the public statements by some of his best-known supporters. Jose Rabaca has been saying in public that if that is not the proper party for the president, another will be formed for him. And regarding another of General Eanes' big problems, this same Rabaca has arrived at the conclusion that Lourdes Pintasilgo could be president only of a very rich country...

With regard to concrete reasons for dissolution, one fact seems to be completely foregone: only the Social Democratic Party (PSD) can furnish them to the president. Because the present condition of the country, from a social and economic point of view, does not permit basing any presidential intervention on the pretext of a "breakdown situation."

There remain the scenarios drawn up by some of the president's closest advisers.

Of these, it might be worth recalling one of the most recent ones, according to which practically all of the political forces are yearning for early legislative elections.

According to the version of some of the president's men, that is so in the case of the PS because nothing would be better for Mario Soares than an "electoral festival all year long." The president's analysts say that from being a victim, he would quickly become a winner...

Does all of this mean that Ramalho Eanes does not have any intentions of dissolving the assembly? That this is not the PRD that interests him? That, after all, he may have a powerful presidential candidate up his sleeve?

There is no answer to these questions. One can only surmise that the candidacy of Lourdes Pintasilgo (made "irreversible" by the subject herself immediately following the formation of the PRD in Troia...) is capable of changing all of the political logic of President General Eanes' men. Because in the view of her supporters, the engineer "is always capitalizing..."

She "scares" orthodox Eanists and the Portuguese moderate right. "Any election timetable suits her" and--her most diehard supporters dream--"the only worthwhile presidential campaign will be the one in which Soares and Pintasilgo oppose one another."

#### Four Scenarios

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 p 16-R

[Article by T.S.: "The Four Scenarios"]

[Text] 1. The normal operation of the institutions and the corresponding election timetable presuppose that presidential elections will be held at the end of this year, immediately followed by local elections.

Legislative elections would always come afterwards.

Or in 1987 if, for the first time in Portugal after 25 April, a normal 4-year legislature will have been completed.

Or 6 months after the election of the new president of the republic, the minimum period after which he can dissolve parliament.

The first possibility can only occur in the case of a victory by Mario Soares in the presidential elections. In that circumstance, it would be relatively simple for the new president to try to keep the PSD tied to a coalition which would at least assure that party of remaining in power. On the other hand, the Socialist Party, for the first time without its leader, would need some time to find a solution for the succession and a face for a new election campaign--the first election campaign in which Soares' picture could no longer appear on PS posters.

Another victorious candidate in the presidential election will naturally be the bearer of a different political commitment which will lead him to dissolve the assembly immediately after the 6-month period during which he is constitutionally prohibited from doing so.

If the normal election timetable is maintained, the presidential elections will have to take place between "the 60th and 30th day prior to the completion of his predecessor's term or following the vacancy of the position," as stipulated by the constitution.

The interpretation of the spirit of the constitution may generate doubts regarding the fact that the two (possible) rounds of the presidential election must mandatorily be held during this period. In any case, Eanes will have to

convene them for a period substantially between 14 November and 14 December 1985. That being the case, according to the text of the constitution, in the beginning of October Eanes will have to schedule the holding of elections.

2. Another foreseeable scenario is that of advancing legislative elections.

Ramalho Eanes loses the power to dissolve the assembly in the last 6 months of his presidential term, thus, he can only decree that dissolution by the deadline of next 14 July. Granting that the president is unlikely to find reasons to dissolve parliament by the time of the PSD congress, scheduled for May, the final possibility for that decision is conceded to be the last [sic] month of his term. It should be noted that the process of consultations with the parties and the Council of State for the purpose of dissolution and the simultaneous scheduling of new elections will require some time.

Constitutionally, legislative elections must be held between the 80th and 90th days following the dissolution of the assembly. In this scenario, the elections would be held between 14 September and 14 October 1985.

This simple fact would force a slight postponement of presidential elections. According to Article 128 of the constitution, presidential elections cannot be held in the 3 months prior to or following legislative elections. Thus, the first round of the presidential elections would be held between 14 December 1985 and 14 January 1986.

3. A third possibility: advancing the presidential elections, which could occur in case of the resignation of the present president of the republic. But the political advantages that such a situation would bring to the various opposing forces do not appear to be very obvious. The PSD still has not selected a candidate; the same is true of the CDS and the Eanist PRD. And the time between the presentation and the launching of presidential candidates is beginning to grow short, even if the elections are held according to the originally scheduled "timing."

4. One last scenario has been aired recently and there are those who even regard it as highly probable: The dissolution of the assembly immediately before the presidential resignation, giving rise to simultaneous presidential and legislative elections.

But the interpretation of some constitutionalists who were involved in the revision of the constitution indicates that this scenario is incompatible with the letter and spirit of the law. Section 2 of Article 128 of the constitutional text is said to be clear in this regard: "The election (of the president of the republic) cannot take place in the 90 days prior to or following the date of elections to the Assembly of the Republic, the term of the outgoing president being automatically extended for the necessary period."

Apparently a presidential resignation immediately following the convening of legislative elections may have been contemplated, from the fact that the president of the Assembly of the Republic is the replacement for the president of the republic in case of the latter's incapacity. In any case, it would

generate a situation of too complex a power vacuum with unforeseeable developments for this possibility to be viewed positively by any of the political protagonists.

#### PSD's Reported Position

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 8-14 Mar 85 p 11

[Article by Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos: "Early Legislative Elections?"]

[Text] 1. Will there or will there not be early legislative elections? This is one of the questions to which I do not believe anyone is in a position to give a sure answer. In the meantime, the question gained particular focus during the tour of the various regions of the country by the current leaders of the PSD, during which they called the attention of their members to that possibility which, according to sources connected with the party, responds to the wishes of a significant part of those leaders.

First of all, it would be well to emphasize the fact that the question of possible early legislative elections presents itself only because of the internal weakness and the governmental results of the coalition in power; an internal weakness and the governmental results of the coalition in power; an internal weakness that is especially the result of a continual series of disputes, quarrels or incidents--the latest one even about the appointment of the governor of the Bank of Portugal!--in a good number of cases, stemming from the very "nature" of the internal situation of the PSD.

And it is well to stress that if the legislative elections are not held before the presidential elections, it is taken for granted that they will be held immediately afterwards unless, at the most, the presidential elections are won by Mario Soares, which at the moment does not seem to me to be very probable.

On the other hand, it does not seem to me that, with reference to presidential elections, one can speak of a "majority" in political terms that necessarily leads to the holding of new legislative elections after those elections. That is not what happened even in 1980; and everyone will recall the arguments of the Democratic Alliance (AD) to the effect that it was indeed justified that that should occur then.

2. But why is it that early legislative elections may be of interest to the PSD or that many of its leaders think they may be? I believe these are the basic reasons:

a) As is known, Prime Minister Maria Soares and the PS have "conceded" almost everything the PSD wants (the Rosado Correia "case" is only one of the most recent and striking examples) precisely to avoid any conflict that can lead to a break and separation. But the moment that the president of the republic cannot dissolve parliament (that is, if the normal timetables are adhered to: after 14 July, 6 months before the end of his term), the positions of Soares and the PS will naturally be strengthened and, after that, everything can be completely different.

b) All the polls indicate that if legislative elections were held now, the positions of the PS and the PSD would be reversed: that is, the PSD would become bigger, receive more votes, than the PS. From the perspective of the presidential elections, that factor can be very important and greatly favor the PSD candidate relative to the PS candidate, the more so since, as is anticipated, the latter will be the present prime minister.

c) On the one hand, not believing some polls that give the new PRD party a (remote) first place in the legislative elections; and on the other, basing themselves, for example, on the poll ordered by the government itself (the figures and conclusions of which O JORNAL reported prominently in the 30 November 1984 edition), the PSD leaders may reach the conclusion that their party would get the most votes if the elections were held today.

And based on the government poll, they may also reach the conclusion that the two coalition parties--the PS and the PSD--will continue to have the absolute majority. Or, according to other public opinion polls, that that majority may be formed with those two parties plus the CDS. In either case, believing also that that first coalition would continue to be possible, or even the second, the PSD would become not the number 2 partner of the government but the number 1 in both cases, and still the pivotal party in the latter case.

d) Early elections would also have the advantage of not giving the PRD so much time to organize in terms of possibly being able to draw more voters away from the PSD than it is presently drawing and which--trusting the polls--is incomparably less than it is drawing from the PS and even less than from the United People's Alliance (APU) (according to the aforementioned poll ordered by the government).

e) Finally, there are those who believe that, in any case, after the PS and the PSD have formally selected their presidential candidates and have seriously begun the presidential election "race," it will be extremely difficult or almost impossible to maintain the coalition.

3. But this possibility can also have many disadvantages for the PSD, which many consider more than the possible advantages. One of the clear disadvantages is that of once again giving the idea that it is the PSD that is the main focus of political instability.

For that reason, even beyond everything the PSD has already done and which can possibly lead to the dissolution of parliament, if it does still more with that object in view, it is entirely advisable for it to attribute responsibility to a third party, obviously the president of the republic, General Ramalho Eanes, who is the one who has the constitutional power to do it; in any case, a president who, on reaching the end of the period when he practically loses the principal power that he still holds--that of dissolving parliament--will be placed in a situation that must be considered complex, to say the least.

It is beside the point now to develop other possible "scenarios" of the forthcoming election timetable. It would be well to recall only, in conclusion, as regards legislative elections, that the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and

1 May 1985

the CDS advocate that they be advanced--the former in a more forcetul manner than the latter, and the fact that the Centrists have even presented a motion of censure of the government also does not leave any room for doubt. As for the PRD, so far it has not taken any position in that regard.

#### Eanes' Reported Motives

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 10 Mar 85 p 8

[Editorial article: "The End of the Term"]

[Text] In recent days, there has been somewhat persistent talk about the possibility of Ramalho Eanes dissolving the Assembly of the Republic before the 14 July deadline. From then until the end of his term, he is constitutionally denied the possibility of taking that action. Mentioned among other signs that lend a certain substance to that possibility are the consultations that the president of the republic is holding with state advisers in that regard. Consulted individually about the current political situation, the question has been posed to some, with opinion being divided: some oppose the action; others view it favorably. Nothing essentially new or democratically illegal.

Furthermore, in a radio interview granted not too long ago, Ramalho Eanes categorically declared that he did not exclude the use of any of the powers granted him in the constitution: "from that perspective, resignation, dismissal of the government, the dissolution of parliament have a certain constantly available value for the president of the republic." He pledged, however, that he would never use any of those instruments "in a manner that was gratuitous and not sufficiently ethical and politically necessary." But, provided that they respect the constitution, the criterion and the judgment, the time and the manner of an intervention of that nature will always be his. Eanes was also decisive in this regard when he said that it was his duty to insure social pacification, including, for example, "through new political opportunities whenever governmental effectiveness is not satisfactory."

Apparently straightforward and transparent, Eanes' performance certainly involves some question marks. For that reason, the steps he takes in the coming weeks will not fail to be followed with attentive and even suspicious expectation, especially by Mario Soares and the government. In fact, notwithstanding the instability that has been occurring within the PSD, despite the economic crisis and the results of the austerity policy, even taking into account a bitter institutional relationship, the country's political, economic and social picture today does not present a sufficiently serious situation to justify such an extreme measure as the dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic. Therefore, unless new and strong disturbances shake or destroy the coalition, it does not appear that Eanes has the "sufficiently ethical and politically necessary" conditions to do so.

The months that remain to Ramalho Eanes will certainly be decisive for the history of this his second term as president of the republic. He does not hide his strong criticism of the performance of the political forces in power, a thinly veiled animosity toward the government, and his intention, when he leaves

Belem Palace, to continue to intervene in the country's life, probably as a leader of the PRD. Thus, his actions cannot be dissociated from a certain strategy that may cause him to descend from the political and moral plane above the parties in which he has sought to remain. His ties with the PRD, the soundings he is conducting to select a presidential candidate, his attitudes toward laws or issues as important as the budget, the EEC and agrarian reform are not based, as some allege, on a deliberate plan to create additional difficulties for the government, justifying its dismissal or the dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic. But neither are they innocent; or if they are, they do not appear to be.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

#### EANES-PINTASILGO RELATIONSHIP DISCUSSED

##### Break Rumored

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 pp 1, 20

[Excerpts] The president of the republic is holding a meeting today with his adviser, Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, to impress upon her the need to choose between her continuation of close ties with the presidential palace and the pursuance of her campaign as a candidate for the presidency. According to a source close to Eanes, this conversation is a follow-up to three others which the president held with the former prime minister in which he attempted to dissuade her from being a candidate with the argument that only with great difficulty would she be successful. The same source also said that the president was allegedly very apprehensive upon learning that Pintasilgo had made it known that her decision to be a candidate was irreversible, despite the risk of creating divisions within the Eanist faction.

Considering the intensity with which Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo is carrying on her campaign and the many meetings which she is having with various social sectors, it is expected that this meeting with the president will end with a break between the two politicians.

It will be remembered that the invitation to take on the function of adviser to the Presidency of the Republic came after Lourdes Pintasilgo had been relieved of her duties as Portugal's ambassador to UNESCO by Prime Minister Sa Carneiro who had succeeded her as prime minister in January 1980.

In that year, noted for the long electoral campaign, the former minister of social affairs was finally mentioned by Lopes Cardoso as a possible candidate for the Presidency of the Republic. However, she ended up being a member of the Policy Committee for the Re-election of Ramalho Eanes—who, in 1979, chose her to head up the third and last executive branch of presidential initiative.

With Melo Antunes, Vitor Alves and Sousa e Castro among others, Lourdes Pintasilgo—who had always showed her reluctance for the military--played an important role in the wings of the presidential palace to the extent that, when her name began to appear in first place in the presidential polls, almost no one among the leadership of the "Eanist" movement could question the support for her candidacy.

Denial

Lisbon 0 DIA in Portuguese 11 Mar 85 p 13

[Excerpt] Contrary to what was published in certain newspapers, Lourdes Pintasilgo will continue as adviser to the president of the republic, the official position which she has been holding at the presidential palace, and this leads us to think that Pintasilgo will have ceased being a candidate for the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] ("Eanist" Party), or, at least, supported by that party.

In fact, Lourdes Pintasilgo will continue as adviser to the Presidency of the Republic in matters pertaining to East Timor. Questioned about an alleged proposal made by the president of the republic asking Pintasilgo to choose between the electoral campaign and the advisory position, a Belem source said that Ramalho Eanes met with Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo Friday "with whom he discussed affairs of state," particularly with regard to the situation in East Timor.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PSD SAID HAUNTED BY EANES, SOARES, SA CARNEIRO

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva]

[Text] The PSD [Social Democratic Party] has three specters--namely, Eanes, Sa Carneiro and Mario Soares. All three have been, each in his own way, very prejudicial to the party.

Let us begin with Eanes.

The conflict waged against him by the social democrats had, as it is easy to prove, a result which was opposite to that which the PSD wanted; it strengthened the president's image.

The reason for this is simple: in making General Eanes its principal enemy, the PSD led the country to believe that the president of the republic had the power and capability of intervention which, in fact, he did not have.

In this manner, the presidential image, rather than being diminished, ended up being strengthened.

The PSD made the people think that Eanes had strength. For a president, having strength is not a crime but a virtue; it would have been tragic for Eanes to appear as a weakling.

The specter of Sa Carneiro also caused the social democrats many problems.

The principal question is this: it now became obvious (if it were necessary to prove the point) that among its militants the PSD does not have any man equal to the late prime minister.

This being the case, it is useless for the party to continue to seek new leaders and compare them with him.

To do this could be an interesting exercise. But it would be one whose only consequence would be for the PSD never again to have strong leadership--diminishing the party in the view of the other parties which do not occupy all their time discussing the virtues and defects of their present leader.

The PSD's third specter is more recent: his name is Mario Soares.

For the social democrats this specter emerged for two reasons.

First, so that Soares could be the prime minister of a coalition in which the PSD ranked second; second, to be a "natural candidate" for the Presidency of the Republic.

As prime minister, Mario Soares taunted the social-democratic pride--in that he occupies a position which the PSD would like to occupy.

As a candidate for the presidency, Soares causes the PSD an undisguisable feeling of envy--in that the PSD knows that among its members it does not have a "natural candidate" at present nor even an individual of any kind who could compare with the secretary general of the PS [Socialist Party].

For these two reasons, Mario Soares has become a specter for the PSD.

And this has already taken its toll.

In fact, if the specter of Soares did not exist in the first place, perhaps the party would not be experiencing the internal instability now prevailing--and which is due in large measure to the fact that each new directorate must be capable of proving itself to the socialists, receiving accusations of weakness while accepting a given PS proposal (which should be considered normal, since it is a coalition government).

Secondly, perhaps the party would not be experiencing the state of anxiety which it is now undergoing with regard to the presidential question; perhaps it would even have found without alternatives a better candidate than the one whom they will probably find.

In view of all this, as long as the PSD does not free itself of these specters, it will never have inner peace and will also never have a strategy.

For a party's strategy must be defined by the party itself before all else --and in the past few years the PSD has been more concerned with the other parties and with its dead than with its objectives.

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POLITICAL

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## PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACIES: OLD, NEW PERSONALITIES DISCUSSED

### Firmino: Increasing PSD Support

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 16 Mar 85 p 24

[Excerpt] The candidacy of Firmino Miguel seems to be winning increasing support among the new PSD [Social Democratic Party] leaders. Rui Machete himself, who until very recently rejected any idea of a military candidate, is beginning to give in. Only Rebelo de Sousa and Capucho persist in opposing him. Capucho still argues for a civilian solution. Marcelo, taking the latter's rejection of the referendum as agreement, is launching a campaign for Lemos Ferreira. Alberto Joao Jardim, who has also perceived that he has little possibility, is already severely criticizing the new PSD leadership (to which he belongs and which helped elect him only a short time ago).

### Firmino Miguel Raps Ambiguity

Indicative of his intention to run for president, Firmino Miguel was quoted by a source close to him as saying recently: "The country has come to a troubling situation and, with the persistent crisis affecting the Portuguese, it is necessary to vitalize economic activity and eliminate the crying social inequities. Any presidential candidate must be characterized by a commitment to radical changes in the Portuguese society, based on a program clearly presented and submitted to the electorate. The organization of the political power and the economic revision of the constitution are specific and basic aspects of such a program, and there is no place for candidates who are ambiguous or indecisive."

### Caution Weakens Firmino Candidacy

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 16 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Pedro Anunciacao]

[Excerpt] Firmino Miguel's apparent reluctance to take risks could, in the end, make him the weakest of the candidates, despite the diversity and strength of the support that he was assumed to have, so weak that he is even admitting the possibility of completely agreeing to the process adopted by the PSD for choosing a candidate, as well as the entire proposal for a counterprogram which the Social Democratic leadership has announced it is drafting.

Strangely enough, broad sectors of civilian society would like a military solution for the next presidential election, as more secure and consistent. The fact is, however: another Eanes candidacy at the end of this year is impossible and there is not a single figure in the Armed Forces with sufficient strength to launch a campaign for Belem. The proof is there: barely 2 weeks away from the PSD referendum, which will round out the nomination process by the major parties, not a single figure from the military sector has yet declared his candidacy.

It is absolutely undeniable that the military have no candidate: Lemos Ferreira, in his capacity as armed forces chief of staff, could represent the institutional solution, but he is met with distant reserve by the entire military structure, which is generally loyal to Ramalho Eanes and to the men of 25 November, and Ferreira is also viewed with suspicion in many civilian circles. Moreover, there is the conviction that he is as vulnerable as Soares Carneiro, since it is highly unlikely that he could achieve a better electoral "score" than Carneiro.

At the moment, the only one advocating Lemos Ferreira's candidacy is Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa--who may already be convinced that the PSD referendum is unlikely to point to a party militant and has already taken from Alberto Joao Jardim whatever advantage the bizarre verbal truculence of the Madeiran leader (bizarre because no one can take it seriously) could give him.

As for the chief of staff himself, although he is probably interested in running (and it is said that in 1980 he was angry with Sa Carneiro, who passed him over in favor of Gen Soares Carneiro), he would not risk his place at the top of the military hierarchy unless he had a solid guarantee of success, a guarantee which is absolutely not there (particularly after the controversial role which he played in the famous purchase of the Corsairs and the disaster that took the life of a Portuguese test pilot in one of those flights). Even Angelo Correia, who was once an enthusiastic supporter of Lemos Ferreira, has abandoned this idea completely and (except for what happened in the case of Mota Pinto, who lost the PSD leadership) Angelo Correia has always had a special gift for placing himself on the winning side.

Firmino Miguel is different. He has a profile which is perfectly suited to the army esprit de corps and he has the sympathy of the Eanist military (and an important portion of the civilian Eanists). Although he is not the candidate of the Armed Forces (they insist they are not in a position to impose or even launch a candidate), he is particularly acceptable to them as a solution.

#### Reluctant but Involved

The fact that Firmino Miguel is demonstrating great reluctance does not mean that he is not strongly engaged in his candidacy. Such effort cannot leave any doubt.

Even before the PSD National Council in Bonfim (which led to the replacement of Mota Pinto by Rui Machete) and after two private lunches with Francisco Pinto Balsemao, Miguel discussed the matter at a dinner in Cascais, in which

Balsemao, Joao Salgueiro, Jose Vitorino, Sande Lemos and a representative of the JSD [Social Democratic Youth] participated. On the very weekend of Bonfim, Miguel went to Porto, where he met with economic groups (the trip was without the knowledge of high-ranking officers and may have been the target of some criticism). Moreover, having already reached an understanding with CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] leader Lucas Pires (with whom Firmino had spoken at length a year ago and continues to maintain contacts through intermediaries trusted by both men), Firmino has indicated his readiness to talk things over with Mota Pinto. For his part, Mota Pinto intends to meet with Firmino Miguel as soon as he learns the results of the referendum and regardless of whether or not he competes in the May congress.

#### Chirac Said To Support Firmino

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 15 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Daniel Ribeira, in Paris]

[Text] The RPR [Rally for the Republic], the neo-Gaullist party of Jaques Chirac, is urging Gen Ramalho Eanes to support Firmino Miguel as candidate for the presidency of the republic, O JORNAL learned in the French capital.

There have already been several contacts between representatives of the Gaullist and General Eanes; according to our sources, the Portuguese president has shown himself to be "very receptive" to the ideas of the French conservatives on this topic.

Chirac's interest in Firmino Miguel and Eanes may be related to the strategy of French capitalism in Africa and the support of some Portuguese circles for the Gaullist ideas about the EEC, which they consider "moribund."

According to the same sources, through his representatives who have met with Eanes, Jaques Chirac has advised the president of the republic not to support Lourdes Pintasilgo and also to "drop" the recently created Democratic Renewal Party [PRD].

According to the Gaullists' who are preparing for the French legislative elections, Lourdes Pintasilgo defends an "outmoded" Third World philosophy which would be highly prejudicial to France, in Portuguese-speaking Africa.

This alleged pressure on the president of the republic to support Firmino Miguel's candidacy is attributed to the fact that Chirac feels a possible victory by Mario Soares would be very harmful to French companies with interests in Africa, since Soares is considered here as "the Americans' man."

#### Financial Support for Firmino

Moreover, Jacques Chirac advocates an end to the EEC and the creation of a Europe with interstate political and economic relations, whereas Mario Soares and Francois Mitterrand advocate strengthening the EEC, the Chirac followers comment.

At a time when Chirac is preparing for decisive elections in France, it is very important to the Guallists that Portugal have a president who agrees to some extent with their ideas about Europe, above all, at a time when the admission of Portugal and Spain to the EEC is a central issue in the election campaigns in France.

According to our sources, the Guallists may even be prepared to provide financial support for Firmino Miguel's campaign, or to see that such support is forthcoming from some French industrial sectors.

#### Guedes da Silva

The Guallists "intermediary" in Portugal has been businessman Bernardo Paulo Guedes da Silva; a source in Belem Palace recently told a French journalist that da Silva had "greatly strengthened" his position with the Portuguese president.

Guedes da Silva was recently presented by Chirac with the keys to the city of Paris and is thought to be a pragmatic conservative. He arranged the meeting on Thursday, 7 March, between Guallist Senator Charles Pasqua and Ramalho Eanes. According to several sources, Guedes da Silva has had lengthy meetings with the president at Belem Palace.

Our sources, French and Portuguese, also told us that Eanes decided to establish a "very strict" line of demarcation between himself and the PRD. Ramalho Eanes may be looking with disfavor on some of the orientations of the new, allegedly "Eanist" party, and our sources assured us that the recent reports about disagreement among "Eanists" are "quite well founded."

#### Japanese, German, American Support

If Firmino Miguel's candidacy were supported by Eanes, it could also count on the support of conservative Japanese, German and American sectors, our informants assured us. According to our sources, a segment of the American Republican Party is also prepared to support this candidate, in opposition to the "Carlucci group," which is said to support Mario Soares.

Ramalho Eanes has not yet said whom he will support. According to the Guallists themselves, however, in Paris he is thought to be "very receptive" to the Guallists position. Even the defenders of the idea say, however, that if he decided to support Firmino Miguel, Eanes would face considerable difficulties, particularly in overcoming the problems which the PRD would give him.

The political justification which the Guallists may have offered Eanes, so that he would not harbor "complexes" about supporting a candidate with Firmino Miguel's profile, is that "within a short time, the Right will be governing most of the European countries," in addition to which President Francois Mitterrand himself is preparing to make alliances with the French Right after next year's legislative elections.

### Personalities Discussed

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 15 Mar 85 pp 3-4

[Text] The 1985 presidential elections will probably be the most hotly contested elections ever conducted in Portugal. Unlike 1976, when an Eanes victory was evident, and 1980, when everything polarized around two candidates, this time there are several candidates with pretensions to the presidency.

At the moment, only two of them are definite. Soares and Pintasilgo have their machinery functioning. The contacts are being made, the actions are being planned. The campaign will probably be hottest between these two candidates. Both of them are very well known; they both have a rare ability to connect with the voters, and although the two could have been considered in the same political area in 1979, today they represent two great paths which the political evolution of the country could take.

Soares will present himself to the voters as the "European" candidate, the candidate to stabilize the regime. Today the secretary general of the PS [Socialist Party] is openly sympathetic to a liberal political ideal, clearly aligned, within the Socialist International, with those who point to the failure of the traditional social-democratic policies, at least in moments of crisis. Moreover, he seems to be the preference of the North Americans. "To oversimplify," the prime minister's colleagues told us, "it could be said that he is now further to the Right, but this is not the issue."

#### "UNESCO Ideology"

On the contrary, Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo espouses what is referred to today as the "UNESCO ideology," sympathetic to the "Third World." She believes sincerely in the power of grass roots organizations, and although she does not oppose parliamentarism, she does not have a very positive opinion of the role of political parties; in her speeches, she subordinates them to the role of grass roots committees and popular mobilization. If Soares promises to be an "arbiter president," almost like a constitutional monarch, who applies the rules without interfering in politics (it is understood that he will respect the majorities formed in the Assembly of the Republic), Pintasilgo can only promise to intervene more actively in politics. She criticizes Eanes for his failure to intervene.

Regarding economic organization, the ideas of the two candidates are absolutely distinct. The PS secretary general advocates the economic liberalization of the society; Lourdes Pintasilgo has advocated maintaining the present economic coordinates, or even correcting what she considers to be the excessive liberalism of the current government.

#### PSD: Third Candidate

After 29 March, another candidate will be nominated and will be presented as a winning candidate. After that date, when the PSD referendum will be held,

the Social Democrats will finally reveal whether they prefer a military or civilian candidate. At this point, everything indicates that the preference will be for a military candidate. The list of possible candidates includes: Firmino Miguel, Lemos Ferreira, Alberto Joao Jardim, Fernando Amaral, Mota Amaral, Pinto Balsemao and Proenca de Carvalho.

If the preference is for a military candidate, the outstanding names are those of two generals who hold high posts in the military hierarchy: Lemos Ferreira, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (CEMGFA), and Firmino Miguel, vice chief of staff of the army (vice-CEME). Among the various trends seen in the PSD, Lemos Ferreira seems to be the strongest possibility at this time, but Firmino Miguel continues to be consistently mentioned. The vice-CEME is a more political man than the CEMGFA and this could be a problem for him. Many Social Democrats fear that he will not make any political contract with the PSD or, even if he does, he will not honor it and will become what they consider "another Faros".

The PSD preference for a military candidate is odd, but the Social Democrats seem to see it as the only chance of victory; despite the fact that for years the PSD has argued for a civilian regime and has accused the parties to its left of defending the intervention of the military in politics, they will probably promote a military candidate, for the third time.

#### PCP Waits for PRD

The PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] has already divulged that it will not compete in the presidential elections. For now, the Communists are waiting. They are waiting for a decision from the Eanists in the PRD, which will allow them to take a position. In fact, the only alternative of the PCP is to support the PRD candidate and to make every effort to see that this candidate is not Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, whom the PCP considers too dangerous. It still does not rule out, as usual, a militant candidate. The Communists would prefer that the PRD choose a candidate to win votes on the Right and not on the Left. For them, the tragedy is that Pintasilgo could be an Otelo in 1985. One thing is certain: the Communists know they will never support Soares, since he represents a direction that is irreconcilable with the views of the PCP.

Finally, the PRD has not made any decision on the matter. Without leaning toward a civilian or military candidate, at least for now, it is known that some of its most influential leaders look more favorably on a civilian. O JORNAL has learned, however, that Eanes will be pressured to support Firmino Miguel. Between Miguel, Pintasilgo and a third name, the PRD must choose a winning candidate.

This possibility might come to bring the Eanists and the PSD into agreement, which would certainly be a political novelty in these times.

#### Soares Wants National Candidacy

The candidacy of Mario Soares will not be formally presented through the PS organization, but by a National Committee of support, consisting of independent figures and some distinguished party members, JORNAL has learned from sources close to the prime minister.

The National Committee which will propose the PS secretary general for the presidency has not yet been formed, but sources close to Soares have told O JORNAL that some names are already being considered, although they would not specify them.

According to other sources, which confirmed the reports, it is certain that such independent figures as Antonio Barreto or Manuel Jose Homem de Mello, industrialists like Belmiro de Azevedo and distinguished PS figures, such as Antonio Macedo and Tito de Moraes, will be included on the committee.

#### Adriano Moreira

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 p 11

[Excerpt] The idea that Adriano Moreira emerged stronger from the last CDS congress appears to be bolstered by the report that a petition will be circulated this week in Lisbon, proposing Moreira for the presidency of the republic, as an important factor for unity among the various factions of the party.

Sources close to the CDS say this will be the best answer, since the party has not reached any agreement regarding support for any candidate outside the party, specifically the candidate to be proposed by the PSD, or for a military candidate. According to the same source[s], the petition will later be forwarded to the National Council.

Although he has been meeting recently with members of the council, Adriano Moreira is maintaining silence on the matter.

#### Melo Antunes Candidacy Rumored

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 15-21 Mar 85 p 13

[Text] Sources close to Belem have told O JORNAL that Melo Antunes could be the candidate preferred by Belem for the presidency of the republic.

Our source guaranteed that, at this time, Melo Antunes has won the support of some of Eanes' advisors, who "feel the lieutenant colonel has a chance of winning all the votes on the Left in the second round, which would mean that, to be elected, Mario Soares would have to insure the support of the CDS and the PSD."

The same informant said that Belem wants a military candidate in order to maintain as commander in chief an individual who can consubstantiate the MFA [Armed Forces Movement], who would be pleasing to the army sector, above all, to those who were engaged in 25 April and are still active in the Armed Forces.

#### New Candidate: Orlando Vitorino

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 16 Mar 85 p 2

[Text] This week in Porto, writer Orlando Vitorino announced his "neoliberal candidacy" for the next presidential elections and proposed

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to take his campaign "all the way," rejecting any "accord" and declining the "political support of any organization."

According to the candidate, the collection of the 1,500 signatures needed to formalize his entry is "exceeding all expectations," particularly because, as he added, "for now there is only one candidate: me."

Orlando Vitorino divulged the names of only a few supporters, who include fellow writers Dalila Pereira da Costa and Sant'Anna Dionisio. The latter is the sponsor of the candidacy, which he considers a "necessary hope and catalyst" for the country, which is "in a dormant state," in his opinion.

In his first public speech, the new presidential candidate proposed to outlaw the PCP and the union federations and attacked the "socialist forces" (a concept which includes the CDS, in his opinion) and "Eunism," of which he said he knew "only one idea," which he attributed to Herminio Martinho: that of "pulling up the vineyards of the Ribetejo to plant wheat."

#### Candidates: List Reviewed

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 16 Mar 85 p 2

[Commentary by Dinis de Abreu: "Prior Contract"]

[Excerpts] The choice of a candidate who will not be a loser at the outset, before he has had a chance to test his strength in the race to Belem, has agitated--and will continue to agitate--all the parties except the Socialist Party, where everything is settled and only awaiting the most fitting opportunity to make the official announcement.

It is easy to imagine the anxiety in such disparate areas as the PSD, the CDS and even the PCP, not to forget the about-to be PRD, faced with the dilemma of designating someone who can give the minimum assurance of leading a change, or at least of not compromising a program.

They are studying profiles, civilian and military; they are weighing advantages and disadvantages; they are researching backgrounds and inventing scenarios, while the "candidates for candidate" are taking their own initiatives, some cautiously, others boldly, establishing their distinct styles and soliciting support.

One of the most handicapped parties is obviously the PSD. Under the previous leadership, and after lengthy hesitation, it already had a candidate. It was largely because of this that Mota Pinto was unhorsed, an irony of fate for a man who has often been accused of being indecisive in matters of such importance. With the new leadership elected in the National Council of Lisbon, the Social Democrats lost a candidate, but they gained a referendum, opening a broad range of possibilities.

#### Diversity

Trends represented in the PSD leadership correspond to a broad range of possible candidates: Francisco Balsemao, Alberto Joao Jardim, Mota Amaral, Fernando Amaral and Proenca de Carvalho, among the civilians; Firmino Miguel and Lemos

Ferreira, among the military. Other names are rumored, but we will stop here.

In theory, Balsemao would be the natural candidate of the PSD, with the authority to unite the disaffected Social Democratic family behind him. A founder, he has the legitimacy and the political background.

It would be an injustice not to recognize his honesty and his dignified stature. But does Balsemao have the psychological characteristics and the political aggressiveness to intimidate Soares? And, at the personal level, has the time come to end the retirement that was thought advisable to recover from the traumas suffered during the decline of the AD [Democratic Alliance]?

Finally, wouldn't it be more advantageous to Balsemao to preserve his reputation as the party's "moral figure," instead of exposing himself to a hasty comeback, with dubious results? These are some reflections on which to ponder. While Balsemao ponders and waits, Alberto Joao Jardim goes forward and assumes the rhetoric of change, nationalist, antisystem, indicating his availability if he "has the support of all the political forces that are not a part of the socialist organization," even if it is necessary to "compromise" and not run "as a PSD leader but as the president of the Regional Government of Madeira."

With the spontaneity for which he is known, in a few months Jardim dropped the indecision which tormented him when his name was suggested by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa at the Braga congress and, contradicting those who imagined him to be a regional leader without national ambitions, he has begun to advance openly, aiming his criticism at any military candidacy and, in particular, that of Firmino Miguel.

According to Jardim, a military candidate would be a "grey" candidate," with the "limitations" of his background, and Firmino Miguel "failed the First Provisional Government politically" and also played "a passive and conformist role as a minister of Mario Soares."

It was not by accident that Jardim turned his artillery on Firmino Miguel, who had appeared to be a lost cause within the PSD. Basically, it confirms insistent rumors that Firmino Miguel is not excluded from the range of possibilities under consideration by the new PSD leadership.

In fact, if the first indications seemed to rule out a military candidacy, and specifically a Firmino Miguel candidacy, the flexibility observed later was a good sign that something was changing in the headquarters on Buenos Aires [Street]. Today, strangely, even as pro-civilian a figure as Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa has been thumping less for his Braga candidate and there are even those who insist that there are new hopes for a military candidate, not with the image of moderation and reverence for the balanced formulas of compromise attributed to Firmino Miguel, but with the forcefulness and willingness to fight, if necessary, that is seen as constituting the "service record" of Lemos Ferreira.

In any event, it is clear that Jardim's priority in conducting his "primaries" within the party consists in heading off any potential support for Firmino Miguel.

Proenca de Carvalho is also employing the rhetoric of "change" in the AIP, advocating a presidential candidate who is not compromised by the national degradation of the last decade, "someone outside the party system," capable of making a "democratic break."

To anyone who wishes to interpret this public reappearance as a sign of his availability, Proenca de Carvalho would observe pointedly that his proposed model for a candidate would be easier to find "in the military area." Despite this feeling, he is still regarded as being a candidate capable of uniting the liberal forces of the PSD and of winning the support of the CDS. But why would Proenca de Carvalho be interested in involving himself in this competition? Would the political capital accumulated as head of the RTP [Portuguese Radio-Television System], handling a sensitive post with the authority that others have lacked (despite the reservations which some of his speeches might merit), have been enough to project his image among an electorate which feels it is in the middle of a labyrinth?

Perhaps the correct interpretation of Proenca de Carvalho's activity is more prosaic: it is to influence, but not to put himself in the "line of fire."

Among the prominent PSD presidential possibilities, we have not yet mentioned Mota Amaral and Fernando Amaral. The Azorian leader was a possibility that disappeared in Braga. Fernando Amaral will be seen only as a respectable president of the Assembly of the Republic.

Obviously, the list is not exhausted with the names mentioned most frequently. It is unlikely, however, that, no matter how many changes the PSD may undergo in the coming months, the choice will fall to anyone who is not already on the horizon.

The decision which will come to prevail in the PSD is central, hence we have lingered on it longer. This is not to say, however, that the CDS, the PSD, the PCP and, above all, the PRD are any more at ease, but only that all of them are depending largely on what happens in the PSD. Until the Social Democrats come to a specific decision, the CDS is restricted to cultivating an image of statesmanship in Adriano Moreira. The PCP will cherish Lourdes Pintasilgo from a prudent distance, and the PRD will weave a web of commitment around Lourdes Pintasilgo and the governor of Macao and, unless it manages to unravel it, the PRD could wind up being trapped in it.

All things considered, the idea of a "prior contract" with the presidential candidate is not an invention of Rui Machete. Others would like to make one, but not for the record.

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POLITICAL

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# PSD'S MACHETE PREPARES PRESIDENTIAL STRATEGY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 pp 1, 20

[Excerpt] Through a decision made yesterday by the Permanent Committee of the PSD [Social Democratic Party], Rui Machete will make an initial selection within the next few days of the party's candidates for the presidential palace by first meeting with various individuals who might be designated by the social democrats for the presidential race. Among the individuals to be contacted by the new PSD leader are Firmino Miguel, Lemos Ferreira and Altino Magalhaes (representing the military sector) and Francisco Balsemao, Fernando Amaral, Mota Amaral, Alberto Joao Jardim and Proenca de Carvalho (representing the civilian sector).

It will be an initial conversation in which Machete will attempt to obtain everyone's support for the selection of a definite candidacy which will possibly be finally ratified by Congress, taking into consideration the results of the referendum. The Permanent Committee also decided that, immediately following the referendum, the chairman of the party would also carry on conversations with political and social organizations with a view to establishing an electoral front.

Thus, the new social-democratic leaders are looking toward Mota Pinto, not even awaiting the results of the Congress in the process of choosing a candidate for the presidential palace.

Meanwhile, when this edition was ready to go to press, Joao Salgueiro's group was meeting at the Lutecia Hotel preparing a strategy of common action for the National Council which is meeting today at the Sheraton. Those in this group who favor a military candidacy expected that this meeting would reveal support for Firmino Miguel. Moreover, seven of its members met last Wednesday with the same intention—namely, Joao Salgueiro, Antonio Capucho, Sande Lemos, Jose Vitorino, Marques Mendes, Silva Marques and Rui Oliveira e Costa.

At the meeting Rui Oliveira e Costa and Marques Mendes spoke out against the idea of a military candidate; this was in addition to Antonio Capucho (who, along with Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa and Helena Roseta, is said to be the staunchest supporter of the civilian concept). Vitorino and Silva

Marques reaffirmed their support for Firmino. Joao Salgueiro, although recently expressing support for Firmino (with whom he met together with other members of his group shortly before the National Council of Bonfim in Porto), preferred not to take any definite stand which would not be adopted by the vast majority of the group as a whole. It should be noted that the JSD [Social Democratic Youth] and Mota Amaral also expressed preference for a civilian candidate--as well as Jardim, although the latter took pains to be nominated as a candidate as the best way to leave the Regional Government of Madeira, which would occur as a result of the budget restrictions which Lisbon will be imposing.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

CAETANO CHARACTERIZES NATIONAL POLITICIANS

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 4 Mar 85 p 24

[Text] Veiga Simao

I was aware of Simao's faults, but I never considered him to be so petty.

Magalhaes Mota

Under the cover of personal likability, he breathed ambition through all his pores.

Joao Salgueiro

He was incapable of carrying out any immediate plan of action, being little sure of himself.

Costa Gomes

Costa Gomes is what he is and nothing can be done about it.

Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo

She is ambitious, intelligent and willful (she will bring virility into Portuguese politics...)

Raul Rego

I have nothing to say about Rego whose talents in the Assembly, and I do not know in how many other public places, no one has yet managed to see.

Vasco da Gama Fernandes

Presumptuous Gama Gernandes, whom not even his coreligionists take seriously, managed in 1974 to obtain an administrative position in a state bank.

Jose Magalhaes Godinho

See how an attorney in the attorney general's office, without inspiration or prestige, filched the function of purveyor of justice.

Mota Amaral

With people of this caliber, purified by holy religion but forgetful of the duties which he contracted on earth, how did the country succeed in escaping tragedy?!...

Mario Soares

He still continues to promise what he cannot fulfill, delighted with the risks of political maneuvering.

Alvaro Cunhal

Whether one likes him or not, he is a man of superior intelligence who has a messianic view of life.

Ramalho Eanes

Dry, wooden countenance, with an air of being permanently annoyed, he represents well the bad conscience of an army in retreat and a regime which ruined Portugal.

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'UNICITY': PRD SEEN PLAYING COMMUNISTS' GAME

Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese 5 Mar 85 p 4

[Article by Manuel Maria Murias]

[Text] "Unicity" is a strange word coined by the communists in their present synonymy. It means unity "against," beyond formal and ideological divergences. Unicity has always been the major strategic motivating force of communist victories. It was unicity "against" the middle class which brought Trotsky to power in October 1917; it was preaching unicity "against" American imperialism which brought about the communization of Eastern Europe, with Soviet tanks at its rear; it was through unicity "against" fascism that the communists seized control of the government during the last 2 years of the civil war in Spain; it was with unicity "against" reaction that 28 September was devised and a subsequent attempt made to control the biggest union "gang" from a centralized standpoint; it is like the spirit of unicity "against" the partidocracy which the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] is now trying to establish, a disordered political assemblage said to be inspired by the president of the republic.

To have unicity it is first necessary to conjure up an enemy. The specter of fascism serves no other purpose, even though it is completely discredited. The communists perceived a long time ago that it is not friendships which unite people--it is enmities. Faced with a universal enemy, believers all unite to defend the collective faith. Now it is the corrupt and degrading partidocratic system; just prior to this time it was reaction, the powerful monopolists and large landowners; in the struggle against the former regime it was fascism and the overseas war.

The MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission] is the legitimate offspring of unicity. It has been coming since the long night... Heir of the defunct MUD [Democratic Union Movement] which was quickly palmed off by the communists, it, in turn, joined the enemies of Salazar for a certain period of time. After 25 April it wanted to survive in a similar manner. It is now trying, incorporated in the PRD and under the possible aegis of Ramalho Eanes, to restore the spirit of unicity to minimize the PS [Socialist Party] and the leftist factions of the PSD [Social Democratic Party], revitalize the MFA to a certain extent and

Portuguese political life to be still more confused, making the country completely ungovernable through the proliferation of parties. The communists live from institutional disorder; despite its unicitarian aspect, the PRD is itself the embodiment of disorder; in the state of anonymity in which our political society finds itself, disorder within disorder is one more step helping the communists seize control of the government.

This does not mean, for certain, that the majority of the founders of the PRD are aware that they are being manipulated. No. It means only that, as of now, the PRD is playing the PCP's game, substantially dividing the electorate of the PS against the crude anticommunism of Comrade Mario Soares, a grotesque symbol of the worst governmental performance, of the most raffish clientelism, of the most sordid corruption.

In the PRD, hunger is coupled with the will to eat and stupidity with the lack of intelligence. First, it incorporated all those who were expelled from the traditional parties of who did not find any positions of leadership in those parties: the most perfect example of this kind is Medeiros Ferreira. Then come those who, sincerely or insincerely, have a socializing presidentialist vision of our political future: this is the case of Pintasilgo and Botequilha. Following that we have an increasing number of opportunists who, however necessary, managed during the past 9 years to live greedily at the expense of the president of the republic. Lastly, in the military sector as a whole the greater part of PC's clandestine apparatus, not being able to completely stifle the new party throughout the years, tried to destroy it by sowing discord among its ranks.

In announcing the organizational Cunhal jumped for joy and his eyes shone with pure delight: after a delay of 10 years he succeeded almost publicly in hitching the head of state to his wagon through a movement which, without principles, is naturally willing to head anywhere. Inasmuch as neither Martinho, nor Pintasilgo, nor Medeiros Ferreira, nor the sone of the late Marcelo Caetano, nor even Eanes know for sure what they want, everything (Cunhal believes) will end up obeying the general principles of any unicity, nothing of nothing, the usual meaningless claptrap of petty politicians, social justice, the rights of the workers, economic development, national independence, the defense of democracy--and other "slogans" without meaning which, anesthetizing the masses, move them forcibly toward servitude.

Obviously, the PRD is a mess. Like any other party, it will serve to politically promote half a dozen ambitious individuals from the extreme Left to the extreme Right and will, moreover, serve as an employment agency and qualified lobbyist. Although not all its adherents are politically marginal, nearly all marginal politicians are included in its ranks. The elimination of Mario Soares seems to be its primary objective. Thus, they are already beginning to lay plans to unite "Soarists," "Eanists" and "Machetists" against a common enemy which, naturally, will again be that present Right which, having been Left when it was advantageous to be so, is now trying to occupy the space left empty by

those who, not accepting either the regime or the system, feel inclined to follow anyone who, intellectually or journalistically, contributed to the legality of "Marcelism" and with the complicity of the latter to the achievement and maintenance of the present legality, which is the contrary of legitimacy.

Perhaps Eanes will not be the Trojan horse which the communists are trying to harness. Nor, perhaps, will all the responsibilities be incorporated in the teratological monster now brought to life. However, in politics what appears to be is--and Eanes, having objectively served the interests of the communists, has appeared to be the PC's wide-open door to the regime. As was the MFA. As the MDP/CDE tried to be; as the CGTP/In [General Federation of Portuguese Workers/National Intersindical] wanted to be; and even now, the UGT [General Union of Workers]; as were all those which, joining in the struggle against the former regime, ended up destroying Portugal, democratically opening the city's doors to the tottering revolutionism of Alvaro Cunhal.

In its very nature, partidocratic democracy is a retreat in the city's defenses. The PRD, like the MDP/CDE, like the PC, is the enemy entrenched beyond the ramparts--even though their respective militants do not want to be that enemy.

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PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

WEU MEMBERSHIP ASSURED--Portugal will join the WEU (Western European Union), according to a promise made yesterday in Lisbon by the chairman of the committee for general affairs of the organization's legislative body after a meeting with Jaime Gama, minister of foreign affairs. In statements made to the press, Joseph Michel of Belgium's Christian Social Party and chairman of WEU's policy committee pointed out that there is no question concerning Portugal's admission into the organization, although there were different opinions as to the nature of that membership. The deputy prime minister and minister of defense in turn said that he considered it important to have "closer ties" between Portugal and the WEU with regard to the implementation of defense programs. Rui Machete spoke at a meeting attended by 23 WEU representatives at which the principal topics for discussion were Portugal's geostrategic position (continent and autonomous areas) and its relationship with NATO from the military standpoint. The minister of foreign affairs in turn said yesterday at a dinner he hosted for the WEU delegation that the country's membership in this organization would complete the picture of Portugal's membership in NATO, the European Council and the EEC. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 8 Mar 85 p 24] 8568

MAD ELECTS COMMITTEE MEMBERS--The National Plenary Session of the Movement for the Strengthening of Democracy (MAD) was concluded yesterday in Lisbon with the election of the organization's national committee members. The following were elected to serve on the National Coordinating Committee: Alvaro Marques, Armando Pedroso Lima, Carlos Silva, Celio Costa, Claudio Teixeira, Diogo Duarte, Jose Roseira, Mariano Calado and Nuno Fisher Pires. The plenary council's board will consist of Teresa Santa Clara Gomes, Braga da Cruz and Joaquim Brandao. At the closing session Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo stressed MAD's characteristic performance and the need to mobilize the people for the presidential and autarchic elections. The plenary session drew up the movement's guidelines for 1985. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 11 Mar 85 p 20] 8568

CAPUCHO-DE SOUSA ALLIANCE--A rapprochement between Antonio Capucho and Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa is becoming more noticeable every day; the two are carrying on an almost constant conspiracy at the home of the one or the other. It is feared that there will be a loss of influence in the pro-Salgueiro group, especially now when that group seems to be leaning

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1 May 1985

# West Europe Report

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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1 May 1985

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

BRUSSELS POLLED ON ELECTIONS, PARTIES, FUTURE OF AREA

Brussels LE SOIR in French 12, 13 Mar 85

[12 Mar 85 pp 11-12]

[Text] Brussels-Wallonia = Brussels-Flanders

Concerning the Flemish and the Walloons, which of the following statements is closer to your opinion?

	<u>French</u>	<u>Dutch</u>	<u>Total</u>
Between the Flemish and the Walloons, there are great differences in ways of thinking and living.	54.5	51.1	53.4
Between the Flemish and the Walloons, there are minor differences in ways of thinking and living.	44.0	46.5	44.9
No response	1.5	2.4	1.8

There are different opinions on the financial resources of the region. Which of the following statements most truly reflects your opinion?

	<u>French</u>	<u>Dutch</u>	<u>Total</u>
Some believe that the Walloon region and the Flemish region should help one another financially (in other words, Wallonia would give money to Flanders and vice versa).	69.4	47.7	63.1
Others believe that each of the regions should be responsible for finding its own financial resources (in other words, Wallonia would not give money to Flanders and vice versa).	27.6	49.3	33.9
No response	3.0	3.0	2.9

The Flemish and Walloons are relatively different, but they have common interests, especially economic, and it is therefore logical for them to

practice true mutual financial aid. The majority of all Brussels natives appreciate the way in which the two major communities must co-exist in Belgium, which does not prevent them from having a critical eye of one another.

That is what emerges from the tables published here, tables that deserve a careful reading.

1 -- The Flemish and Walloons are different: That is the opinion of 1 out of 2 Brussels natives, a trend a little more marked among French-speakers than Dutch-speakers, if one excepts the Volksunie [Flemish National Party, VNP] voters who, in a proportion similar to that of the FDF [Francophone Democratic Front] voters (68 percent), deem these differences to be very great. Voters of the other Flemish parties tend to minimize these differences, especially if they are SP voters (55 percent).

2 -- These differences are illustrated anecdotally by the way in which both groups define the other. We proposed to the Francophones and the Dutch to choose, from a list of positive and negative adjectives, those which best describe the three Belgian "types." The verdict is both brutal and comical. In the general opinion, the Brussels natives are bon vivants, talkative and optimistic, but the Dutch-speakers accuse them of arrogance as well. The Flemish appear to be hard-working, conservative and religious. Serious, the French-speakers add. As for the Walloons, opinions differ. They are contradictory and bons vivants, the French-speakers say. They are above all lazy and talkative, accuse the Dutch-speakers, who also deem them to be deliberately contrary.

3 -- But these labels do not stand in the way of cohabitation. Thus, 75 percent of the Brussels residents -- more Francophone than Dutch-speaking (table not published) -- deem that the common economic interests link Brussels with Wallonia. The same proportion thinks that the same economic interests bring Brussels and Flanders closer together.

4 -- This community of interests has a financial corollary. Some 63 percent of the Brussels inhabitants believe that the two communities must help one another. This is naturally a mainly Francophone opinion and shared by some three-fourths of the PS, PRL [Reform and Freedom Party of Wallonia] and PSC [Christian Social Party] voters, as well as 6 out of 10 FDF voters. Concerning the Flemish, only the socialist voters want that mutual aid for the most part (56 percent). Elsewhere, it is the desire for autonomy that prevails, with a logical peak for VU [Volksunie, VNP] voters.

Most Persecuted?

Do you believe that the Brussels residents are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Flemish and Walloons regarding:

	Francophones			
	Yes	No	Unsure	No resp.
Political decisions	49.6	33.8	15.8	0.8
Economic decisions	49.1	31.9	18.0	1.0

	Dutch-speakers			
	Yes	No	Unsure	No resp.
Political decisions	15.1	64.9	19.2	0.8
Economic decisions	14.2	64.9	20.2	0.7

	Total			
	Yes	No	Unsure	No resp.
Political decisions	39.3	43.2	16.6	0.8
Economic decisions	38.9	41.7	18.5	1.0

In your opinion, what is the main attitude: 1) of the Flemish toward Brussels; and 2) of the Walloons toward Brussels?

	Flemish		
	French	Dutch	Total
Indifferent to the fate of Brussels	14.6	30.4	19.3
Mainly want to defend the Brussels residents who speak their language	64.1	72.1	66.4
Want to make Brussels a region like the others	22.1	30.2	24.9
Want to take control of Brussels	75.2	32.9	62.2

	Walloons		
	French	Dutch	Total
Indifferent to the fate of Brussels	38.3	31.7	36.0
Mainly want to defend the Brussels residents who speak their language	54.0	72.2	59.6
Want to make Brussels a region like the others	43.9	34.8	41.4
Want to take control of Brussels	29.0	51.1	35.5

Totals of over 100: several possible responses.

If there are poor cousins in Belgium, it is the Brussels residents! This general diagnosis is made by 1 out of 2 Francophones. It becomes much more acute when one takes up, not the big issues, but daily life in the capital. Right in Brussels, Francophones feel at a disadvantage regarding employment, both public and private. Dutch-speakers feel scorned in mass transportation and the hospitals. On the periphery, these frustrations are also noted, but

are not the majority and are essentially shared by those who do not live there! The inequalities are partially explained by the attitude of the Flemish, accused by a French-speaking majority of trying to colonize Brussels. And, as a remedy, one sees the institution of integral bilingualism, of political personnel, communal employees, and so on.

One should take a closer look at the picture.

In Brussels (unpublished tables), a majority of the French-speakers say they are at a disadvantage compared with the Flemish with respect to obtaining jobs in the private sector (53 percent) and public sector (66 percent). A majority of the Dutch-speakers feel linguistically disadvantaged in their contacts with hospitals (52 percent) and mass transportation (58 percent). These disadvantages are not perceived by the other community. Only 10 percent of the Flemish deem, for example, that the Francophones are at a disadvantage regarding employment and, at the other end of the scale, 33 percent of the French-speakers -- a record -- recognize the cultural discrimination against Dutch-speakers in Brussels.

#### Schools

On the periphery, the situation is particularly disconcerting. A majority of the French-speakers believe that the French-speakers in the six communes with facilities are disadvantaged regarding private employment (50 percent) and public employment (60 percent). But the residents of the periphery themselves perceive this discrimination much less than Brussels residents from the core city and even less than the inhabitants of the suburbs.

One example: It is especially in Brussels (37.6 percent) and in the suburbs (21 percent) that one deems that the French-speakers in the communes with facilities are disadvantaged regarding nursery schools and schools open to them. Locally, the disadvantage is apparent only to 15.6 percent of the inhabitants! This does not even represent half of the French-speakers!

Nevertheless, Brussels is definitely a land of imbalances, as confirmed by the responses to another question (see above table) dealing with the feeling of discrimination of Brussels residents, the Flemish and the Walloons in the Belgian Government. It is the Brussels residents who generally appear to be in the most frequent minority in political and economic decisions. This conviction is shared by a majority of French-speakers and especially by socialist, PRL and FDF voters.

As for the Dutch-speakers (unpublished table), nearly 1 out of 2 believe that Flanders is at a disadvantage compared with other regions. It is an opinion which the French-speakers absolutely do not share. As for the Walloons, their position is judged more objectively, but with puzzlement. It is recognized that they are more an economic rather than political minority and a minority of Dutch-speakers willing to pity the Walloons is clearly larger than that of the French-speakers perceiving discrimination against Flanders.

## Colonialism

How is one to explain such unequal treatment? The start of a response to this question can be found in the image which the Brussels residents have of the intentions of the two communities toward them. Above all, the Flemish want, say those questioned, to defend the Flemish of Brussels (66.4 percent) and take control of the capital. The Walloons, anxious to defend the Francophones, also intend to make Brussels a complete region. Flemish "imperialism" is definitely essentially perceived by a large majority of French-speakers, upper-level personnel, independents and more PS than FDF voters, while Walloon "imperialism" strikes only 1 out of 2 Flemish, especially skilled workers and lower-level government employees. It will also be noticed that while a large part of the French-speakers feel "abandoned" by the Walloons, it is the feeling of only 1 out of 3 Dutch-speakers with regard to his community. Finally, in the eyes of those questioned, it was the Walloons (41.4 percent) who, much more than the Flemish (24.9 percent), want to play the game of three-handed federalism in Brussels.

## Technical Side to Our Poll

### Why Our Brussels Emerges From Yoke

How did we draw "our" map of Brussels? First of all, we had to foil a trap. Were we to poll only the 19 communes of the city or a larger area, made up of those 19 communes and another 6 with facilities? In both cases, it was a relatively easy and not very costly solution. But in both cases, it implied a political choice that we did not want to make.

Were we to limit Brussels to the 19 communes? Then we would have implicitly accepted the "containment" of the capital. Were we to extend it to the communes with facilities only? Then we would have been considering a political situation that remains controversial as a fact. Above all, more than that political trap that we wanted to avoid, it was the journalistic frustration that we feared and rejected. After all, was one of the exciting aspects of the poll that of outlining that greater "natural, spontaneous" Brussels that no vote, no study, had ever defined? Did we not have to go very far, get the larger picture, choosing the broadest, most "international" definition of our capital?

We therefore decided to break down the "political" walls of the city, give priority to the social, economic and geographic data, in exchange for re-designing, following the study, of a narrow, different Brussels than we had imagined at first.

## Geographic Brussels

It was the geographers and sociologists who helped us make the choice. Josette Dawance and Francoise Noel, research fellows at the Free University

of Brussels, consulted different studies, the list of which is appended for purists. Their common goal: to define the communes of the city of Brussels in the larger sense, in terms of various demographic, socioeconomic, statistical and morphological criteria. Such as, for example, the proportion of inhabitants of these entities born in the 19 communes, the proportion of workers with jobs in the capital Brussels, the rate of activity of women, but also different features of the housing, the residential size of the communes, and so on.

In a sense, these different studies are summarized in the study of the Brabant Regional Economic Council. It is that study that was used by Dawance and Notel to define, in an initial analysis, a "Brussels metropolitan center" made up of a core -- the 19 communes -- and two rings: the 6 communes with facilities, on the one hand, and the suburbs made up of 24 communes. "Our" Brussels therefore had 49 communes.

And yet, the choice was not definitive. The "pre-poll" made for reasons we give elsewhere caused us to eliminate some of the peripheral communes that we had initially chosen, either because too small of a percentage of their inhabitants considered themselves as Brussels residents or because the percentage of active persons in that commune working in Brussels was clearly under 40 percent, or because the commune considered had no common border with a commune of Brussels.

On the basis of these combined criteria, Halle, Liedekerke, Kortenberg, Braine-le-Chateau and Ottignies were eliminated. The second -- the real -- survey could then begin, in a Brussels of 44 communes.

Our Brussels includes:

The 19 communes of the district of the capital city Brussels; the 6 communes of the district of Hal-Vivvorde, so-called "with facilities": Drogenbos, Kraainem, Linkebeek, Rhode-Saint-Genese, Wemmel, Wezembeek-Oppem; the 19 communes of the Flemish and Walloon suburbs: The Flemish suburb: Asse, Beersel, Dilbeek, Grimbergen, Hoeilaert, Machelen, Meise, Overijse, Sint-Pieters-Leeuw, Steenokkerzeel, Ternat, Vilvorde, Zaventem, Tervueren. The Walloon suburb: Braine-l'Alleud, La Hulpe, Lasne, Rixensart, Waterloo.

#### 14 Percent Dutch-speakers

In order to validly question 3,000 inhabitants of "greater Brussels," we questioned 6,000. Was that a joke? Not completely. To make up a valid sampling for the "real" poll, we in fact had to conduct a pre-survey, quickly but precisely, of 3,000 persons from the same geographic zone.

No official statistics show the exact proportion of French- and Dutch-speakers in the Brussels metropolitan area. This is the direct result of the elimination, starting in 1960, of the linguistic aspect of the national

census. The Flemish community at that time feared that the figures might show too precisely and undeniably its minority presence in certain regions of contact between communities.

Our goal was to question, grosso modo, as many French-speakers as Dutch-speakers, in order to find a sufficiently broad and reliable sampling of all "types" of Brussels residents. But we also wanted, for each question, to be able to determine the choices of the "average Brussels resident," combining Dutch- and French-speakers. To do so, we had to find the exact proportion of each community in the overall population. And we had to know how many Francophones and Flemish lived in the 19 communes and the communes with facilities, as well as in the main suburbs. Therefore, in November, we submitted a quick questionnaire made up of 12 questions to 2,892 inhabitants of our greater Brussels, chosen at random from the election lists. The questions had to do with the socioeconomic characteristics of the persons questioned, but also their linguistic affiliation: In what language do you prefer to respond to this questionnaire? Do you consider yourself as a Brussels native, Flemish, Walloon, a Brussels native and Flemish, a Brussels native and Walloon? Do you consider yourself to be French-speaking or Dutch-speaking? It was based on the answers to these three questions that Dawance and Noel made up the "linguistic status" of those questioned, a status shown on the table below. On definite geographic and sociological bases, we could indicate -- with minimal risk of error -- the proportion of French-speakers and Dutch-speakers in the "three rings" of our metropolis.

	<u>Brussels</u>	<u>With Facilities</u>	<u>Flemish Suburb</u>	<u>Walloon Suburb</u>	<u>Total</u>
French-speaking	84.2	52.3	15.6	96.4	66.7
Dutch-speaking	14.0	46.2	82.9	2.3	31.6
Absolutely bilingual	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.3	1.7

#### Foreigners?

Let us say so frankly: Our poll has one gap. It excludes 3 out of 10 adult Brussels residents: those not of Belgian nationality. But the gap is a deliberate choice based on very solid reasons, technical as well as sociological. And if, as one will see, the exclusion of foreigners bothers those who expect of a survey such as ours an exact, precise and exhaustive photographic study of the Brussels reality, it also offers guarantees of homogeneity of the population polled, reliability and therefore, fidelity of the image rendered.

From the technical standpoint, first of all. The inclusion of foreigners living in Brussels stems from various authorities: the commune, for those who, with a "residency permit," are naturally included in the population registries; the Ministry of Justice for those who, not in this case, figure only on the registry of foreigners. Other foreigners do not appear on the

population registries, either because they live in Brussels illegally or because they enjoy certain immunities. Such is the case of diplomats, SHAPE and NATO personnel and, to a certain extent, EEC officials. These "unregistered persons" in Brussels number 40,000, according to some sources. It was therefore impossible to set up a single file on non-Belgian Brussels residents, in which one could have had a rather broad and reliable sampling, with all the scientific guarantees required.

Recent polls have proved it: The traditional tool of the poll is scarcely effective when it is a matter of questioning persons living in different cultural worlds on the same issues. God knows that in Brussels in particular, the worlds co-existing are definitely different.

The geographic mobility of foreigners, the frequent refusals to respond from certain nationalities would also have compromised the value of information that would have been gathered with difficulty.

For all these reasons, we finally decided to use the Brussels population of Belgian nationality for the INUSOP [expansion unknown] poll. However, this will not prevent us, as one can see, from taking up the problems and thousand and one problems of the foreign presence in Brussels.

#### Who Helped

One word on the way in which we drafted the INUSOP-LE SOIR poll.

As in previous surveys, we first of all appealed to our staff, collecting the questions that seemed interesting to the different journalists involved.

For its part, INUSOP, with the cooperation of the Institute of Sociology of the ULB, also cleared the way. The drafting of the questions, issue by issue, was done in the traditional manner by a LE SOIR-INUSOP-ULB team. But given the political importance and technically delicate nature of the questionnaire, we sought additional backing and aid. That of the CRISP (Center of Research and Sociopolitical Information), known for its competence and honesty in the analysis of all political and social questions. A team of experts from the CRISP therefore helped us throughout the preparation and drafting of the questionnaire, but also when it was necessary to determine the nature of the sampling and the geographical limits of the survey, supplying precious aid that further strengthens the interest and reliability of the poll that the reader will discover over the next 3 weeks.

#### Scientific Aid

For the conception of the sampling, the geographic area and questions of the poll:

For INUSOP-UNIOP [expansion unknown]: Camille Javeaux, director; Mark Hofmans, Dutch-speaking researcher.

For the Institute of Sociology of the ULB: Nicole Delruelle-Vosswinkel, director; Josette Dawance and Francoise Noel, in charge of research.

For the CRISP: Xavier Mabilie, deputy general director; Francis Delperee, administrator, professor at the UCL [Catholic University of Louvain]; Robert Tollet, administrator, professor at the ULB.

Rereading survey commentaries: Josette Dawance, Xavier Mabilie and Francoise Noel.

Sources: B. Jouret: "Definition Spatiale du Phenomene Urban Bruxellois." Institute of Sociology. Published by the ULB, 1972, 339 pp.

E. Van Hecke: "La Delimitation de l'Agglomeration Morphologique Bruxelloise a Partir des Secteurs Statistiques," in COURRIER HEBDOMADAIRE, No 623, CRISP, 30 November 1973, 25 pp.

H. Van der Haegen and M. Pattyn: "Les Regions Urbaines Belges," in ETUDES STATISTIQUES, No 56, 1979, INS, pp 235-249.

B. Vinikas and C. De Greef: "La Metropole Bruxelloise: Quelques Aspects de Son Evolution au Cours des Annees '70," in ECO-BRABANT, No 30, December 1981, CERB, pp 17-19.

C. Vandermotten and A. Collard: "La Periurbanisation Bruxelloise: Le Debut de la Fin?" ULB, 1984, mimeo., 11 pp and maps.

The poll was conducted in the field by the INUSOP-UNIOP between 28 November 1984 and 3 January 1985. A total of 2,818 persons were questioned, including: 1,050 in the 19 communes of the city of Brussels; 795 in the 6 peripheral communes with facilities; and 973 in the 19 communes making up the Brussels suburbs.

[13 Mar 85 pp 4-5]

[Text] Voting Choice Next Time

Whom will the Brussels residents vote for? Within the framework of a survey such as this, it was necessary to pose this catch question, realizing that its results would have to be interpreted with maximum caution and for several reasons.

In general, first of all, the reliable polling institutes -- led by INUSOP, naturally -- have learned to distrust pre- or postelection "consultations," first of all, because the rates of no response may reach peaks, thus compromising the value of the effective responses. Second, in the lapse of time separating the poll from the elections, many events may occur that would upset the election map.

Whom will you vote for in the coming elections?<sup>1</sup>

	1981, Actual Votes in Brussels Cantons	1985 Voting Intentions
FDF	22.55	7.7
PRL	15.82	13.7
PS	12.33	10.3
PSC	9.29	5.6
UDRT-RAD [expansion unknown]	8.70	0.5
CVP [Social Christian Party]	6.75	2.1
PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress]	5.68	1.7
VU	4.41	1.1
SP	3.40	2.8
Ecolo	3.09	11.8
PCB-KPB	2.1	1.5
Agalev		1
Vlaams Blok		0.1
Others (minor lists)	5.9	0.6
No response		2.6
Blank	6.91	3.1
No vote		1.7
Will not vote		2.6
Do not know		18.3
Refuse to say		13.3

<sup>1</sup> In the first column of the above table, we reprint the results, by party, of the legislative elections of November 1981, in the Brussels cantons. In addition to the 19 communes, these cantons include certain communes or parts of communes in the administrative district of Hal-Vilvorde. But it is the election division the most similar to our sampling. One must therefore take the comparison between this column of figures and the second, which indicates voting intentions in the 19 communes, with the customary reservations.

In the case at hand, the second reservation is particularly important. No one knows, at the present time, what election configuration, either traditional or revolutionary, will be engendered by the "great maneuvers" underway between and within several Brussels parties.

The quite recent thinning of the FDF and the parallel strengthening of the PS are already sufficiently important phenomena to upset the above data. But these movements will not be the first or the last of the pre-election period.

We therefore could not resist the pleasure of engaging in pre-election speculations, giving them their rightful place -- more anecdotal than scientific -- and trying to limit damage to a minimum.

The table included compares voting intentions expressed by persons questioned in the 19 communes with the actual results of the 1981 legislative elections observed in the cantons of Brussels, the political-administrative entity closest to these 19 communes which, electionwise, do not exist as such. Such a comparison would be hazardous if we envisaged all of our greater Brussels. The latter, as we have explained, has been outlined in terms of geographic and social criteria that in no way coincide with the political outlines of the election cantons.

### Thrilling Main Trends

The main trends emerging from this picture are exciting. One in fact observes: an impressive decline in the FDF, which, from being the leading Brussels party in 1981, has fallen to fourth place; a settling -- rather surprising, if one is to believe the mood and certain polls -- of the PRL, which is losing 2 percent of its voters, but is becoming the leading party in the 19 communes; a thundering "green thrust," with Ecolo becoming the second-ranking party in Brussels, coming out of nowhere; the very clear decline of the PSC, which no longer gains 6 percent of the Brussels voters; the decline in the PS like that of the PRL, placing the party in third place in Brussels; and the decline in all Flemish lists.

How can one explain that only one surge corresponds to all these declines and still fails to make up for them? The answer to the question is very probably to be found in the 13 percent refusals to respond and in the 18 percent unsure. They are the ones who will make the difference on election day. In the meantime, they, along with other things already mentioned, compromise the predictive value of the poll table.

### Satisfied Voters Choose the CVP, PRL, PSC

How is the party for which you voted in 1981 now defending your interests?

<u>1981 Vote</u>	<u>PSC</u>	<u>CVP</u>	<u>PS</u>	<u>SP</u>	<u>PRL</u>	<u>PVV</u>	<u>FDF</u>	<u>VU</u>	<u>PC</u>	<u>UDRT</u>	<u>Ecolo</u>	<u>Agal.</u>
Well	59.7	66.9	49.7	64.1	61.7	61.8	45.7	63.5	21.9	42.8	46.2	64.5
Poorly	19.4	12.5	20.0	10.9	15.3	14.7	32.9	11.4	34.4	25.0	12.6	10.4
Depends	11.4	12.5	21.7	16.7	16.5	15.4	14.0	18.6	28.1	14.3	22.4	16.7
Do not know	9.4	8.2	8.6	8.3	6.5	8.1	7.3	6.6	15.6	17.9	18.7	10.4

More than the preceding table, which is indicative at best, another question gives one an idea of the degree of attachment of each voter to his adopted party. That is what the above table indicates. It shows the extent to which voters approve or disapprove of the current action of their chosen party.

Those who come out the best are undeniably the Flemish parties on the whole, led by the CVP and a "yellow card" for the PVV, which has 14 percent unsatisfied voters in its ranks.

On the French-speaking side, the "stars" are governmental: the PSC and the PRL. The good points of the PS, Ecolo and the FDF are less important, not exceeding 50 percent, and one notes a peak of dissatisfaction in 1 out of 3 FDF voters. It is a record beaten only by the PC, whose troops appear on our table to have a very low level of satisfaction.

Nols, Spaak, Gol: Neither Stars Nor Messiahs

Politicians who best defend Brussels (total names mentioned) (in percent).

Do not know	55.1
None	5.2
Nols, Roger	9.8
Spaak, Antoinette	9.0
Gol, Jean	5.0
Vanden Boeynants, Paul	3.6
Anciaux, Vic	3.3
Cudell, Guy	3.2
Martens, Wilfried	3.2
Desir, Georges	2.9
Thijs, Jean-Louis	2.8
Goor, Cecile	2.8
Spitaels, Guy	2.1
Brouhon, Herve	2.0
Hatry, Paul	1.9
Outers, Lucien	1.9
Simonet, Henri	1.8
Moureaux, Philippe	1.5
Moureaux (undet.)	1.5
Tindemans	1.4
Weckx, Hugo	1.3
Lagasse, Andre	1.2
Defosset, Leon	1.2
Neyts-Uyttebroeck, A.-M.	1.2
DeClercq, Willy	1.1
Demuyter, Albert	1.0
Clerfayt, Georges	0.9
Desmaret, Michel	0.9
Moureaux, Serge	0.9
DePaux, Lydia	0.7
Deprez, Gerard	0.7
Van Halteren, Pierre	0.7
Nothomb, Ch.-Ferdinand	0.6
Van Miert, Karel	0.6

Chabert, Jos	0.5
Desmaret (undet.)	0.5
Van Geyt, Louis	0.5
De Groeve, Andre	0.5
Steyaert, Rika	0.4
Vandenhaute, Jacques	0.4
De Wulf	0.4
De Donnea	0.4
Thijs (undet.)	0.4
Deleuze, Olivier	0.4
Pouillet, Edouard	0.3
Schiltz, Hugo	0.3

(Total over 100 percent due to several responses possible from each person.)

Which politicians not from Brussels should participate in the coming legislative elections in Brussels?

Do not know	32.2
None	53.0
Gol, Jean	2.2
Van Miert, Karel	2.0
Spitaels, Guy	1.7
Happart, Jose	1.6
Martens, Wilfried	1.5
Tindemans, Leo	1.4
De Clercq, Willy	1.2
Deprez, Gerard	0.7
Schiltz, Hugo	0.6
Maystadt, Philippe	0.6
Claes, Willy	0.6
Tobback, Louis	0.5
Glinne, Ernest	0.5

(Total different from 100 percent due to several responses possible from each person.)

Question: Who is the political "star" of Brussels? Answer: No one. When asked which politicians best defend Brussels, 60 percent remain silent. Among the men and women who come to the top, one finds two "real" Brussels residents: Roger Nols and Antoinette Spaak, real political locomotives that one might well grab hold of in the weeks ahead.

In third place: Jean Gol, from Liege, who, if one is to believe the poll, would not do too badly if he ran in the capital! The next in line, a veteran, Paul Vanden Boeynants, barely comes ahead of a triad made up of a socialist (Cudell ahead of Spitaels and Moureaux, bound to make people jealous) and two Flemish, who are quite different: "statesman" and "father" Wilfried Martens, on the one hand, and on the other, the symbol of hard,

pure Flemish combat, Vic Anciaux, leader of the Volksunie. In addition, one should emphasize the scant popularity of the regional ministers from the different parties. The first one named, Mrs Goor, of the PSC, does not obtain 3 percent.

Along the same line of ideas, one will note that the Brussels residents are scarcely awaiting a saviour. At most, they would lean toward Jean Gol, whose previous score is confirmed here, and Karel Van Miert, the image of a certain Flanders. Jose Happart is comically sandwiched between his party president, Guy Spitaels, and the prime minister. But beyond the anecdotal, the most striking figure of the table is undoubtedly that of the 85 percent of the Brussels residents who expect nothing from anyone.

#### Flemish and Walloons Judge Brussels Residents

Even if our survey aims to reveal what Brussels residents are like to other Belgians, it seemed logical to us to try to learn the feeling of Walloons and Flemish, using certain questions put to our sampling of 3,000 persons. We therefore asked INUSOP to "test" some of the questions put to the people of Brussels by putting them to a sampling of all Belgians.

Let us state straight off: This second poll conducted by INUSOP did not have the scope of the survey done by LE SOIR and the following information was gathered from a sampling of 700 persons: 350 in Flanders and 350 in Wallonia distributed in over 150 communes in the country and questioned from 16 January to 4 February. The population questioned was representative of the Belgian population 18 and over. The results obtained were naturally pondered based on the true distribution of inhabitants in the two regions of the country.

#### Wallonia and Flanders Willing To Sacrifice Brussels?

The Flemish and Walloons feel the same emotions toward Belgian as do the Dutch- and French-speaking people of Brussels.

In general, the feeling of being Belgian prevails rather clearly, a feeling reinforced by the impression that everyone, whether from Flanders, Wallonia or Brussels, seems to live on an equal footing. There is also a unanimity for "old Belgium" and for the role to be played by Brussels as the capital.

Naturally, certain federalist feelings do appear, particularly in the models of development to be chosen for the two main regions. There is also the distrust of Wallonia for Flanders which is unilateral: In the eyes of those questioned, the northern region would tend to want to control Brussels.

## Being Belgian

To what group do you feel you mainly belong? (in percent)

	<u>Walloons</u>	<u>Flemish</u>
All Belgians	63	43
Community	8	24
Region	16	8
Province	4	3
Commune	9	20

One is more Belgian -- or Belgian-tending -- in Wallonia than in Flanders. However, on both sides -- and this is also true in Brussels -- the strongest feeling of attachment is definitely to Belgium.

The "substitutes" proposed to citizens: communities and regions, reveal their weakness, with the French community, the Flemish region, attaining scarcely 8 percent. The Flemish community and Walloon region are a little more popular.

The attraction of the commune does appear to be much stronger in Flanders than in Wallonia and than among the Flemish of Brussels.

In addition, the poll revealed the specific choices of certain socioprofessional categories, Wallonia and Flanders combined. It is worth noting that the category of independents is relatively little "Belgian-tending" and relatively municipalist (42 percent for Belgium; 23 percent for communal affiliation as the first choice). Workers choose Belgium by 53 percent (first choice) and students by 62 percent.

## Economic Policy

The Brussels residents are at a disadvantage with regard to political decisions:

	<u>Walloons</u>	<u>Flemish</u>
Yes	18	6
No	54	69
Do not know	27	19

Regarding economic decisions:

Yes	18	5
No	54	71
Do not know	26	18

The Flemish are at a disadvantage regarding political decisions:

	<u>Walloons</u>	<u>Flemish</u>
Yes	2	44
No	76	36
Do not know	21	15

Economic decisions:

Yes	3	44
No	76	36
Do not know	21	14

The Walloons are at a disadvantage regarding political decisions:

	<u>Walloons</u>	<u>Flemish</u>
Yes	55	10
No	24	64
Do not know	20	21

Economic decisions:

Yes	60	9
No	21	64
Do not know	18	21

The Walloons and Flemish are definitely convinced (64 percent) that the people of Brussels are at no disadvantage regarding political and economic decisions.

One generally tends to deny one's own privileges or to see privileges only if one's neighbor enjoys them. The Flemish seem convinced that they are at a disadvantage and so do the Walloons.

Wallonia: Flanders Wants To Absorb Brussels

What is the main attitude of the Flemish regarding Brussels?

	<u>Flanders</u>		<u>Walloon</u>	
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
They are indifferent to it.	34	61	20	76
They mainly want to defend Brussels people who speak their language.	77	18	68	28
They want Brussels as a third region.	26	63	32	61
They want to control Brussels.	25	63	74	22

What is the main attitude of the Walloons toward Brussels?

	Flanders		Wallonia	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
They are indifferent to it.	35	55	24	72
They mainly want to defend Brussels people who speak their language.	77	14	66	29
They want Brussels as a third region.	36	50	62	31
They want to control Brussels.	45	42	28	67

In the provinces, everyone believes that "the others" are not indifferent to Brussels. It is an opinion that the Brussels residents were not far from sharing concerning the Flemish and Walloons.

One observes a solidarity of the Walloons with the Francophone Brussels people and of the Flemish with the Dutch-speaking Brussels residents. However, it is a solidarity lacking in any desire for absorption.

The Flemish do not preach the idea of a Brussels region equal to the other two regions -- far from it -- but the Walloons do favor the idea. However, they clearly reject "tripartite federalism," which precisely implies the equality of Brussels with the other regions. It is a paradox that tends to indicate that on community matters, the Walloons do not make the connection between general ideas and their practical implications.

#### Province Not Federalist

What kind of a future would you want for Belgium?

	<u>Flemish</u>	<u>Walloons</u>
United state	59	70
Two-way federation	20	7
Three-way federation	8	10
Nine-way federation	3	7
Two states	7	3
Three states	2	3

"Old Belgium" retains the edge, even among the young (63 percent of the persons questioned between the ages of 18 and 34 look favorably upon a united future) and the working class (68 percent).

A two-way federal state would satisfy 1 out of 4 Flemish, but scarcely 7 out of 100 Walloons. As for three-way federalism, it would apparently succeed only in Brussels. Only 10 percent of the Walloons and 8 percent of the Flemish would want it, a valuable piece of political information! But, as one can see, it is partially contradicted by other tables.

## Walloons Not Consistent

What kind of a future would you want for Brussels?

	<u>Walloons</u>	<u>Flemish</u>
A territory dependent on the national government	46	64
A full region	42	13
A European city independent of the Belgian Government	10	19

Should Brussels remain the capital of Belgium?

	<u>Walloon</u>	<u>Flanders</u>
Yes	92	88
No	0	5

Surprise! The Walloons who had previously been the fervent defenders of a united Belgium and very reserved regarding three-way federalism, only desired by 10 percent of them, are now 42 percent behind a "Brussels as a third region," which is nevertheless another way of describing that three-way federalism! One has already observed among French-speaking Brussels residents that divorce between the highly present idea of a united Belgium and the contradictory claim of a status as a full region for Brussels. But the phenomenon achieves greater scope here. At most, one might risk assuming that, obsessed by their emotional desire for national unity, the Walloons are, when one speaks in specifics, much more discriminating.

The Flemish are truer to themselves, with only 13 supporting Brussels as a third region. On the other hand, they support the current hybrid situation: "Brussels as a territory dependent on the national government." One will also note that this solution is the first one chosen by the Walloons, who are definitely not in a hurry to get Brussels out of its political ghetto.

As in Brussels, the idea of a European city is scarcely enticing. It is true that public opinion does not yet have a very precise political understanding of it.

## Autonomy for Regions

Your future mainly depends on solidarity with the Brussels residents. Do you:

	<u>Walloons</u>	<u>Flemish</u>
Totally agree	23	9
Agree somewhat	35	19

(cont.)

Disagree somewhat	20	28
Totally disagree	19	40

Your future mainly depends on the autonomous development of your region.  
Do you:

	<u>Walloons</u>	<u>Flemish</u>
Agree totally	46	28
Agree somewhat	28	33
Disagree somewhat	14	19
Totally disagree	9	16

From the standpoint of the Flemish, solidarity with the Brussels residents has no decisive effect on the future and 68 percent of them do not want to hear about the idea. Inversely, solidarity with the Brussels residents carries weight in the eyes of the Walloons (as one can see by adding the "totally" and "agree somewhat": 58 percent).

Nevertheless, the future of Wallonia depends on its autonomous development, 74 percent of the Walloons think, while 61 percent of the Flemish are of the same opinion for their own regional development.

This tends to show that the Walloons are henceforth well imbued with the adage "Save yourself." And that the Flemish experience their relationship with the mother country more calmly.

#### Bilingualism

Bilingualism is our art of living! That is the message sent to us by the Brussels residents in the INUSOP tables that we are publishing below, tables that place the French-speaking parties in an unstable position with respect to their election following.

Does one not see a majority favoring overall bilingualism of public officials and of communal and even private services?

Certain data published yesterday indicate that a majority of the French-speaking people of Brussels feel deprived of private and public jobs, while a majority of the Dutch-speakers feel poorly served by the hospitals and mass transport.

Overall bilingualism appears to be a remedy to these evils. It is a famous stepping stone in the political sea.

Is there a reasonable solution to the linguistic-political malaise felt by the people of Brussels? Yes, bilingualism! At least, this is the feeling of a French- and Flemish majority.

1 -- They favor -- especially in the "communes a facilites," \* total bilingualism of communal elected officials. In this connection, one will note that only a minority of French-speakers (8.7 percent) expresses antibilingual feelings. An absolute majority of the voters in the French-speaking parties deem such bilingualism indispensable. The sole exception: FDF voters who are divided between those who deem bilingualism "desirable" (42 percent) and those who deem it indispensable (41 percent).

It will be noted that the minority of French-speakers rejecting bilingualism is not as great as that of the Flemish expressing the same attitude, all indications of a linguistic "pragmatism" that scarcely fits with the claims of certain parties.

2 -- In daily life as well, French-speakers vastly prefer to have bilingual public servants. They clearly prefer this highly practical solution to that of "bilingualism of services but unilingualism of public servants" preached by the PS and the FDF.

Only 1 out of 3 Brussels residents and French-speakers support this second solution. This proportion rises to 36 percent for PS voters and 40 percent (compared with 58 percent for bilingualism of public servants) for FDF voters.

The following table shows the choice of Brussels residents concerning relations with employees at communal offices and windows. But there is also a majority supporting bilingualism of police and gendarmes (78.5 percent), post office employees (70 percent), conductors on mass transit (78.6 percent), personnel at major stores (74.8 percent) and in hospitals (74 percent). In all cases, it is the inhabitants of the communes with facilities who say they are the most fervent supporters of overall bilingualism.

In the second part of our survey next week, we shall pay more detailed attention to the practice of bilingualism in Brussels. What language is spoken at home, at work, in the schools? What language do people want to learn? Here also, the attitudes of the Brussels residents are very interesting.

Do you believe it is indispensable, desirable but not indispensable or not at all necessary for the burgomaster, aldermen, communal council members and CPAS [Public Centers for Social Aid] advisers to be bilingual (French-Dutch) in your commune?

	French	Dutch	Brus.	Commune/ Facil.	Suburbs	Total
Indispensable	52.3	62.6	62.5	73.9	41.0	55.9
Desirable, not indis.	37.4	25.1	32.1	20.3	37.5	33.4
Not at all necessary	8.7	10.8	4.1	4.5	19.3	9.2
No response	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.4	2.2	1.6

\*[Dutch speaking communities with special provisions for the Francophone minority]

Concerning bilingualism (French-Dutch) in public and private services, there are two possible solutions: Either every employee will be bilingual, speaking French and Dutch, or every office or service will have unilingual employees (speaking either French or Dutch), but in each of the two languages.

For communal offices and windows, for example, which of these two solutions do you prefer?

	First Solution: Bilingual Employees		
	French	Dutch	Total
Communal offices and windows	62.6	81.6	68.6

	Second Solution: Bilingual Offices		
	French	Dutch	Total
Communal offices and windows	35.3	15.6	29.1

	First Solution: Bilingual Employees			
	Brussels	Com.Fac.	Suburbs	Total
Communal offices and windows	67.2	81.8	69.6	68.6

	Second Solution: Bilingual Offices			
	Brussels	Com.Fac.	Suburbs	Total
Communal offices and windows	31.1	16.6	27.2	29.1

#### Brussels

For whom will Brussels vote? The question, an exciting, essential one in a poll such as ours, has in recent days taken a particular turn. The "desertion" of two leaders from the FDF: Defosset and Moureaux, and their rallying to a PS list is already enough to mix up the election cards that we had so patiently drawn. But in addition, it could serve as a detonator -- or excuse -- for a veritable political explosion in Brussels, an explosion of which, by the very force of things, our poll conducted at the end of 1984 does not bear a trace.

One must therefore read some of the following tables with a special frame of mind, remembering constantly that they describe the mental images, expectations and choices of the Brussels residents before the latest events. And seek, not the reflection of the vicissitudes, but the visible portion of icebergs, of bottom swells.

What are the main reasons for choosing a party, in the eyes of the Brussels residents? Economic, linguistic or some other? How do the people of Brussels view the parties, those for which they vote and for which they do not vote? How do they experience bilingualism? The answers to these

questions still retain the same interest they had when they were posed. They will gain more in the weeks ahead.

In the political domain, you know that there is talk of the right and the left. Where would you situate yourself?

		<u>French</u>	<u>Dutch</u>	<u>Total</u>
Left	1	3.5	3.5	3.5
	2	9.7	7.0	8.9
	3	13.9	10.8	12.8
Center	4	32.3	31.1	32.0
	5	15.3	13.6	14.3
	6	6.9	8.3	7.3
Right	7	2.7	2.8	2.7
Do not know		13.8	21.3	16.2
No response		2.0	1.7	1.8

		<u>Brussels</u>	<u>Com.Fac.</u>	<u>Suburbs</u>
Left	1	3.9	1.1	2.8
	2	10.7	8.3	5.5
	3	13.1	8.4	12.8
Center	4	31.4	36.6	32.4
	5	15.8	16.8	12.7
	6	7.0	8.9	7.8
Right	7	3.2	3.6	1.6
Do not know		13.0	15.2	22.2
No response		1.8	1.1	2.1

In the center, everyone! This is undoubtedly how one could sum up the above scale, a relatively harmonious scale, even if it is slightly tipped to the left, pushed by the French-speakers and the inhabitants of the 19 communes. It is the younger people, upper-level personnel, teachers and workers who place themselves the furthest to the left, with the merchants and liberal professions ranging themselves -- traditionally -- to the right of the political scene. As for government employees, they are the least "centrist," the least indifferent to politics, inasmuch as they have more supporters of the left and right than of the middle. Those same officials, moreover, say, in answer to another unpublished question, that they are relatively strongly interested in politics. If 10 percent of all Brussels residents say they are very interested in politics, 33 percent devote "average interest," 30 percent "slight interest" and 26 percent not interested at all. But among the committed, one mainly finds, in addition to civil servants, the upper-level personnel, liberal professions and potential voters of the SP, PSC, the Volksunie and the Communist Party. The PRL, PS and FDF voters manifest the same average interest in politics, while the declared indifferents are mainly the elderly, workers and CVP voters.

The following terms have great importance in the lives of some individuals. What is your personal reaction to them: positive, negative, neither for nor against, or do the words evoke nothing for you?

	<u>Pos.</u> <u>Reac.</u>	<u>Neg.</u> <u>Reac.</u>	<u>Neither for</u> <u>Nor against</u>	<u>Evokes</u> <u>Nothing</u>	<u>No</u> <u>Response</u>
Capitalism	30.4	31.5	27.8	7.7	2.7
Socialism	35.5	28.8	26.3	6.9	2.5
Unitarianism	33.7	22.3	19.2	21.7	3.1
Liberalism	47.0	20.4	20.0	9.9	2.7
Trade unionism	28.9	35.2	24.8	8.1	3.0
Separatism	7.0	56.8	14.7	18.7	2.9
Federalism	27.6	33.1	21.9	14.4	3.1
Leftism	8.2	53.5	18.1	17.2	3.1
Provincialism	12.6	39.7	24.0	20.3	3.4
Racism	11.0	67.9	12.7	5.5	2.9
Ecology	59.6	9.3	18.0	10.3	2.7
Pluralism	43.5	11.6	17.5	24.2	3.2
Anti-Semitism	8.9	59.6	12.5	16.2	2.8

What strikes a chord with the people of Brussels? In descending order: ecology, liberalism, pluralism. What do they abhor? Racism, anti-Semitism, separatism. However, the labels suggested give rise to a refined interest rather than outright enthusiasm.

This is sometimes a matter of concern. Nearly 24 percent of those questioned actively approve of or do not disapprove of racism and 21 percent have the same attitude toward anti-Semitism. The word "racism" is judged positively by those under 25 (13 percent), Brussels residents of the 19 communes, blue-collar workers and merchants, while it is clearly rejected by employees of the private sector, the liberal professions and teachers. Anti-Semitism is accepted by civil servants and lower-level management, but fortunately, in all these cases, it is a matter of undeniable minorities.

One might single in on other singular or revealing choices of the people of Brussels. Politically speaking and in a straight line with what was revealed above, the notion of unitarianism attracts a majority of Francophones and is rejected by a majority of Dutch-speakers, while the word "federalism" has the opposite fate. The word "liberalism" receives majority support from the French-speakers (51 percent) and the people of Brussels (49 percent). The word "ecology" attracts elderly persons and those of average means rather than the young, an indication of its strong penetration of all strata of society and its unpoliticized nature.

What makes the people of Brussels vote? Above all, economic and social interests, "class" interests, followed by ethical and moral concerns.

When you vote for a party or candidate, what are the two factors that you deem to be most important from among the following:

	<u>Total</u>
Interest for your social milieu	38.0
Positions on linguistic and community matters	22.7
Positions on moral and ethical problems (abortion, education)	29.7
Positions on economic and social matters	56.8
Positions on international issues	14.5
I do not take these factors into account; I vote, out of tradition, for the same party always.	16.3

Linguistics is a lesser motive, although it appears to be a little more important in the communes with facilities, where 28.6 percent of those questioned name it, and negligible in the eyes of Dutch-speakers, 80 percent of whom do not name it.

If economic and social positions appear to be more important to those under the age of 45, to management personnel and the liberal professions, those who have done advanced studies, blue-collar workers and merchants vote to defend their own milieu.

The elderly, the merchants and the less educated generally vote out of tradition, while voting for moral and ethical reasons mainly mobilizes those under 45, teachers and university students, a new factor on the election scene.

#### A Brussels Party?

In your opinion, is there a party that defends Brussels residents more than the others?

	<u>Brussels</u>	<u>Com./Facil.</u>	<u>Suburbs</u>	<u>Total</u>
Yes	44.4	46.6	44.3	44.4
No	50.8	47.5	51.0	50.7
No response	4.9	5.9	4.7	4.9

Is it necessary to have a party exclusively for Brussels?

	<u>French</u>	<u>Dutch</u>	<u>Total</u>
Yes	35.9	15.2	29.7
No	60.7	82.5	67.3
No response	3.4	2.2	3.0

Is there a party that particularly defends Brussels? Yes, say 45 percent of the Brussels residents, a few more among the French-speakers, management personnel and intermediate-level civil servants. It is among the FDF voters that one finds a maximum of persons (70 percent) responding affirmatively to this question. Consequently, when one asks that 45 percent what party they are thinking of, they first of all name that same group, with 63 percent designating it, compared with 8.8 percent for the PRL and 8 percent for the Volksunie. This image, "FDF = Brussels," is naturally present among voters of the party, but also those of the PS (71 percent), the PRL and the CVP (61 percent), the PVV (60 percent). It will be noted that 18 percent of the PS voters, 30 percent of the PRL voters, 26 percent of the VU voters name their party of choice as the most typically of Brussels.

There is no paradox here. In fact, a majority of the Brussels residents (67.3 percent) believe that it is not necessary to have a party exclusively for Brussels. This conviction is clearly less established in Brussels and among French-speakers than among Dutch-speakers. But if one recalls that the Brussels residents vote primarily on economic, social and ethical issues, matters that are not necessarily "typically Brussels-related," one understands that the defense of the capital is not necessarily a must in the eyes of the voters.

Most Dynamic: the PRL and the FDF

What party in Brussels seems to you to be the most dynamic?

	<u>Brussels</u>	<u>Com.Facil.</u>	<u>Suburbs</u>	<u>French</u>	<u>Dutch</u>
PSC	7.3	5.9	4.9	7.8	3.7
CVP	2.5	7.0	8.7	1.2	12.9
PS	11.2	5.7	6.1	11.5	4.6
SP	2.9	3.5	5.1	1.3	9.1
PRL	22.9	13.9	12.4	24.3	6.7
PVV	1.9	2.2	3.9	0.3	7.6
FDF	14.7	22.7	15.9	16.4	13.1
VU	1.1	5.0	6.1	0.4	8.6
PC/KP	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.1
UDRT/RAD	2.1	2.5	2.0	2.7	0.7
Ecolo	9.7	4.8	4.2	9.9	3.2
Agalev	0.7	1.1	2.0	0.2	3.2
No response	22.2	25.3	28.2	23.0	26.7

The Brussels residents seem rather inclined to grant the labels of dynamism, courage and democracy to parties for which they do not vote, as indicated by a question for which the above table supplies a sampling and which dealt with the features of the various groups present in Brussels.

Which is the most dynamic party? The party most open to the young? The party closest to the population? These questions leave 1 out of 3 Brussels residents puzzled and reveal some surprises.

The most dynamic party is undeniably the PRL (for 19 percent, 23 percent of these in Brussels), followed by the FDF (15.4 percent, 16 percent of these French-speakers, 22 percent residents of the communes with facilities and 13 percent Flemish) and the PS (9.4 percent, 11.2 percent of them in Brussels).

The Flemish choose the CVP in second place (12 percent), followed by the SP (9.1 percent).

On the other hand, it is the PS (17.6 percent) which appears to be the party closer to the population, followed by the FDF and the PRL, with 13.8 percent of the Flemish naming the SP. The PS is also in the lead as the party rallying women, followed closely by the FDF (13.3 percent compared with 13. percent): the so-called "Antoinette effect."

As for Ecolo, it is by far the one that rallies the most young people (22 percent). Its rivals: the PS and the PRL, are close behind.

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CSO: 3619/64

POLITICAL

BELGIUM

VAN MIERT ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC ISSUES IN ELECTION

Brussels LE SOIR in French 7 Mar 85 pp 1, 2

/Article by Karel Van Miert, President of Socialist Party/

/Text/ It is obvious to everyone that the upcoming elections will be of crucial importance for us all. Neither the prime minister nor his partners in the present coalition are allowing the slightest doubt to remain in this regard; their clearly announced intention is to pursue together the same policy that they have pursued until now. This means that the policy of socially-inverted redistribution will thus be followed for a new 4-year period. In concrete terms, we can therefore expect a further reduction in the purchasing power of the great majority of the population for the benefit of a group to which the present government has given special favors and attention, such as, for example, financial amnesty. With such a prospect, impoverishment could only increase and the unemployed, sick, pensioners, handicapped persons and families would be again painfully hit in coming years.

Moreover, it is clear that there is little to be expected of the present government team with regard to its taking a realistic initiative of its own to stimulate a real detente between the East and the West. The servile attitude adopted by the government in the missile question adequately demonstrates this inability to act independently. But there it is. In order to be able to continue in office, the present majority must meet the test of elections. And the question that remains to be answered is whether the present coalition will still have, after the coming elections, a majority that will allow it to pursue its policy. This majority is weak. It is now based only on half-a-dozen seats in the Chamber and an equal number in the Senate. The European elections of June 1984 showed that this majority could easily be overturned. And such is the stake in the coming elections. Because it is only by turning the present majority into a minority that a basic change of policy will become possible. Now, such is our goal. And this makes it necessary to call for the gathering together of all our forces.

Thus, I find myself obliged to draw from the present political situation a number of conclusions affecting me personally.

The principal conclusion is that, in these circumstances, I can no longer reject the moral imperative of proposing my candidacy in the upcoming national

elections. Thus, my goal is to win a seat in the national parliament, rather than to continue to sit in the European parliament. An ever-growing number of friends, both inside and outside the socialist movement, have succeeded in convincing me that many voters would not understand my refusal to engage personally in the electoral fight at such a crucial moment. It is obvious that, as a deputy in the national parliament, I will remain faithful to my European convictions and will continue the fight for a unified, democratic and peaceful Europe by other means and in other forums. I continue to believe also that the only way to face up to the Soviet Union is to gather together all the forces of the European democracies, it being understood, however, that they should conduct themselves in a truly autonomous manner and not, as now, allow themselves to be moved about as pieces on the East-West chessboard. Meanwhile, it is logical for our people to worry first of all about things in everyday life. The majority of the population rightly wants the fight against unemployment to be conducted with greater firmness and determination. The purchasing power of modest and middle incomes must be protected again. The fight against poverty must be carried out by acts rather than words. And in cases in which there is insufficient private investment, the public sector must intervene. A selective recovery, such as we have been advocating for some time, is indispensable.

Finally, our country must find the courage to act autonomously and oppose the mad escalation in the armaments race. In this connection, we must abandon the idea of installing 48 cruise missiles--and this, moreover, would be in conformity with the wishes of the people.

As the former American secretary of defense, McNamara, said again recently: "These arms (i.e., the 572 new American intermediate-range missiles destined for Europe) will increase neither the security of Western Europe nor that of NATO. I see no military need for their installation."

Thus, the Socialist Party will continue to fight, with all the means at its disposal, against this policy of overarming. Even if the present government decides to begin deployment of the missiles, we would go back on this decision if the people gave us the mandate to do so. It can do this by expressing itself clearly in the coming elections.

It is on the basis of these overall, socioeconomic and propeace positions that I propose to lead my party, whose president I have had the honor of being for nearly 8 years.

I will therefore head the Socialist Party ticket for the Chamber of Deputies in the Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde district. It is a place where the fight will be very hard, especially given the consolidation of forces on the Right that is now taking place.

Finally, I want henceforth to give my personal attention to the task of bringing to a successful conclusion the reform of the state in such a way that Brussels will find its place and both Flemish-speakers and French-speakers will feel at home. This would be in everyone's interest.

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

# PROSPECTS FOR NEW SOLIDARITY AND PARTICIPATION PARTY

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 20 Feb 85 pp 35-36

[Article by Jose Fontaine: "Voters Sought for a New Party"]

[Text] Several thousand militants from the MOC [Christian Workers' Movement (Walloon)] have decided to present at the coming elections a new party, to be called SEP [Solitarity and Participation]. Several factors may help to explain this remarkable turn of events in a Walloon context.

The MOC is not exactly a full-blown institution in and of itself, but rather an agency that groups together the divers branches of the Christian workers' movement in general: sick-funds, trade unions and cultural associations (such as the JOC [Young Christian Workers], for example, or Vie Feminine [Woman's Life], a very dynamic women's organization). But on a political level, not only are the "Christian Democrats" of the PSC [Christian Social Party] represented within the MOC family (by whom I mean only the members of parliament who stand behind the workers, thus not all the members of the PSC), but also certain figures from the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] and the Walloon Rally (RW) (already since the early seventies).

Each of the three tendencies within the MOC is for the moment on the decline: the RW seems to have fallen into a state of lethargy, or more accurately, into a moribund condition, since its reversal at the time of the European elections. The FDF in Brussels is clearly in difficulty: in 1974 the Christian Democratic MPs of the PSC still represented 55 percent of the congressional group, but now it is scarcely 28 percent.

For that matter, can one indeed still speak of an organized leftist tendency within the PSC, for the chairman has done away with the representation in so-called "families" (Christian Democrats versus CEPIC [Political Center of Christian Independents and Cadres])? It seems doubtful. To this must be added the fact that many Christians, by crossing over to the dissident RW offshoot party, the RPW [Walloon People's Rally], have openly joined the PS, such, among others, as the chairperson of the RPW himself, Yves de Wasseige.

The chairperson of the MOC, Mrs Wynants, has also condemned in very harsh terms the current policy of the government, which had never before been implemented. From all of this it follows that the CSC [Confederation of Chris-

tian Trade Unions], which, however, is nowhere declining in Wallonia, no longer enjoys reliable political extension, while the FGTB [General Confederation of Labor of Belgium], (its socialist counterpart) indeed maintains a definite relationship with the PS.

The PS, which has managed to come up with a few Christians, seems, however, not so much to have transmitted signals of an opening toward the non-socialists, as has the Flemish Socialist Party, with its Operation Breakthrough. For a few months one has been hearing the Walloon socialists say that they would really like to get a coalition going with the liberals, to constitute the Walloon administration, if that body is no longer to be constituted proportionately, as in the current phase of regionalization.

SEP people make these analyses on the basis of the present power relationships in Wallonia. They distrust the PS, not so much because of their Christian background as because they find the party too uncommunicative, too bureaucratic, with a militant nucleus of liberals, whereby it seems out of the question for the PS to become a really pluralistic party. The Christian progressive militants are just as fearful that the PS should intervene too much in union matters and in the cultural organizations, in which they play a very dynamic role (youth movements, women's movements....), much more dynamic perhaps than the socialists.

SEP conducted a sociological study some time ago to determine whether a moderate-left, pluralistic and federalist party would have a chance of gaining the ascendancy in Wallonia. From that unpublished study it appears, for example on the ethical level, that a very broad and tolerant plurality exists concerning such matters as divorce, abortion, contraception and the fact of unmarried couples living together. The same tolerance, the same progressive propensity, seems to be there with regard to emigration, division of labor, the elimination of inequalities and the existence of two systems of education.

True, in all these areas, especially the ethical problems and the matters concerning education, a hard clerical nucleus still exists (13 percent view abortion as a crime, eight percent are opposed to divorce or premarital relationships and four percent are even against contraception), and they presumably make up the hard core of the PSC electorate, as the counterpart of the hard secular nucleus within the PS. It is the tolerant and progressive electorate that the SEP wants to win over.

When one asks them whether they are not hunting in the same preserve as the ecologists, they answer that the kind of greening that incarnates the same values of openness and progressiveness is too insensitive to the concrete social reality. (One example: certain "green" proposals on the level of agriculture give the appearance of a great deal of fantasy and are more "prophetically" than politically directed). Through the activities of SEP militants within the Christian workers' movement, the former can link their sensitivity to "green" with a more concrete "social" commitment. And on the community level, the SEP will be more "Wallingant" [rabidly pro-Walloon] than the PSC or the Ecology Movement (which is not difficult), but less than the PS or whatever remains of the specific federalist tendencies (RW).

On paper, SEP indeed represents an overall picture of aspirations that thrive in society, a picture of anxieties that are already being promoted in Flanders by the Flemish Socialist Party and the Volksunie (ever since the--in my opinion--fortunate separation from the Flemish bloc ). But will SEP be able to obtain an electorate? Do they have sufficient financial means? Will the "Christian" militants and voters not give priority to an existing "Christian" structure instead of to a newcomer whose effectiveness remains uncertain? Even with a restricted electorate, SEP does represent a heavy threat to the PSC, but not to the PS, the party that is still the strongest in Wallonia (stronger than the CVP [Social Christian Party] in Flanders) and is therefore favored by our electoral system.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

STRAUSS REPLIES ON AEROSPACE, SECURITY, ARMS EXPORTS ISSUES

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Mar 85 pp 14-18

[Interview with Franz Josef Strauss; date and place not indicated: "We Need to Strengthen the European Pillar of NATO"]

[Text] Dr Franz Josef Strauss, the minister president of Bavaria has been dealing with defense policy and the defense economy for more than 20 years. While defense minister, Strauss was materially responsible for the buildup of the Bundeswehr; while serving as finance minister, he was concerned with the fiscal issues relating to defense; as chairman of the board of the German Airbus Ltd and member of the board of Messerschmitt, Boelkow, Blohm (MBB), he is particularly involved in the fortunes of the German aerospace and arms industry. Speaking very openly as he usually does, Dr Strauss remarks on the role to be played by the aerospace and defense industries in this day and age in the following interview. As far as he is concerned, the industrial potential necessary for our defense must be maintained. Arms exports, for which he stipulates four criteria, could contribute toward that end. In this context, Strauss comes out in principle in favor of exporting the Leopard 2 to Saudi-Arabia. Replying to a question on the fears that the Americans might some day pull out of Europe after all, Strauss pleads for close integration of American and European security interests and calls for strengthening the European NATO pillar.

[Question] You are a member of the board of the German Lufthansa and for a number of years have served as chairman of the board of the German Airbus Ltd and are considered the best sales promoter of this joint European undertaking. Is your strong commitment to aerospace matters based on the fact that both MBB and German Airbus are located in Munich and that you personally are an enthusiastic flier?

[Answer] My interest in aviation generally is based on my view that this technology functions as a pacemaker for research and development as well as the economy and industry. For decades, German aviation pioneers such as Junkers, Messerschmitt, Heinkel and Focke-Wulff left their imprint on aviation and turned it into an important factor without which the modern world economy would be unthinkable. Civil aviation is one of the most important lifelines of our world and military aviation is an indispensable component of any defense system. With the expansion of air transport into space one more logical step in the utilization of this technology was achieved. When air sovereignty was restored to the FRG in 1955, our job was to catch up once again with the technological standard of the Western world with the help of small-scale innovations and larger-scale production licensing projects. Because of the "technology gap," we had to provide help to our industry to get started. This was done. Thanks to a number of international cooperation projects, the German aerospace industry has caught up once again.

The Airbus project in particular, which was begun in the mid-sixties, required a good deal of political support because it led to a reordering of the aerospace industry. The goal of the policy which was adopted was to get away from national parochialism and work toward an efficient European communal effort and Airbus' success on the world market thus far fully justifies that original approach. I assumed the chairmanship of the board of the German Airbus Ltd in Munich and the European Airbus Industry in Toulouse because I felt it was necessary--above and beyond the political coordination aspect--to come up with a basic industrial plan to help European aerospace technology retain its rightful place on the world market past the year 2000. The European aerospace industry is showing the flag in the skies. Because of my experience on the board of the Airbus companies, I was elected to the board of both MBB and the German Lufthansa.

[Question] Until a few years ago, the U.S. aerospace industry in particular because of the large space programs performed a pacemaker role for industry as a whole. But has it not given up that role in the meantime to the electronics industry?

[Answer] The aerospace industry has continued to hold on to its pacemaker role. Over the years, the electronics industry has come to assume a similar function. Historically speaking, the space program with its need for highly reliable electronic systems has virtually triggered the development of electronics. As before, the aerospace industry keeps sending out impulses to the electronics industry. In addition, it also has an impact on the development of new materials and processes--such as the use of solar cells to generate energy.

[Question] During the past several years, the German aerospace industry has built up considerable development and production capabilities as a result of the large-scale Airbus and Tornado projects. Against the background of stagnating orders for civilian aircraft and continually rarer and smaller military aircraft projects, do you believe that this industrial capacity will be fully utilized over the long term?

[Answer] Let us look at civil aviation first. It is true that sales went down as a result of the worldwide recession. But if we take a look at the airlines' current balance sheets, we find that a real recovery has taken place, enabling them to buy the equipment they need over the next few years. This will help the European aviation industry among others to expand its production capabilities once again. In 1988, the smaller A-320 will be on the market in addition to the A-300 and the A-310 and our plans for the TA-11, the European long-range version, are beginning to take shape.

On the military side, the situation is different. We are facing major capacity problems in the aviation industry by the end of this decade because the Fighter 90 will not make an impact on production until 1993. But I am sure that government and industry will work out joint plans to help bridge over the gap and/or to prevent excessive fluctuations in the labor force by issuing contracts for improving combat effectiveness of existing air force units and thereby reducing the loss of know-how to tolerable levels.

[Question] Not only the aviation industry—the Fighter 90 project appears to be a good deal less ambitious than the Tornado project—but also the tank and naval industries seem headed for bad times. New frigates will not be coming in until the mid-nineties and the Marder successor generation of vehicles is not likely to make full use of the tank industry until the time the Leopard 3 goes into production in the late nineties. Isn't there a danger that the armament industry will have to build down at least in part for lack of orders and that it will, in consequence, drop to too small a level to satisfy later Bundeswehr procurement programs? Do you think there is any way to deal with this problem?

[Answer] Large-scale procurement programs are of a cyclical nature, that is true. In other words, production capabilities must be built up over a number of years and it is then difficult to obtain additional orders because the product cycles of modern large-scale projects normally run for more than 20 years. The intervals between the different major projects are getting longer all the time. That is the main problem. On the other hand, I do think it is possible for the purchaser and the contractor to plan ahead together and so to avoid major losses in terms of development teams and production capabilities. Such planning would also include the procurement of spare parts, industrial maintenance and, above all, improvement of combat efficiency. This would create the possibility of preserving the capabilities required for maintaining the FRG's defense readiness.

[Question] The Flick organization is about to sell the Krauss-Maffei tank plant in Munich, we assume, because it cannot use it to full capacity now that the Leopard 2 production series is completed. What is the extent to which the Bavarian government is involved in this matter and has it taken any steps in any specific direction? In view of the already cited sales picture, would it not make more sense to have two tank developers and producers in Germany instead of three?

[Answer] As a result of the negotiations thus far, a group of firms—also including the Bavarian Construction Finance Office—is to acquire the Krauss-Maffei shares from the Buderus Co; but the transaction must still be approved by the Federal Cartel Office and be sanctioned by the individual firms. The Bavarian government, of course, was very much interested in having this firm whose significance extends far beyond the armament industry as such continue to be managed in a way which guarantees Bavarian interests and above all those of the FRG as a nation and which not only preserves jobs but also helps create new ones. This approach is in keeping with long-range Bavarian economic policies on the strength of which Bavaria has become the home of efficient, future-oriented industries. It is our job to secure and expand upon these achievements. The change of ownership of Krauss-Maffei, which is about to take place, is one more milestone along this road.

As for the second part of your question, all I can say from where I am sitting is that the FRG has not done badly in the past with its three tank developers and producers—the more so since this meant that the entire industry was involved in the major projects.

[Question] Most of the problems we have been talking about could surely be resolved, if the government were to liberalize German arms exports to a greater extent than heretofore. This raises the following question: How do you feel about exporting military technology? Would you be in favor of a more liberal policy than we have at present?

[Answer] Our armament industry production capabilities were established with a view to meeting our own demand. No attempt was ever made—as is the case in other countries—to create and maintain export-oriented capabilities. But I do believe that existing laws do provide us with sufficient political flexibility to enable the FRG government—in view of the political situation in the world—to approve exports of German military products such as might serve German interests.

[Question] Which criteria would a country outside the NATO community have to satisfy in order to be able to receive German military materials?

[Answer] The political guidelines governing the export of weapons of war and other military equipment which were set down on 28 April 1982 by the then SPD/FDP government also dealt with the question of supplying arms to non-NATO countries. The guideline contains two basic principles:

"Approvals for export must be guided by the vital interests of the FRG--- where vital interests is interpreted by the FRG government to mean the foreign and security policy interests of the FRG, taking into account the interests of the alliance."

"There must be an adequate guarantee that the military weapons and other quasi-military equipment are only intended for the defense of the importing nation or the region concerned."

Arms exports, to my way of thinking, must be looked at from the following point of view: the maintenance of the research and development potential; ongoing modernization of weapons systems and lowering of prices of production series; job protection; political influence in oil and raw material-producing countries; possibility of building plants in these countries.

[Question] Does that mean you would supply Leopard 2's and similar modern weapons to Saudi-Arabia ?

[Answer] In principle, yes. The question of German arms supplies to Saudi-Arabia is indissolubly connected to our relationship with Israel. For my political friends and myself this means that we cannot agree to or consider any policy which would result in an abandonment of Israel. The special responsibility which the German people bears toward the state of Israel and its citizens does not mean on the other hand that we must always and in every regard agree with the official policies of Israel. The basic goal of our political actions is and will continue to be to preserve peace for Israel because that is the only way in which the past will at long last be done with in the relationship between our two peoples.

And it is also on this political and moral basis that the issue of supplying arms to Saudi-Arabia must be decided. Israel in particular which, according to Israeli press reports, attains 20 percent of its industrial exports in the arms trade should be able to appreciate the fact that the FRG government's saying no to arms exports would not be understood by the man in the street in view of the high rate of unemployment in the FRG and in view of the fact that the armament industries of other nations stand ready to provide weapons systems of almost equal value. I would also not conceal the fact that reports according to which Israel even supplies arms to countries hostile to her are making this difficult decision no easier for the government of the FRG. At any rate, we must keep in mind that Saudi Arabia is not only one of our most important sources of oil and one of the most notable trading partners for German industry as a whole but that it also is a decisive stabilizing factor in this crisis area of

international politics. In the interest of world peace it is therefore necessary to put Saudi Arabia in a position to exercise this ordering function. Beyond that, however, I believe that explosive issues of this kind should be resolved in confidential conversations among friends and not in the marketplace of public debate.

[Question] In your view, how far should the German side go in taking certain reservations—some of them voiced rather loudly—concerning greater German arms exports into account?

[Answer] We have already touched on the basic precepts underlying German arms export policy as well as the basic approach to a particularly sensitive issue. Beyond that, I see no need publicly to speculate about possible reactions of German policymakers to public opinion pressure from abroad—much of it based on national egotism.

[Question] Is there any politically feasible way at all of liberalizing German arms exports? Are there not serious reservations against it—at least within the ranks of the CDU and more specifically within the ranks of the FDP, the coalition partner?

[Answer] The arms export issue will always be the subject of debate in every democratic country in the world and as a result there will be differences of opinion. In the final analysis, however, the executive and the legislative branch of our government must orient their decisions on the vital interests of the German people according to the constitution.

[Question] Some politicians are saying that NATO should announce uniform export guidelines under which Germany would then export [arms] as **their** "assigned" supplier, so to speak, to particular countries. For another thing, this would cut down on competition among various NATO countries prepared to supply arms. Do you think that such a regulation has a chance of being adopted? Would you at the very least be in favor of an agreement to prevent or at least restrict the export of high technology military equipment?

[Answer] It would certainly be a good thing, if we could get such a uniform policy adopted; but I do not see much hope of that because within NATO, too, there is a wide variety of interests among the different countries from the point of view of economics, history and geography. In this connection I would like to call attention to the Cocom round in which the Western industrial nations are represented and in which they are working out common guidelines regulating the export of sophisticated military equipment.

[Question] The "peace movement" has not only mounted sharp attacks against arms exports but also against all production of military equipment and has been pillorying the arms industry. Scientists and engineers at the

universities and increasingly even within industry itself no longer wish to work on defense contracts. What do you think can be done about that and what arguments might the defense industry—which admittedly has often been left in the lurch by the government—employ to counter the trend?

[Answer] As I already remarked, the German arms industry takes its cue from the defense needs of the FRG. In view of the unchanged threat to our country, we cannot do without the NATO alliance, the Bundeswehr or the arms industry which works for it.

Credible deterrent capability which effectively preserves the peace is indispensable for safeguarding peace and protecting freedom in view of the Soviet arms buildup. To do this, we must be prepared on moral grounds to defend ourselves and must have the equipment to mount this defense. It is the prime task of our industry to maintain this defense capability. It thereby creates one of the preconditions for our policy thanks to which we are able to live in peace and freedom and also secures the very freedom of speech and assembly which the so-called peace movement uses—and in some instances unfortunately abuses—in such ample measure. It is our job therefore to see to it that our soldiers and technicians and the scientists of the arms industry are not placed into the same corner as the enemies of peace.

[Question] European politicians and military men both feel that the nuclear threshold must be raised over the next several years. This is to be achieved increasingly with the aid of new military technologies. Do you see any chance at all for that in view of the fact that it would call for increased expenditures for development and procurement? Can this be financed and can it be implemented politically?

[Answer] Raising the nuclear threshold means strengthening conventional deterrent capability. In view of the fact that all the European members of the alliance are faced with the low birth rate generation of draftees this goal can only be attained with the help of the next generation of "intelligent weapons systems." To do this, we will have to pool the scientific-technological know-how and the superior efficiency of the free world economic order and use both to harmonize our technologically attainable goals with our economic capabilities. But we should not harbor any illusions about one thing: in view of the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet Union in the field of conventional forces—which the West can only reduce but not remove both for domestic policy-psychological reasons and for economic ones—we will continue to rely at least for the foreseeable future on the nuclear component of our defenses.

[Question] There are many times when I cannot get over the impression that Europe expects some American troops to be withdrawn in the long run.

Can this still be prevented or should Europe take account of this by increasing its own defense efforts, e.g. by revitalizing the WEU, the Western European Union ?

[Answer] That is not the question. Europe is being given one last historical opportunity to preserve its right to self-determination and, at the same time, to secure an appropriate voice in world affairs for itself provided it is prepared to shore up the firmness and strength of the transatlantic bridge by means of a strong European pylon. As yet, Europe has not found a response to this challenge—one which would correspond to its size and the size of its population, its economic strength, its technological-scientific potential and above all its cultural heritage. The Soviet threat to the contrary notwithstanding, Europe has not been able to unite in a common and resolute approach to the vital issue of foreign and security policy and to speak with one voice to the outside world on these issues—not because of a lack of insight into the necessity for it but because of internal weakness and partisan tactics.

That is why Europe, as before, is not as yet in a position to take its fate resolutely into its own hands and to take on that degree of political responsibility and self-reliance in world affairs which the Americans would be delighted to turn over to it sooner rather than later. The very call for a withdrawal of American troops from Europe—as issued last summer by Sen Nunn, a man who has been arguing in favor of strong conventional forces in Europe for years—is an expression of the disappointment over [America's] European allies. In the American view, they are not making the kind of contribution to the defense against the common threat which may be expected of them but are continually criticizing or even raising unfounded suspicions about American policies—all the while relying on American protection. The issue of the presence of American troops in Europe, however, must not be made to depend on the quality of European-American relations. Just like the European armed forces the American troops are stationed in Europe in order to guarantee a strong and credible conventional and nuclear deterrent capability which will help prevent war in the interest both of America and Europe.

The credibility of this deterrent capability stands and falls with this concatenation of American and European security interests. That is why the red thread running through the Soviet Union's Western policy is the attempt to push the Americans out of Western Europe which would then—as a result of outside pressure and internal subversion—be unable to escape its inexorable fate of slipping into the communist empire.

That is why we need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. To be sure, Europe will not become a comparable force of equal value and equal rank in the common defense alliance until it has united politically and has integrated its national armed forces in a common European force.

A common European army such as we already tried to establish under the European Defense Community less than 10 years after the end of World War II may seem like a utopian political idea in the face of present European realities. But we know from history that a utopian political concept has very often marked the beginning of decisive developments. As outlandish as it may appear today, one should not lose sight of this goal because the unification of Europe into one state must of necessity also lead to the creation of a joint defense force. In this context one should also consider the fact that the integration of national armies in one common European force would be more effective by far than the summation of all the individual armed forces.

[Question] The French government has repeatedly stated that the French nuclear capability must remain exclusively under French command. In spite of this, can you see any chances for closer cooperation on European defense including British and French nuclear weapons ?

[Answer] Very shortly after he took office, the new French prime minister, [Laurent] Fabius, reaffirmed earlier statements according to which the French nuclear weapons were exclusively designed for the defense of France and were therefore not available for the defense against an attack on the FRG. In view of this unequivocal statement and the fact that there is no sign whatever that France will return into the integrated NATO system in the foreseeable future, I think it would be a waste of time to speculate about whether France might be prepared to have any partner share in its control of its nuclear arsenal as part of a joint European defense effort.

9478

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

# CP CHAIRMAN AALTO AGAIN OFFERS TO COOPERATE WITH SOCIALISTS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 Feb 85 p 11

[Article: "FCP's Arvo Aalto Again Offers To Cooperate with SDP"]

[Text] In a speech in Kemi on Saturday Chairman Arvo Aalto of the Communist Party once again offered the hand of cooperation to the Social Democrats. In Aalto's opinion the bourgeoisie is now doing well in Finland and the left wing is doing poorly. The advance of the bourgeoisie can only be stopped by the combined forces of the workers' movement according to Aalto.

"This presupposes concentrated work on the part of the whole workers' movement. The image of the workers' movement, its philosophy, and its objectives have become obscured in the eyes of the majority of our people. The workers' movement must demonstrate its existence in a visible manner and it must also show that it has the power to carry out its will and what it now wants," stated Aalto.

In his opinion the whole left wing could demonstrate its will and power in shortening work time. This objective could unite the left wing in the same manner as at the time of birth of the workers' movement, thinks Aalto.

"Shortening work time is a suitable, timely, and sufficiently important issue which in order to be accomplished would require the combined forces of the workers' movement already in the next round of contract talks."

Aalto pointed out that the combined support of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] and the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] is now smaller than it has been in 50 years in the workers' movement. "The SDP leadership has long held to the idea that everything is going well for themselves and poorly only for the SKDL. The recent municipal elections have provided an impetus for changing this type of thinking," stated Aalto.

## Vennamo and The Veterans

Special attention should be given to improving the position of war veterans on a pension in the government's next round of budget negotiations, demanded Pekka Vennamo, SMP [Finnish Rural Party] chairman and second finance minister, in

Turku on Saturday. Vennamo considered that an improvement could be accomplished the easiest by increasing the allowance to veterans.

If the state economy and social views do not make it possible to increase the allowance for all veterans, in Vennamo's opinion a significant increase should at least be ensured for those receiving a small pension.

Another necessary pension policy reform for veterans would be to take the years of front line service into full consideration in all pension systems.

Presently years of front line service are considered as entitlement time in public pension systems. Those who have worked in the private sector or in their own firms are denied this benefit.

The livelihood of veterans on a pension is according to Vennamo tied to how the position of low-income pensioners is generally improved. All the smallest pensions should now be increased when the major national pension reform has been completed.

10576

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

POLYNESIAN STABILITY, POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE EXAMINED

Paris LIBERATION in French 18 Mar 85 pp 19-20

[Article by Jean Guisnel: "Polynesia, an Archipelago Under Atomic Influence"]

[Text] The situation in the second French territory in the Pacific is very different from that of New Caledonia. The financial repercussions of the nuclear test center at Mururoa are not unconnected to this. And even though it may mean closing their eyes to certain practices of the local political class, Paris is anxious to maintain the current peace in the 120 islands.

Papeete -- Will the Caledonian disease one day reach French Polynesia and Tahiti, 6,000 kilometers away? Nothing is less certain... True, the "domino theory" has its followers under the Tahitian skies and certain local supporters of independence are not far from thinking that in the coming months their archipelago of 120 islands might also experience similar "movements." And yet, all indications are that the Polynesian situation is quite different from the one in the other French territory in the Pacific: Gaston Flosse, the RPR [Rally for the Republic] president of the territorial administration of Polynesia rules his country with an iron hand and, on the other hand, the supporters of independence divided into a nebula of small parties are far from representing a force comparable to that of the FLNKS [Kanak Independence Movement]. Finally, France has interests here which are much more important than those it defends in New Caledonia, because it is here that, for the last quarter of a century and since its departure from the Algerian bases, it has conducted all of its nuclear experiments.

Even though France's activities in Mururoa are regularly denounced by the independent countries of the South Pacific led by Australia and New Zealand, France does not intend to let go of its nuclear atoll which is "absolutely essential to the maintenance of our technological level and, consequently, to the coherence of our defense system," according to what General Jeanou Lacaze, chief of staff of the armed forces, said last 14 January.

It was on 6 September 1984, following the election in May 1982 of a new territorial assembly, that Polynesia attained its new status: henceforth, Gaston Flosse, leader of the Tahoeraa, local variant of the RPR, will with full powers lead the government of Polynesia which has been endowed with very broad

powers by the French parliament. As a matter of fact, Paris has kept only its "inalienable" prerogatives to itself: the issuing of currency, defense, police, diplomacy, higher education and local administration...

Since early September the 10 Polynesian ministers have been in the big building housing the government. Each one of them immediately set up highly padded staffs by hiring, for a small fortune, certain upper level metropolitan civil servants posted in Tahiti and known to be sympathetic to the opposition. They have also enticed a fair number of councillors from the Paris city hall who have made it their duty to pursue their career in the tropics. Daniel Naftalski, assistant director of Jacques Chirac's staff, was the kingpin of this "Paris-Papeete axis" and performed his tasks to the greatest satisfaction of his Polynesian friends; a few months later he went to do the same thing for Dick Ukeiwe.

Even though Tahitian politicians keep repeating that "the metropolitan political systems should not be imported here," it must be noted that relations between Paris and its far away territory are far from ignoring the politicians' concerns. Making full use of the status of partner of the central government, but also of the real powers and the broad freedom given to them by their new autonomy, Gaston Flosse and his friends do not let a single occasion go by without pointing out that the loyalty and attachment of Polynesia to France are feelings which must be cultivated by both parties... True, the government of Papeete never talks of claiming its independence because, as Alexandre Leontieff, vice president and minister of economic affairs, specified: "we have all the advantages of it without its inconveniences." This does not prevent the development of polemics, of which the Pacific Experimentation Center [CEP] is both the symbol and the stake.

In spite of the economic manna they have brought to Polynesia, some voices arose from the very beginning against the French nuclear tests. Since the beginning of underground testing about a decade ago, which is much less harmful to the environment, the opposition has become somewhat smaller, but there are always outspoken opponents of these activities. Last year, without having joined those critics, Gaston Flosse had set the cat among the pigeons by demanding the organization by France of a "popular referendum" on nuclear testing, thus picking up the idea launched several years ago by the independence party "Ia Mana Te Nunaa." "It is because the CEP has been poisoning life in Polynesia for several years that President Flosse has asked for that referendum," explained Alexandre Leontieff. "The abscess must be lanced. If the people were to take a stand against its presence, then we would start negotiations to ask for its departure. On the other hand, if the voters asked that it remain, then those who protest would have to give in both inside and outside the territory."

There never was any response from Paris to this proposal, not without stressing that the current legislation does not allow Gaston Flosse to organize such a referendum on his own, which Flosse is very well aware of... In fact, there is every indication that the autonomous government was trying then as it is today to give guarantees to the very powerful Polynesian evangelical church which is opposed in principle to the experiments, but is also very sensitive to the

"Anglo-Saxon" influences of the countries participating in the South Pacific forum. By proposing an initiative which was doomed to failure from the beginning, Gaston Flosse nevertheless disassociated himself from the French state and thus satisfied, at least in part, a non-negligeable section of his electorate as the evangelists represent 55 percent of the population. If you add to that the Jehova's Witnesses and other Mormons,\*the proportion goes up to 70 percent. What politician would ignore such a force?

However, this double trigger operation allowed Gaston Flosse to raise the bidding. By half threatening to allow the development of a campaign against the presence of the CEP, he placed himself in a position of strength to demand in coin of the realm, the price of his docility, from the French state. Two years ago, the current president of the autonomous government already estimated that the Ministry of Defense would have to pay Polynesia an annual sum of 440 million francs, this sum representing "economic compensation" for the presence of the armed forces in the Pacific... As negotiations on this issue were never pursued, the customs treaty signed between the territory and the French state expired on 1 January 1984, and all imports by the CEP are henceforth taxed without special considerations.

In order to make a point of its displeasure, the autonomous government of Papeete, sole master of its customs rates which represent a significant part of its revenue, early this year imposed an additional 40 percent tax on all scientific measuring instruments and optical fibers used by the CEP. It should be noted that in 1983, the armed forces and the Atomic Energy Commission spent 216 million francs in customs duties, of which 14.8 million were for a flat rate on scientific equipment, which contributed nearly 15 percent of the territory's budget.

The financial squabbles which brought the French government and the government of Polynesia into conflict, have now given way to quarrels about the future of New Caledonia, with Gaston Flosse siding with his friend Ukeiwe, but leaving untouched the independence supporters of the "Ia Mana Te Nunaa" Party which has sent three elected officials to the territorial assembly after having won 15 percent of the votes in the 1982 elections. Even though they exclude all non-democratic means to achieve their goals, the leaders of "Ia Mana" demand no less energetically the departure, plain and simple, of CEP which in their eyes is guilty of having "destroyed everything in the Polynesian economy by producing upheavals which benefited only a tiny part of the population." Jacqui Drollet, secretary general of the party, figures that the nuclear tests will end one day anyhow, "it is in the geological nature of things" and that the only realistic position for France, "whose historical vocation it is," would be to prepare "a smooth transition toward independence." Always the Caledonian syndrome!

The appearance of numerous shanty towns in Tahiti, the depopulation of the "peripheral" islands, the increase in unemployment, the abandonment of food-producing cultivation, etcetera... are so many proofs, according to Ia Mana, of the perverse effects of the presence of CEP "which has created completely artificial needs and lifestyles. It is true that if it were to leave tomorrow we would be in a bloody mess," admitted Jacqui Drollet, "but we have trump

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\* [as published]

cards. We can profit from tourism, provided we do not transform ourselves into another Hawaii... We wouldn't want the Polynesians to leave for the mountains or to stay in the cities only to sweep the streets." In addition, he stressed, the sea is not exploited, aquaculture is still embryonic and agriculture could, if it were developed, provide for all the food needs of the people. Alone among all the others, the independence supporters are also demanding an income tax in Polynesia, in the name of "social justice."

As the sole organized opposition to Gaston Flosse, the "Ia Mana" has strongly criticized the French government for never having "cleaned house" in a Polynesian political class which sometimes does exactly as it pleases with the rules. The various rains of subsidies which water Polynesia are distributed by the territorial government, that is to say by the "Tahoeraa" Party, which is said to have the unfortunate tendency to outrageously favor those municipalities which are favorable to the party and sometimes even certain castes of businessmen in allocating public markets. Names are circulated, enormous "affairs" are alluded to, and certain elected officials, who can hardly be suspected of sympathy for the theses of the supporters of independence, privately admit that it is "too bad" that the legal consequences of such actions, which would be obvious in the home country, are never even considered in Polynesia.

In the name of the "most elementary morality" Paul Ballal, treasurer of the Ia Mana Party, said rebelliously: "We were the only party in the territory to support Mr Mitterrand in the presidential elections, and there was no change afterwards... Georges Lemoine, minister for the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments and Territories], is the objective ally of Gaston Flosse: he has made nice speeches and practices the reverse policy! We agree with the minister when he says that permanent assistantship must end. Don't forget that it is you in the home country who pay the taxes and we Polynesians who consume them..." And he quoted the case of the small municipality of Taputapuatea, in the Leeward Islands, with 2,500 inhabitants, the only one governed by a member of Ia Mana, which has an annual budget at its disposal of more than 16 million francs. "Thanks to whom? To the French taxpayers..."

In the "official" circles in Paris the broad outline of the accusations made by "Ia Mana" are confirmed, and they even admit without too much hesitation that the tranquility of Polynesia requires that one be able sometimes to close one's eyes! Nuclear testing, the policy of deterrence and the French presence in the Pacific are at that cost, they admit with a touch of cynicism. The defeat of the "traditional" Polynesian left in the 1982 elections, the division among its aging leaders, but also the consummate political art of Gaston Flosse are so many data which are taken into account in Paris. Even though the local "boss" may sometimes cause the Polynesian fiber to vibrate against France, and even though certain questionable practices have been established even if they are difficult to prove and all the more so to prosecute, all of this does not authorize France in spite of everything, we were told, to revive colonial practices "which no longer fit our times." The same source stressed that "the French government will implement the internal autonomous status completely and faithfully."

France will undoubtedly remain as long as it needs to -- as long as it is able to? -- that is to say as long as its defense policy requires that it proceed with nuclear testing. Unless the internal Polynesian situation drastically changes in the near future, which does not seem very likely, Tahiti should not become another New Caledonia. Racial antagonisms are virtually nonexistent there, and the influence of those countries in the South Pacific which are opposed to nuclear experiments is only moderately felt so far. The unsinkable French airplane carrier in the South Pacific still has good days ahead...

#### Caledonian Repercussions

Has French Caledonia been affected by the Caledonian disease? While a few non-serious incidents have already occurred in Papeete in recent months, 1,500 people demonstrated without incident on Saturday in Faaa, close to the international airport of Tahiti, to protest against the nuclear testing and in favor of independence. The demonstration, prohibited by the high commissioner, Alain Orhel, had been organized by the mayor of Faaa, Oscar Temaru, leader of the small "Front for the Liberation of Polynesia." Two leaders of the FLNKS, Messrs Yewene Yewene and Yann Celene Uregei, participated in the rally and stated that the independence of New Caledonia would "lead to the independence of Polynesia."

#### Supporters of Independence Weak and Divided

The Tahitian independence party "Ia Mana Te Nunaa" (power to the people) is the only party actually represented in the territorial assembly ruled by the Tahoeraa, party of the president of the Gaston Flosse (RPR) administration. At every election since its creation in 1975, the Ia Mana, which has three elected officials, has won approximately 15 percent of the votes and it presents itself as in favor of self-administration.

It exists together in Polynesia with five other independence parties with much smaller support:

- the Front for the Liberation of Polynesia, led by the mayor of Faaa, Oscar Temaru;
- the TTTT [expansion unknown] (president Daniel Ching);
- the Te Faateraa Tiama O Polynesia Maohi (president Vairaatoa Taiarapa);
- the Te Aratai (president Jean Baptiste Ceran-Jerusalem);
- the Te Tiamaraa O Te Nunaa Maohi (president Mai Tetua).

8463

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1 May 1985

POLITICAL

GREECE

## WORKERS RETURNING FROM SWEDEN OFTEN DISILLUSIONED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Apr 85 p 8

[Article: "Many Disappointed in Their Old Homeland"]

[Text] Greek immigrants move back to their homeland in much greater numbers than any other minority in Sweden.

This tendency began to be noted in 1978, and since then significantly more Greeks have left Sweden than have come here. Since 1978, 6,500 Greeks have tried to create a new life for themselves in Greece. That means that about one-third of the Greek colony in Sweden have tried to move back.

But one has to say tried, because about one-third of those who move to Greece are back in Sweden after a few years. Some of them move back and forth several times, and have become a kind of pendulum.

Until 8 years ago emigration from Greece was still greater than the return migration, but in 1977 things changed. Each year now between 15,000 and 30,000 Greeks return, mostly from West Europe. Since the fall of the junta in 1974 about 400,000 Greek emigrants have moved back to Greece.

There are probably more reasons why the return migration has increased drastically among Greeks.

Most came to Sweden at the end of the 60's and the beginning of the 70's. If they are ever to return they should do it now, before they are too old, before the children begin school or before they are so grown that they themselves can choose to remain in Sweden.

Andreas Papandreou's PASOK Government has infused new hope in many Greeks. They believe they will be welcomed, guaranteed a job and economic support if they go home. Above all they believe that they are returning to a society which is more democratic than when they left, where the administration is free from the crippling bureaucracy, nepotism and sluggishness.

## Isolated Themselves

But one-third of those who tried to return were disappointed or failed in their efforts. That could be because they were not well received, or that they had unrealistic dreams about the homeland they left 10 or 15 years ago.

Margot Ahl in the Immigration Administration has, together with Tommy Holm, studied the questions connected with return migration.

She said that the Greeks who, during their years in Sweden, participated in Swedish society have better chances at succeeding with return migration.

But those who lived here in Sweden on the fringes of Swedish society, who isolated themselves, did not learn Swedish, did not try to influence their own lives, they also seem to land on the fringes of Greek society when they move back.

These Greeks regard their stay in Sweden as temporary, as incidental. They work hard, mostly at cleaning work. They save their money so that they can return to Greece as soon as possible.

## No Education

But in their struggle for a better future life they risk losing their children, the children that the effort was made for. We are on the way to having a second generation of young Greeks who are not educated for the future which their parents dreamed of, but who are becoming a new generation of cleaners.

When they return to Greece they have no useful qualifications in their baggage, no education, no extra language, no qualifying work experience. And their children may have lost their Greek.

They return with their worn backs and have a difficult time finding a livelihood. They have only the money that they have saved.

Now that the return migration to Greece has gained momentum the Greek state realizes that measures are required if the emigrants' experiences will be of use, and if they will be able to get along in Greece after many years abroad.

Unemployment in Greece is eight percent. The returned Greeks are often seen as competition for the existing jobs.

Therefore the Greek state tries to entice the returned migrants to areas where people are needed, and away from the large overpopulated cities Athens and Thessaloniki.

## State Support

Those who are willing to take up farming or will start industries in under-developed parts of the country (but not in the tourist business) can get extensive state support and very advantageous loans, a kind of regional development support.

But few Greeks are using it. They originally left Greece because working on the land made them poor, not rich. They have hardly returned to work in agriculture again.

During recent years the state has also established so-called reception classes for Greek children who return after perhaps an entire life abroad.

Here the children get intensive education, primarily in Greek, and are prepared to enter the general school system.

## Psychological Problems

Within Greece's equivalent to the Social Welfare Board they have noticed a special problem connected with return migration: many of the returned children have psychological problems, and they are trying to find ways to help the children and their parents.

It is the so-called second generation which is paying the highest price for the migration. This generation is growing, and today the number of immigrant children in West Europe is about 7 million.

9287

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POLITICAL

NORWAY

STANISLAV LEVCHENKO TESTIFIES AGAINST TREHOLT IN TRIAL

Oslo VERDENS GANG in Norwegian 20 Mar 85 pp 9-11

[Article by Michael Grundt Spang: "Master Spy Testifies Against Treholt"]

[Text] Former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko, who just has testified in the Treholt trial, defected to the United States in 1979 while he was serving in Tokyo.

He was in Tokyo from 1975 to 1979, under cover as a journalist for the Soviet magazine called NEW TIME [NOVAYE VREMYA], which supposedly was read by the top politicians of the Soviet Union and therefore--again supposedly--had great influence on Soviet politics.

The American KGB expert, John Barron, describes Stanislav Levchenko and his defection in depth in his latest book, "The KGB Today--The Hidden Hand." According to Barron, NEW TIME really is a front for the KGB, and its journalists in foreign countries are permanent KGB agents who use the power of a journalist in order to make contacts with people.

Spy School

Levchenko was commissioned by the KGB as a young man and attended spy school before he became connected with NEW TIME--first, in Moscow, and after 1975, as a correspondent in Tokyo. Levchenko became one of the KGB's best officers; he commissioned one "big fish" after another in Japan and received "a gold star," but also made many enemies among the top echelon of the KGB.

Discomfort

Levchenko felt an increasing discomfort with his job.

In part, he had a fascination for Christianity but was required to attend his church in secret.

In part, he was surprised to discover that the capitalist world was not as Moscow described it. He saw that the capitalist system was superior to the communist. Shops were bulging with goods and the long lines which he knew from Moscow did not exist.

Levchenko's abhorrence was increasing. It was his own country's system which was corrupt and deceptive. When he read in PRAVDA about supposed famine in the United States, he knew that the grain harvest had been a failure--not in the United States, but rather, in the Soviet Union itself. Levchenko knew that he would defect and it was only a question of when.

#### Caring for Contacts

Meanwhile, he took care of his contacts--Japanese scientists and politicians who he had lured into a trap, frequently by offering them space as authors in NEW TIME for good pay. He enticed them with the notion that they were writing for a group of readers which included members of the Politburo itself.

Initially, they were only ordinary articles and analyses. But later, Levchenko pressured them to obtain sensitive material. And once his contacts became dependent on the income, they were given a final test by the KGB before they were commissioned as agents and permanently established in the network.

#### Polyansky

It was one of the ironies of fate that the Soviet Union's ambassador in Tokyo at the time was Dimitri Polyansky. The Soviet Union's ambassador in Oslo today is the same Dimitri Polyansky.

Levchenko met Polyansky frequently in Tokyo. He took great care not to meet him in Oslo! Polyansky and Levchenko were in Tokyo together when an international sensation occurred: a Soviet fighter pilot flew his MIG 25 into Tokyo, landed and requested political asylum in the United States. The Soviet MIG plane was examined by Western experts before it was returned.

#### Defected

Levchenko defected by going into a restaurant complex which was frequented by American officers. He requested to meet the highest-ranking American intelligence officer possible. When a tall, distinguished person approached him, Levchenko demanded to see his credentials in order to be certain with whom he was dealing. Then he said that he was a major in the KGB and wanted to defect.

The American also wanted to assure himself about with whom he was dealing and asked:

"Who is the present resident chief of the KGB in Tokyo?"

"Guryanov."

"Who is the chief of PR Line (political espionage)?"

"Yerokhin."

"And the former chief of PR Line?"

"Prommikov."

This convinced the American that he was dealing with a KGB man.

#### Declined to Talk

In the United States, Levchenko initially refused to disclose secrets to the CIA. He had wanted to leave his country, not betray it. American psychiatrists who examined him, among other things with lie detectors, characterized him as being truthful to a nearly unheard of degree, with very high morals.

When Levchenko learned that the Soviet Union not only would not allow his wife, Natalia, to travel to the United States with their children, but also, that his wife and children were suffering, he changed his mind. He decided to do everything which he could to fight the system at home. He told the CIA everything which he knew and became one of the best informants the West has seen.

#### Hunted

Levchenko knows that he is hunted by the KGB. He told John Barron:

"Someday they may find me. But as long as there is breath in me, I will fight. If we do not resist them, they will make humanity as worthless as a grain of sand."

#### Interview with Levchenko

"The best weapon against the KGB is knowledge about the KGB." This was the comment of the Soviet defector, former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko, in this exclusive interview which he gave VG [VERDENS GANG]. Presumably this was the primary objective of his testimony in the Treholt case--to provide the court with information on the KGB and its mode of operations. Presumably, it also was the reason that he agreed to an interview with a Norwegian newspaper.

VG met Levchenko in a hotel room in Oslo. It was a serious Levchenko who greeted us, but occasionally, he thawed a bit with a smile and an occasional good laugh.

VG: "We assume that your name no longer is Stanislav Levchenko--neither in the United States nor in Norway?"

Levchenko: "My name is Levchenko and I am proud of it. But I obviously live under an alias."

VG: "Can you say where you live?"

Levchenko: "I live in the United States. I will not define it more precisely. When I leave Oslo, I will return to the United States to give a number of lectures. I cannot go into this further, among other reasons, because I know that during the course of recent years, the KGB has made several attempts to capture me."

VG: "Have you been officially condemned to death? Are you a hunted man?"

Levchenko: "Yes, I have been officially condemned to death in a trial in Moscow. Fortunately, I was not present in the court (a little smile). And I am hunted. I know of several attempts by the KGB to find me. They have attempted to track me down through postal deliveries. Mail to me goes through five layers before it ends up in my hands. The KGB has attempted to trace through these layers. They also have retained an American attorney to track me down."

VG: "We thought that the so-called 'Wet Department'--Department V, which stood for extermination--had been abandoned in the Soviet Union?"

Levchenko: "Department V, as such, has been closed down. But its activities have been absorbed by the illegal service which is included under the First Central Division of the KGB. This is located in a building complex in the area of Tjoply Stan, 40 kilometers from the center of Moscow."

VG: "Is it correct that today the KGB at any rate is exterminating people less frequently than previously?"

Levchenko: "That is difficult to say. At any rate, in order for an extermination to occur today, the KGB must have permission from the Politburo. That was not required during the Stalin era."

#### Wife

VG: "You have taken a clear stand against the KGB. Do you think that your former wife, Natalia, is in danger because of this, or do you think it has had a reverse effect--that they are protecting her from attack?"

Levchenko: "Unfortunately, I do not believe that they are protecting her. I know very little about her situation today. Theoretically, we could have maintained contact, but that could not serve any practical purposes. Initially, after I went to the United States, I telephoned her. It was possible to dial direct then. I advised her to cooperate 100 percent with the KGB. The last thing one should do in the Soviet Union is to attempt to resist the KGB. Whether she followed my advice, I do not know. Today, it is no longer possible to telephone direct to the Soviet Union. One must go through the national telephone operator and give one's own number, and I cannot allow myself to do that. We have no contact now."

Polyansky

VG: "While you were in Tokyo, Polyansky was the Soviet ambassador there. Did you know that he is in Oslo now?"

Levchenko: "Yes, I knew that in advance. I could read about it in American newspapers partly in connection with the fact that mines had been laid following the submarine provocations, and partly in connection with the fact that Polyansky did something as rare as to offer a Soviet excuse for the missile which deviated over Norwegian territory."

VG: "Since you knew him from Tokyo, have you considered calling him to say hello?"

Levchenko: "No. Perhaps he misses me, but I do not miss him."

Defected

VG: "Why did you defect to the United States in Tokyo in 1979?"

Levchenko: "That is a long story. But I gradually had more and more negative feelings toward the system. I must be fair: I was not pressured into becoming an officer in the KGB. I did that of my own free will. I did it at a time when I originally thought that the Soviet Union had the potential for moving in the direction of becoming a social democratic welfare society--something like that which is found in Sweden. I made a mistake. It became clear that the system in the Soviet Union had a self-defensiveness of absurd dimensions. I began to despise the system. Later, I decided to fight the system. But I could not do that within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. If one fights the system from within the boundaries of the Soviet Union, one ends up in prison or in a psychiatric asylum. Accordingly, I defected."

VG: "How have you been received in the United States and the West?"

Levchenko: "With an open heart. I have never regretted. I only have regretted that I did not do it sooner."

VG: "Svetlana Stalin obviously regretted and returned to the Soviet Union?"

Levchenko: "She did that. But her circumstances cannot be compared with anyone else's. As Stalin's daughter, she will hardly go hungry. It is substantially different with respect to Bitov, who also defected initially to the West, and thereafter returned. He literally has disappeared."

Naive West?

VG: "How would you characterize the attitude of the West toward Soviet politics. Are we naive?"

Levchenko: "I will not generalize in that fashion. We are talking about one-third of humanity. Many of them are temperate and understand. Of course others are naive and we have seen an example of this naivete in recent days: the American press compared the Soviet Union's new leader, Gorbachov, with Jack Kennedy, and his wife with Jacqueline Kennedy. This is to misinform the readers."

VG: "Gorbachov is no Kennedy?"

Levchenko: "He is a good guy in private. And his wife conducts herself well and dresses fashionably. During his spare time, Gorbachov can be a delightful man. It is only when he arrives at the office that he must do what the Politburo says. Since Stalin's time, the Soviet Union has not been a personal dictatorship, but rather, a collective dictatorship. Something else which the commentators forget is that Gorbachov is a product of Andropov. It was Andropov who brought him in as a full member of the Politburo."

"The rumors about Gorbachov are misleading."

"Another example of the misinformation is the 'sensation' which was leaked to the Western press more than 10 years ago: it was whispered among Western journalists that there were both hawks and doves within the Politburo and that the West would be very clever to be cooperative with the Soviet Union so that the doves would prevail. Misinformation typically must be simple and easy to follow. This misinformation was so simple and easy to follow that this more-than-10-year-old 'discovery' still is adhered to today."

#### Espionage

VG: "Mr Levchenko, can you say which area of espionage is the most important--military, political or technical espionage?"

Levchenko: "All three. Perhaps political espionage is the most important in our times. (It seems as if he suddenly is in doubt.) But perhaps military espionage is the most important. Industrial and technologic espionage also is extremely important for the Soviet Union which is attempting to minimize its technological inferiority compared with the United States while simultaneously saving billions of rubles on its own research."

VG: "Is it really true that the KGB maintains experts in all three areas in every single embassy in the West, including Oslo?"

Levchenko: "Yes, experts in all three areas, plus one: disinformation."

#### Agent Recruiting

VG: "Is the rumor true that a KGB agent in a foreign country is obligated to recruit at least one agent (spy) during the course of his tenure, at least if he is to have a chance for advancement?"

Levchenko: "It depends. The KGB is a very serious organization. It recognizes that in certain countries, recruiting can be very difficult. In other countries, it is easier and one had better recruit several; just a moment: in the middle of the 1970's, the chief of the First Central Division sent a top-secret memo to all KGB residents everywhere in the world. It stated that emphasis should be placed on quality agents in preference to quantity. Efforts were to be made toward people who had, or in great likelihood could obtain, access to secret information."

VG: "Is the recruiting of an agent a long process?"

Levchenko: "Yes. The KGB is an extremely patient organization. It can wait months and years for a recruiting process to be carried out."

VG: "How many did you yourself recruit during your days in Tokyo?"

Levchenko: "Three fully commissioned, and one partially."

Cannot be Stopped

VG: "Can the KGB be stopped in its efforts in the West?"

Levchenko: "No, the KGB cannot be completely stopped or restrained, but its work can be made more difficult. And that can occur through people in the West being given information about the KGB and its methods of operation. Objective knowledge, the ability to judge--this is what the media in the West must provide to the public concerning the KGB. They cannot have the opinion that KGB agents are indistinguished and clumps of people with funny hats as they are portrayed in movies and books. This is the third or fourth generation of KGB agents--extremely well trained, sophisticated people, well-versed in the culture of the country in which they are stationed. The KGB is far more dangerous in reality than on film!"

VG: "What do you mean that a KGB officer must know the country's culture?"

Levchenko: "One unfortunate comment can ruin a recruiting operation in an instant. Take the Japanese specialty, raw fish. If a KGB officer in Japan loathes this fish and makes a derogatory comment about it during a lunch with the person on whom he is working, everything can be ruined. Thus, it is correct to say that some KGB agents have great abilities at recruiting, while others are more perfect in directing an already-commissioned agent."

Under Pressure

VG: "Does an agent perform more poorly if he is under pressure from the KGB than if he is working willingly?"

Levchenko: "You can be absolutely certain that all agents work under great pressure. And why? Because the officer who directs him works under pressure and because the chief of the directing officer lives under pressure, because there is pressure at all levels all the way back to Moscow. The spy business is tough. There are many exposed nerves there."

#### KGB's Goal

VG: "What is the KGB's specific objective with its misinformation and influence in the West today?"

Levchenko: "To reduce the military programs of the United States and NATO. You recall all of the dramatic fighting which the Soviet Union put up during the middle of the 1970's against the plans for development of a neutron bomb. The KGB worked to the maximum and orders went out to the entire KGB network in the West to fight this. They succeeded in getting the American president to shelve the plans. The KGB viewed this as its greatest victory since the Second World War.

"Today, the Soviet Union has been forced back to the negotiating table by reason of the American and European weapons programs. Its objective is to get these reduced. Simultaneously, there is no one--and I repeat, no one--who has any idea what the Soviet Union is doing with its own weapons program."

This is how Stanislav Levchenko ended his conversation with VG, a few hours before he was quietly shipped out of Norway.

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POLITICAL

NORWAY

# POLICE ESTABLISH TIGHT SECURITY AROUND TREHOLT TRIAL SCENE

Oslo VERDENS GANG in Norwegian 20 Mar 85 p 8

[Article by Olav Steimler: "Iron Ring Tightened"]

[Text] The candy notwithstanding, Arne Treholt is in safe hands. The iron ring around the Oslo courthouse is still tight. No one can say that the standby troops and national police have become more relaxed than they were at the beginning of the Treholt case.

"Kong Haakon" [a brand name candy] was a pure slip-up according to the admission of the national police who have not yet finished any poison analysis of the pieces of chocolate. The police do not think it likely that it was the candy which gave Arne Treholt stomach difficulties, but they are checking for safety's sake.

Widespread speculation was caused on Monday when the routine around the Oslo courthouse suddenly was strengthened and the barricades moved.

The clarification given the police themselves was not completely true. "Part of the security is to change the routines along the way," stated police division chief Lars Bjorn Midgaard, when the police moved forward to the outer doors on Monday morning.

## KGB Defector

The truth is that the police were protecting the life of a witness, KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko. He defected from the KGB in 1979. This was the cause for the guards.

Yesterday, conditions around and in the courthouse were "normalized." The sensitive witness had left the country.

## Fixed Patterns

The commuting route from Drammen district prison to the Oslo courthouse is driven according to fixed patterns with three or four variations. Two shifts divide the driving, and the route is chosen after the rush hour and with consideration that no one should be able to predict where the procession will travel on any particular day.

Norway's best- and most-guarded man is still Arne Treholt. Letters and visitors are strictly controlled. From now on, "Kong Haakon" also will be available only through the prison's strict guards.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

## EANES' DECISION REGARDING DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT

### Advisers Queried

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Pedro d'Anunciacao: "Bad Times for Eanes"]

[Excerpt] Eanist Advisers Against Dissolution

One of the questions the president of the republic has put to his (state and personal) advisers in the round of consultations in which he is engaging is, precisely, what they think of dissolution. Not that he is planning it soon.

Various international commitments assumed (among them Reagan's visit to Portugal, his trip to China and the NATO meeting in Lisbon in the beginning of June) would advise against dissolution in the very short term. Moreover, if elections will have to be held within 3 months following the dissolution, in order that they not take place in mid-summer, that dissolution should only be decreed in the beginning of June. There remains a big problem: how to manage to present a well-founded pretext so as not to affect the Eanist party electorally (which, according to a recent poll by Marktest, would now obtain 28 percent of the votes against 15 percent for the Socialist Party (PS), 15 percent for the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), 17 percent for the Social Democratic Center Party (CDS) and 20 percent for the Social Democratic Party (PSD).

Furthermore, the lack of a serious pretext is reportedly the strongest argument used by some presidential advisers (among them Nobre da Costa, Melo Antunes and Henrique de Barros) to oppose early legislative elections and to advocate that the Eanists prepare for the presidential elections with a strong candidate.

As the days go by, the problem becomes more difficult for Eanes. And we are told confidentially that the disposition displayed by the president in Belem Palace is a good sign of that. The truth is that if early legislative elections now appear to be the most comfortable solution for Eanes--beyond blocking Pintasilgo's candidacy, they would not leave the country entirely in the hands of Mario Soares after June--that option may have a costly electoral onus, the accusation of seeking to favor his own party, an onus that would be aggravated by a contrary position by the Council of State. In the meantime, Eanes has reportedly not hidden his keen interest in hearing the opinion of Mota Pinto on the political situation.

Presidential 'Suspense'

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 p 15-R

[Excerpt] The Suspense Coming From Belem

Do conditions exist or not exist for Eanes to dissolve the Assembly of the Republic? Does the president want or not want to advance legislative elections?

For the time being, the response from the Belem presidential palace comes only in the form of "suspense," while the president's men are reduced to making contradictory statements and presenting scenarios designed to try to preserve some maneuvering room for Ramalho Eanes.

The "suspense" may have increased because of the manner in which Eanes saw fit to listen individually to the members of the Council of State, his only explanation being that "he has little contact with them." Even though the opinion of this organ is of a nonbinding nature, the president has to consult it if he should decide to dissolve the Assembly of the Republic.

Added to that is the fact that Eanes has not revealed his real feelings about the recently created Democratic Renewal Party (PRD). And his silence, consequently, permits speculation.

Then there are the public statements by some of his best-known supporters. Jose Rabaca has been saying in public that if that is not the proper party for the president, another will be formed for him. And regarding another of General Eanes' big problems, this same Rabaca has arrived at the conclusion that Lourdes Pintasilgo could be president only of a very rich country...

With regard to concrete reasons for dissolution, one fact seems to be completely foregone: only the Social Democratic Party (PSD) can furnish them to the president. Because the present condition of the country, from a social and economic point of view, does not permit basing any presidential intervention on the pretext of a "breakdown situation."

There remain the scenarios drawn up by some of the president's closest advisers.

Of these, it might be worth recalling one of the most recent ones, according to which practically all of the political forces are yearning for early legislative elections.

According to the version of some of the president's men, that is so in the case of the PS because nothing would be better for Mario Soares than an "electoral festival all year long." The president's analysts say that from being a victim, he would quickly become a winner...

Does all of this mean that Ramalho Eanes does not have any intentions of dissolving the assembly? That this is not the PRD that interests him? That, after all, he may have a powerful presidential candidate up his sleeve?

There is no answer to these questions. One can only surmise that the candidacy of Lourdes Pintasilgo (made "irreversible" by the subject herself immediately following the formation of the PRD in Troia...) is capable of changing all of the political logic of President General Eanes' men. Because in the view of her supporters, the engineer "is always capitalizing..."

She "scares" orthodox Eanists and the Portuguese moderate right. "Any election timetable suits her" and--her most diehard supporters dream--"the only worthwhile presidential campaign will be the one in which Soares and Pintasilgo oppose one another."

#### Four Scenarios

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 p 16-R

[Article by T.S.: "The Four Scenarios"]

[Text] 1. The normal operation of the institutions and the corresponding election timetable presuppose that presidential elections will be held at the end of this year, immediately followed by local elections.

Legislative elections would always come afterwards.

Or in 1987 if, for the first time in Portugal after 25 April, a normal 4-year legislature will have been completed.

Or 6 months after the election of the new president of the republic, the minimum period after which he can dissolve parliament.

The first possibility can only occur in the case of a victory by Mario Soares in the presidential elections. In that circumstance, it would be relatively simple for the new president to try to keep the PSD tied to a coalition which would at least assure that party of remaining in power. On the other hand, the Socialist Party, for the first time without its leader, would need some time to find a solution for the succession and a face for a new election campaign--the first election campaign in which Soares' picture could no longer appear on PS posters.

Another victorious candidate in the presidential election will naturally be the bearer of a different political commitment which will lead him to dissolve the assembly immediately after the 6-month period during which he is constitutionally prohibited from doing so.

If the normal election timetable is maintained, the presidential elections will have to take place between "the 60th and 30th day prior to the completion of his predecessor's term or following the vacancy of the position," as stipulated by the constitution.

The interpretation of the spirit of the constitution may generate doubts regarding the fact that the two (possible) rounds of the presidential election must mandatorily be held during this period. In any case, Eanes will have to

convene them for a period substantially between 14 November and 14 December 1985. That being the case, according to the text of the constitution, in the beginning of October Eanes will have to schedule the holding of elections.

2. Another foreseeable scenario is that of advancing legislative elections.

Ramalho Eanes loses the power to dissolve the assembly in the last 6 months of his presidential term, thus, he can only decree that dissolution by the deadline of next 14 July. Granting that the president is unlikely to find reasons to dissolve parliament by the time of the PSD congress, scheduled for May, the final possibility for that decision is conceded to be the last [sic] month of his term. It should be noted that the process of consultations with the parties and the Council of State for the purpose of dissolution and the simultaneous scheduling of new elections will require some time.

Constitutionally, legislative elections must be held between the 80th and 90th days following the dissolution of the assembly. In this scenario, the elections would be held between 14 September and 14 October 1985.

This simple fact would force a slight postponement of presidential elections. According to Article 128 of the constitution, presidential elections cannot be held in the 3 months prior to or following legislative elections. Thus, the first round of the presidential elections would be held between 14 December 1985 and 14 January 1986.

3. A third possibility: advancing the presidential elections, which could occur in case of the resignation of the present president of the republic. But the political advantages that such a situation would bring to the various opposing forces do not appear to be very obvious. The PSD still has not selected a candidate; the same is true of the CDS and the Eanist PRD. And the time between the presentation and the launching of presidential candidates is beginning to grow short, even if the elections are held according to the originally scheduled "timing."

4. One last scenario has been aired recently and there are those who even regard it as highly probable: The dissolution of the assembly immediately before the presidential resignation, giving rise to simultaneous presidential and legislative elections.

But the interpretation of some constitutionalists who were involved in the revision of the constitution indicates that this scenario is incompatible with the letter and spirit of the law. Section 2 of Article 128 of the constitutional text is said to be clear in this regard: "The election (of the president of the republic) cannot take place in the 90 days prior to or following the date of elections to the Assembly of the Republic, the term of the outgoing president being automatically extended for the necessary period."

Apparently a presidential resignation immediately following the convening of legislative elections may have been contemplated, from the fact that the president of the Assembly of the Republic is the replacement for the president of the republic in case of the latter's incapacity. In any case, it would

generate a situation of too complex a power vacuum with unforeseeable developments for this possibility to be viewed positively by any of the political protagonists.

#### PSD's Reported Position

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 8-14 Mar 85 p 11

[Article by Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos: "Early Legislative Elections?"]

[Text] 1. Will there or will there not be early legislative elections? This is one of the questions to which I do not believe anyone is in a position to give a sure answer. In the meantime, the question gained particular focus during the tour of the various regions of the country by the current leaders of the PSD, during which they called the attention of their members to that possibility which, according to sources connected with the party, responds to the wishes of a significant part of those leaders.

First of all, it would be well to emphasize the fact that the question of possible early legislative elections presents itself only because of the internal weakness and the governmental results of the coalition in power; an internal weakness that is especially the result of a continual series of disputes, quarrels or incidents--the latest one even about the appointment of the governor of the Bank of Portugal!--in a good number of cases, stemming from the very "nature" of the internal situation of the PSD.

And it is well to stress that if the legislative elections are not held before the presidential elections, it is taken for granted that they will be held immediately afterwards unless, at the most, the presidential elections are won by Mario Soares, which at the moment does not seem to me to be very probable.

On the other hand, it does not seem to me that, with reference to presidential elections, one can speak of a "majority" in political terms that necessarily leads to the holding of new legislative elections after those elections. That is not what happened even in 1980; and everyone will recall the arguments of the Democratic Alliance (AD) to the effect that it was indeed justified that that should occur then.

2. But why is it that early legislative elections may be of interest to the PSD or that many of its leaders think they may be? I believe these are the basic reasons:

a) As is known, Prime Minister Maria Soares and the PS have "conceded" almost everything the PSD wants (the Rosado Correia "case" is only one of the most recent and striking examples) precisely to avoid any conflict that can lead to a break and separation. But the moment that the president of the republic cannot dissolve parliament (that is, if the normal timetables are adhered to: after 14 July, 6 months before the end of his term), the positions of Soares and the PS will naturally be strengthened and, after that, everything can be completely different.

b) All the polls indicate that if legislative elections were held now, the positions of the PS and the PSD would be reversed: that is, the PSD would become bigger, receive more votes, than the PS. From the perspective of the presidential elections, that factor can be very important and greatly favor the PSD candidate relative to the PS candidate, the more so since, as is anticipated, the latter will be the present prime minister.

c) On the one hand, not believing some polls that give the new PRD party a (remote) first place in the legislative elections; and on the other, basing themselves, for example, on the poll ordered by the government itself (the figures and conclusions of which O JORNAL reported prominently in the 30 November 1984 edition), the PSD leaders may reach the conclusion that their party would get the most votes if the elections were held today.

And based on the government poll, they may also reach the conclusion that the two coalition parties--the PS and the PSD--will continue to have the absolute majority. Or, according to other public opinion polls, that that majority may be formed with those two parties plus the CDS. In either case, believing also that that first coalition would continue to be possible, or even the second, the PSD would become not the number 2 partner of the government but the number 1 in both cases, and still the pivotal party in the latter case.

d) Early elections would also have the advantage of not giving the PRD so much time to organize in terms of possibly being able to draw more voters away from the PSD than it is presently drawing and which--trusting the polls--is incomparably less than it is drawing from the PS and even less than from the United People's Alliance (APU) (according to the aforementioned poll ordered by the government).

e) Finally, there are those who believe that, in any case, after the PS and the PSD have formally selected their presidential candidates and have seriously begun the presidential election "race," it will be extremely difficult or almost impossible to maintain the coalition.

3. But this possibility can also have many disadvantages for the PSD, which many consider more than the possible advantages. One of the clear disadvantages is that of once again giving the idea that it is the PSD that is the main focus of political instability.

For that reason, even beyond everything the PSD has already done and which can possibly lead to the dissolution of parliament, if it does still more with that object in view, it is entirely advisable for it to attribute responsibility to a third party, obviously the president of the republic, General Ramalho Eanes, who is the one who has the constitutional power to do it; in any case, a president who, on reaching the end of the period when he practically loses the principal power that he still holds--that of dissolving parliament--will be placed in a situation that must be considered complex, to say the least.

It is beside the point now to develop other possible "scenarios" of the forthcoming election timetable. It would be well to recall only, in conclusion, as regards legislative elections, that the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and

the CDS advocate that they be advanced--the former in a more forcetful manner than the latter, and the fact that the Centrists have even presented a motion of censure of the government also does not leave any room for doubt. As for the PRD, so far it has not taken any position in that regard.

#### Eanes' Reported Motives

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 10 Mar 85 p 8

[Editorial article: "The End of the Term"]

[Text] In recent days, there has been somewhat persistent talk about the possibility of Ramalho Eanes dissolving the Assembly of the Republic before the 14 July deadline. From then until the end of his term, he is constitutionally denied the possibility of taking that action. Mentioned among other signs that lend a certain substance to that possibility are the consultations that the president of the republic is holding with state advisers in that regard. Consulted individually about the current political situation, the question has been posed to some, with opinion being divided: some oppose the action; others view it favorably. Nothing essentially new or democratically illegal.

Furthermore, in a radio interview granted not too long ago, Ramalho Eanes categorically declared that he did not exclude the use of any of the powers granted him in the constitution: "from that perspective, resignation, dismissal of the government, the dissolution of parliament have a certain constantly available value for the president of the republic." He pledged, however, that he would never use any of those instruments "in a manner that was gratuitous and not sufficiently ethical and politically necessary." But, provided that they respect the constitution, the criterion and the judgment, the time and the manner of an intervention of that nature will always be his. Eanes was also decisive in this regard when he said that it was his duty to insure social pacification, including, for example, "through new political opportunities whenever governmental effectiveness is not satisfactory."

Apparently straightforward and transparent, Eanes' performance certainly involves some question marks. For that reason, the steps he takes in the coming weeks will not fail to be followed with attentive and even suspicious expectation, especially by Mario Soares and the government. In fact, notwithstanding the instability that has been occurring within the PSD, despite the economic crisis and the results of the austerity policy, even taking into account a bitter institutional relationship, the country's political, economic and social picture today does not present a sufficiently serious situation to justify such an extreme measure as the dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic. Therefore, unless new and strong disturbances shake or destroy the coalition, it does not appear that Eanes has the "sufficiently ethical and politically necessary" conditions to do so.

The months that remain to Ramalho Eanes will certainly be decisive for the history of this his second term as president of the republic. He does not hide his strong criticism of the performance of the political forces in power, a thinly veiled animosity toward the government, and his intention, when he leaves

Belem Palace, to continue to intervene in the country's life, probably as a leader of the PRD. Thus, his actions cannot be dissociated from a certain strategy that may cause him to descend from the political and moral plane above the parties in which he has sought to remain. His ties with the PRD, the soundings he is conducting to select a presidential candidate, his attitudes toward laws or issues as important as the budget, the EEC and agrarian reform are not based, as some allege, on a deliberate plan to create additional difficulties for the government, justifying its dismissal or the dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic. But neither are they innocent; or if they are, they do not appear to be.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

#### EANES-PINTASILGO RELATIONSHIP DISCUSSED

##### Break Rumored

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 pp 1, 20

[Excerpts] The president of the republic is holding a meeting today with his adviser, Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, to impress upon her the need to choose between her continuation of close ties with the presidential palace and the pursuance of her campaign as a candidate for the presidency. According to a source close to Eanes, this conversation is a follow-up to three others which the president held with the former prime minister in which he attempted to dissuade her from being a candidate with the argument that only with great difficulty would she be successful. The same source also said that the president was allegedly very apprehensive upon learning that Pintasilgo had made it known that her decision to be a candidate was irreversible, despite the risk of creating divisions within the Eanist faction.

Considering the intensity with which Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo is carrying on her campaign and the many meetings which she is having with various social sectors, it is expected that this meeting with the president will end with a break between the two politicians.

It will be remembered that the invitation to take on the function of adviser to the Presidency of the Republic came after Lourdes Pintasilgo had been relieved of her duties as Portugal's ambassador to UNESCO by Prime Minister Sa Carneiro who had succeeded her as prime minister in January 1980.

In that year, noted for the long electoral campaign, the former minister of social affairs was finally mentioned by Lopes Cardoso as a possible candidate for the Presidency of the Republic. However, she ended up being a member of the Policy Committee for the Re-election of Ramalho Eanes--who, in 1979, chose her to head up the third and last executive branch of presidential initiative.

With Melo Antunes, Vitor Alves and Sousa e Castro among others, Lourdes Pintasilgo--who had always showed her reluctance for the military--played an important role in the wings of the presidential palace to the extent that, when her name began to appear in first place in the presidential polls, almost no one among the leadership of the "Eanist" movement could question the support for her candidacy.

Denial

Lisbon 0 DIA in Portuguese 11 Mar 85 p 13

[Excerpt] Contrary to what was published in certain newspapers, Lourdes Pintasilgo will continue as adviser to the president of the republic, the official position which she has been holding at the presidential palace, and this leads us to think that Pintasilgo will have ceased being a candidate for the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] ("Eanist" Party), or, at least, supported by that party.

In fact, Lourdes Pintasilgo will continue as adviser to the Presidency of the Republic in matters pertaining to East Timor. Questioned about an alleged proposal made by the president of the republic asking Pintasilgo to choose between the electoral campaign and the advisory position, a Belem source said that Ramalho Eanes met with Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo Friday "with whom he discussed affairs of state," particularly with regard to the situation in East Timor.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PSD SAID HAUNTED BY EANES, SOARES, SA CARNEIRO

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva]

[Text] The PSD [Social Democratic Party] has three specters--namely, Eanes, Sa Carneiro and Mario Soares. All three have been, each in his own way, very prejudicial to the party.

Let us begin with Eanes.

The conflict waged against him by the social democrats had, as it is easy to prove, a result which was opposite to that which the PSD wanted; it strengthened the president's image.

The reason for this is simple: in making General Eanes its principal enemy, the PSD led the country to believe that the president of the republic had the power and capability of intervention which, in fact, he did not have.

In this manner, the presidential image, rather than being diminished, ended up being strengthened.

The PSD made the people think that Eanes had strength. For a president, having strength is not a crime but a virtue; it would have been tragic for Eanes to appear as a weakling.

The specter of Sa Carneiro also caused the social democrats many problems.

The principal question is this: it now became obvious (if it were necessary to prove the point) that among its militants the PSD does not have any man equal to the late prime minister.

This being the case, it is useless for the party to continue to seek new leaders and compare them with him.

To do this could be an interesting exercise. But it would be one whose only consequence would be for the PSD never again to have strong leadership--diminishing the party in the view of the other parties which do not occupy all their time discussing the virtues and defects of their present leader.

The PSD's third specter is more recent: his name is Mario Soares.

For the social democrats this specter emerged for two reasons.

First, so that Soares could be the prime minister of a coalition in which the PSD ranked second; second, to be a "natural candidate" for the Presidency of the Republic.

As prime minister, Mario Soares taunted the social-democratic pride--in that he occupies a position which the PSD would like to occupy.

As a candidate for the presidency, Soares causes the PSD an undisguisable feeling of envy--in that the PSD knows that among its members it does not have a "natural candidate" at present nor even an individual of any kind who could compare with the secretary general of the PS [Socialist Party].

For these two reasons, Mario Soares has become a specter for the PSD.

And this has already taken its toll.

In fact, if the specter of Soares did not exist in the first place, perhaps the party would not be experiencing the internal instability now prevailing--and which is due in large measure to the fact that each new directorate must be capable of proving itself to the socialists, receiving accusations of weakness while accepting a given PS proposal (which should be considered normal, since it is a coalition government).

Secondly, perhaps the party would not be experiencing the state of anxiety which it is now undergoing with regard to the presidential question; perhaps it would even have found without alternatives a better candidate than the one whom they will probably find.

In view of all this, as long as the PSD does not free itself of these specters, it will never have inner peace and will also never have a strategy.

For a party's strategy must be defined by the party itself before all else --and in the past few years the PSD has been more concerned with the other parties and with its dead than with its objectives.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

**PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACIES: OLD, NEW PERSONALITIES DISCUSSED**

**Firmino: Increasing PSD Support**

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 16 Mar 85 p 24

[Excerpt] The candidacy of Firmino Miguel seems to be winning increasing support among the new PSD [Social Democratic Party] leaders. Rui Machete himself, who until very recently rejected any idea of a military candidate, is beginning to give in. Only Rebelo de Sousa and Capucho persist in opposing him. Capucho still argues for a civilian solution. Marcelo, taking the latter's rejection of the referendum as agreement, is launching a campaign for Lemos Ferreira. Alberto Joao Jardim, who has also perceived that he has little possibility, is already severely criticizing the new PSD leadership (to which he belongs and which helped elect him only a short time ago).

**Firmino Miguel Raps Ambiguity**

Indicative of his intention to run for president, Firmino Miguel was quoted by a source close to him as saying recently: "The country has come to a troubling situation and, with the persistent crisis affecting the Portuguese, it is necessary to vitalize economic activity and eliminate the crying social inequities. Any presidential candidate must be characterized by a commitment to radical changes in the Portuguese society, based on a program clearly presented and submitted to the electorate. The organization of the political power and the economic revision of the constitution are specific and basic aspects of such a program, and there is no place for candidates who are ambiguous or indecisive."

**Caution Weakens Firmino Candidacy**

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 16 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Pedro Anunciacao]

[Excerpt] Firmino Miguel's apparent reluctance to take risks could, in the end, make him the weakest of the candidates, despite the diversity and strength of the support that he was assumed to have, so weak that he is even admitting the possibility of completely agreeing to the process adopted by the PSD for choosing a candidate, as well as the entire proposal for a counterprogram which the Social Democratic leadership has announced it is drafting.

Strangely enough, broad sectors of civilian society would like a military solution for the next presidential election, as more secure and consistent. The fact is, however: another Eanes candidacy at the end of this year is impossible and there is not a single figure in the Armed Forces with sufficient strength to launch a campaign for Belem. The proof is there: barely 2 weeks away from the PSD referendum, which will round out the nomination process by the major parties, not a single figure from the military sector has yet declared his candidacy.

It is absolutely undeniable that the military have no candidate: Lemos Ferreira, in his capacity as armed forces chief of staff, could represent the institutional solution, but he is met with distant reserve by the entire military structure, which is generally loyal to Ramalho Eanes and to the men of 25 November, and Ferreira is also viewed with suspicion in many civilian circles. Moreover, there is the conviction that he is as vulnerable as Soares Carneiro, since it is highly unlikely that he could achieve a better electoral "score" than Carneiro.

At the moment, the only one advocating Lemos Ferreira's candidacy is Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa--who may already be convinced that the PSD referendum is unlikely to point to a party militant and has already taken from Alberto Joao Jardim whatever advantage the bizarre verbal truculence of the Madeiran leader (bizarre because no one can take it seriously) could give him.

As for the chief of staff himself, although he is probably interested in running (and it is said that in 1980 he was angry with Sa Carneiro, who passed him over in favor of Gen Soares Carneiro), he would not risk his place at the top of the military hierarchy unless he had a solid guarantee of success, a guarantee which is absolutely not there (particularly after the controversial role which he played in the famous purchase of the Corsairs and the disaster that took the life of a Portuguese test pilot in one of those flights). Even Angelo Correia, who was once an enthusiastic supporter of Lemos Ferreira, has abandoned this idea completely and (except for what happened in the case of Mota Pinto, who lost the PSD leadership) Angelo Correia has always had a special gift for placing himself on the winning side.

Firmino Miguel is different. He has a profile which is perfectly suited to the army esprit de corps and he has the sympathy of the Eanist military (and an important portion of the civilian Eanists). Although he is not the candidate of the Armed Forces (they insist they are not in a position to impose or even launch a candidate), he is particularly acceptable to them as a solution.

#### Reluctant but Involved

The fact that Firmino Miguel is demonstrating great reluctance does not mean that he is not strongly engaged in his candidacy. Such effort cannot leave any doubt.

Even before the PSD National Council in Bonfim (which led to the replacement of Mota Pinto by Rui Machete) and after two private lunches with Francisco Pinto Balsemao, Miguel discussed the matter at a dinner in Cascais, in which

Balsemao, Joao Salgueiro, Jose Vitorino, Sande Lemos and a representative of the JSD [Social Democratic Youth] participated. On the very weekend of Bonfim, Miguel went to Porto, where he met with economic groups (the trip was without the knowledge of high-ranking officers and may have been the target of some criticism). Moreover, having already reached an understanding with CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] leader Lucas Pires (with whom Firmino had spoken at length a year ago and continues to maintain contacts through intermediaries trusted by both men), Firmino has indicated his readiness to talk things over with Mota Pinto. For his part, Mota Pinto intends to meet with Firmino Miguel as soon as he learns the results of the referendum and regardless of whether or not he competes in the May congress.

#### Chirac Said To Support Firmino

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 15 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Daniel Ribeira, in Paris]

[Text] The RPR [Rally for the Republic], the neo-Gaullist party of Jaques Chirac, is urging Gen Ramalho Eanes to support Firmino Miguel as candidate for the presidency of the republic, O JORNAL learned in the French capital.

There have already been several contacts between representatives of the Gaullist and General Eanes; according to our sources, the Portuguese president has shown himself to be "very receptive" to the ideas of the French conservatives on this topic.

Chirac's interest in Firmino Miguel and Eanes may be related to the strategy of French capitalism in Africa and the support of some Portuguese circles for the Gaullist ideas about the EEC, which they consider "moribund."

According to the same sources, through his representatives who have met with Eanes, Jaques Chirac has advised the president of the republic not to support Lourdes Pintasilgo and also to "drop" the recently created Democratic Renewal Party [PRD].

According to the Gaullists' who are preparing for the French legislative elections, Lourdes Pintasilgo defends an "outmoded" Third World philosophy which would be highly prejudicial to France, in Portuguese-speaking Africa.

This alleged pressure on the president of the republic to support Firmino Miguel's candidacy is attributed to the fact that Chirac feels a possible victory by Mario Soares would be very harmful to French companies with interests in Africa, since Soares is considered here as "the Americans' man."

#### Financial Support for Firmino

Moreover, Jacques Chirac advocates an end to the EEC and the creation of a Europe with interstate political and economic relations, whereas Mario Soares and Francois Mitterrand advocate strengthening the EEC, the Chirac followers comment.

At a time when Chirac is preparing for decisive elections in France, it is very important to the Guallists that Portugal have a president who agrees to some extent with their ideas about Europe, above all, at a time when the admission of Portugal and Spain to the EEC is a central issue in the election campaigns in France.

According to our sources, the Guallists may even be prepared to provide financial support for Firmino Miguel's campaign, or to see that such support is forthcoming from some French industrial sectors.

#### Guedes da Silva

The Guallists "intermediary" in Portugal has been businessman Bernardo Paulo Guedes da Silva; a source in Belem Palace recently told a French journalist that da Silva had "greatly strengthened" his position with the Portuguese president.

Guedes da Silva was recently presented by Chirac with the keys to the city of Paris and is thought to be a pragmatic conservative. He arranged the meeting on Thursday, 7 March, between Guallist Senator Charles Pasqua and Ramalho Eanes. According to several sources, Guedes da Silva has had lengthy meetings with the president at Belem Palace.

Our sources, French and Portuguese, also told us that Eanes decided to establish a "very strict" line of demarcation between himself and the PRD. Ramalho Eanes may be looking with disfavor on some of the orientations of the new, allegedly "Eanist" party, and our sources assured us that the recent reports about disagreement among "Eanists" are "quite well founded."

#### Japanese, German, American Support

If Firmino Miguel's candidacy were supported by Eanes, it could also count on the support of conservative Japanese, German and American sectors, our informants assured us. According to our sources, a segment of the American Republican Party is also prepared to support this candidate, in opposition to the "Carlucci group," which is said to support Mario Soares.

Ramalho Eanes has not yet said whom he will support. According to the Guallists themselves, however, in Paris he is thought to be "very receptive" to the Guallists position. Even the defenders of the idea say, however, that if he decided to support Firmino Miguel, Eanes would face considerable difficulties, particularly in overcoming the problems which the PRD would give him.

The political justification which the Guallists may have offered Eanes, so that he would not harbor "complexes" about supporting a candidate with Firmino Miguel's profile, is that "within a short time, the Right will be governing most of the European countries," in addition to which President Francois Mitterrand himself is preparing to make alliances with the French Right after next year's legislative elections.

### Personalities Discussed

Lisbon O JOURNAL in Portuguese 15 Mar 85 pp 3-4

[Text] The 1985 presidential elections will probably be the most hotly contested elections ever conducted in Portugal. Unlike 1976, when an Eanes victory was evident, and 1980, when everything polarized around two candidates, this time there are several candidates with pretensions to the presidency.

At the moment, only two of them are definite. Soares and Pintasilgo have their machinery functioning. The contacts are being made, the actions are being planned. The campaign will probably be hottest between these two candidates. Both of them are very well known; they both have a rare ability to connect with the voters, and although the two could have been considered in the same political area in 1979, today they represent two great paths which the political evolution of the country could take.

Soares will present himself to the voters as the "European" candidate, the candidate to stabilize the regime. Today the secretary general of the PS [Socialist Party] is openly sympathetic to a liberal political ideal, clearly aligned, within the Socialist International, with those who point to the failure of the traditional social-democratic policies, at least in moments of crisis. Moreover, he seems to be the preference of the North Americans. "To oversimplify," the prime minister's colleagues told us, "it could be said that he is now further to the Right, but this is not the issue."

#### "UNESCO Ideology"

On the contrary, Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo espouses what is referred to today as the "UNESCO ideology," sympathetic to the "Third World." She believes sincerely in the power of grass roots organizations, and although she does not oppose parliamentarism, she does not have a very positive opinion of the role of political parties; in her speeches, she subordinates them to the role of grass roots committees and popular mobilization. If Soares promises to be an "arbiter president," almost like a constitutional monarch, who applies the rules without interfering in politics (it is understood that he will respect the majorities formed in the Assembly of the Republic), Pintasilgo can only promise to intervene more actively in politics. She criticizes Eanes for his failure to intervene.

Regarding economic organization, the ideas of the two candidates are absolutely distinct. The PS secretary general advocates the economic liberalization of the society; Lourdes Pintasilgo has advocated maintaining the present economic coordinates, or even correcting what she considers to be the excessive liberalism of the current government.

#### PSD: Third Candidate

After 29 March, another candidate will be nominated and will be presented as a winning candidate. After that date, when the PSD referendum will be held,

the Social Democrats will finally reveal whether they prefer a military or civilian candidate. At this point, everything indicates that the preference will be for a military candidate. The list of possible candidates includes: Firmino Miguel, Lemos Ferreira, Alberto Joao Jardim, Fernando Amaral, Mota Amaral, Pinto Balsemao and Proenca de Carvalho.

If the preference is for a military candidate, the outstanding names are those of two generals who hold high posts in the military hierarchy: Lemos Ferreira, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (CEMGFA), and Firmino Miguel, vice chief of staff of the army (vice-CEME). Among the various trends seen in the PSD, Lemos Ferreira seems to be the strongest possibility at this time, but Firmino Miguel continues to be consistently mentioned. The vice-CEME is a more political man than the CEMGFA and this could be a problem for him. Many Social Democrats fear that he will not make any political contract with the PSD or, even if he does, he will not honor it and will become what they consider "another Eanes."

The PSD preference for a military candidate is odd, but the Social Democrats seem to see it as the only chance of victory; despite the fact that for years the PSD has argued for a civilian regime and has accused the parties to its left of defending the intervention of the military in politics, they will probably promote a military candidate, for the third time.

#### PCP Waits for PRD

The [Portuguese Communist Party] has already divulged that it will not compete in the presidential elections. For now, the Communists are waiting. They are waiting for a decision from the Eanists in the PRD, which will allow them to take a position. In fact, the only alternative of the PCP is to support the PRD candidate and to make every effort to see that this candidate is not Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, whom the PCP considers too dangerous. It still does not rule out, as usual, a militant candidate. The Communists would prefer that the PRD choose a candidate to win votes on the Right and not on the left. For them, the tragedy is that Pintasilgo could be an Otelo in 1985. One thing is certain: the Communists know they will never support Soares, since he represents a direction that is irreconcilable with the views of the PCP.

Finally, the PRD has not made any decision on the matter. Without leaning toward a civilian or military candidate, at least for now, it is known that some of its most influential leaders look more favorably on a civilian. O JORNAL has learned, however, that Eanes will be pressured to support Firmino Miguel. Between Miguel, Pintasilgo and a third name, the PRD must choose a winning candidate.

This possibility might come to bring the Eanists and the PSD into agreement, which would certainly be a political novelty in these times.

#### Soares Wants National Candidacy

The candidacy of Mario Soares will not be formally presented through the PS organization, but by a National Committee of support, consisting of independent figures and some distinguished party members, JORNAL has learned from sources close to the prime minister.

The National Committee which will propose the PS secretary general for the presidency has not yet been formed, but sources close to Soares have told O JORNAL that some names are already being considered, although they would not specify them.

According to other sources, which confirmed the reports, it is certain that such independent figures as Antonio Barreto or Manuel Jose Homem de Mello, industrialists like Belmiro de Azevedo and distinguished PS figures, such as Antonio Macedo and Tito de Moraes, will be included on the committee.

#### Adriano Moreira

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 p 11

[Excerpt] The idea that Adriano Moreira emerged stronger from the last CDS congress appears to be bolstered by the report that a petition will be circulated this week in Lisbon, proposing Moreira for the presidency of the republic, as an important factor for unity among the various factions of the party.

Sources close to the CDS say this will be the best answer, since the party has not reached any agreement regarding support for any candidate outside the party, specifically the candidate to be proposed by the PSD, or for a military candidate. According to the same source[s], the petition will later be forwarded to the National Council.

Although he has been meeting recently with members of the council, Adriano Moreira is maintaining silence on the matter.

#### Melo Antunes Candidacy Rumored

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 15-21 Mar 85 p 13

[Text] Sources close to Belem have told O JORNAL that Melo Antunes could be the candidate preferred by Belem for the presidency of the republic.

Our source guaranteed that, at this time, Melo Antunes has won the support of some of Eanes' advisors, who "feel the lieutenant colonel has a chance of winning all the votes on the Left in the second round, which would mean that, to be elected, Mario Soares would have to insure the support of the CDS and the PSD."

The same informant said that Belem wants a military candidate in order to maintain as commander in chief an individual who can consubstantiate the MFA [Armed Forces Movement], who would be pleasing to the army sector, above all, to those who were engaged in 25 April and are still active in the Armed Forces.

#### New Candidate: Orlando Vitorino

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 16 Mar 85 p 2

[Text] This week in Porto, writer Orlando Vitorino announced his "neoliberal candidacy" for the next presidential elections and proposed

to take his campaign "all the way," rejecting any "accord" and declining the "political support of any organization."

According to the candidate, the collection of the 1,500 signatures needed to formalize his entry is "exceeding all expectations," particularly because, as he added, "for now there is only one candidate: me."

Orlando Vitorino divulged the names of only a few supporters, who include fellow writers Dalila Pereira da Costa and Sant'Anna Dionisio. The latter is the sponsor of the candidacy, which he considers a "necessary hope and catalyst" for the country, which is "in a dormant state," in his opinion.

In his first public speech, the new presidential candidate proposed to outlaw the PCP and the union federations and attacked the "socialist forces" (a concept which includes the CDS, in his opinion) and "Fauism," of which he said he knew "only one idea," which he attributed to Herminio Martinho: that of "pulling up the vineyards of the Ribetejo to plant wheat."

#### Candidates: List Reviewed

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 16 Mar 85 p 2

[Commentary by Dinis de Abreu: "Prior Contract"]

[Excerpts] The choice of a candidate who will not be a loser at the outset, before he has had a chance to test his strength in the race to Belem, has agitated--and will continue to agitate--all the parties except the Socialist Party, where everything is settled and only awaiting the most fitting opportunity to make the official announcement.

It is easy to imagine the anxiety in such disparate areas as the PSD, the CDS and even the PCP, not to forget the about-to be PRD, faced with the dilemma of designating someone who can give the minimum assurance of leading a change, or at least of not compromising a program.

They are studying profiles, civilian and military; they are weighing advantages and disadvantages; they are researching backgrounds and inventing scenarios, while the "candidates for candidate" are taking their own initiatives, some cautiously, others boldly, establishing their distinct styles and soliciting support.

One of the most handicapped parties is obviously the PSD. Under the previous leadership, and after lengthy hesitation, it already had a candidate. It was largely because of this that Mota Pinto was unhorsed, an irony of fate for a man who has often been accused of being indecisive in matters of such importance. With the new leadership elected in the National Council of Lisbon, the Social Democrats lost a candidate, but they gained a referendum, opening a broad range of possibilities.

#### Diversity

Trends represented in the PSD leadership correspond to a broad range of possible candidates: Francisco Balsemao, Alberto Joao Jardim, Mota Amaral, Fernando Amaral and Proenca de Carvalho, among the civilians; Firmino Miguel and Lemos

Ferreira, among the military. Other names are rumored, but we will stop here.

In theory, Balsemao would be the natural candidate of the PSD, with the authority to unite the disaffected Social Democratic family behind him. A founder, he has the legitimacy and the political background.

It would be an injustice not to recognize his honesty and his dignified stature. But does Balsemao have the psychological characteristics and the political aggressiveness to intimidate Soares? And, at the personal level, has the time come to end the retirement that was thought advisable to recover from the traumas suffered during the decline of the AD [Democratic Alliance]?

Finally, wouldn't it be more advantageous to Balsemao to preserve his reputation as the party's "moral figure," instead of exposing himself to a hasty comeback, with dubious results? These are some reflections on which to ponder. While Balsemao ponders and waits, Alberto Joao Jardim goes forward and assumes the rhetoric of change, nationalist, antisystem, indicating his availability if he "has the support of all the political forces that are not a part of the socialist organization," even if it is necessary to "compromise" and not run "as a PSD leader but as the president of the Regional Government of Madeira."

With the spontaneity for which he is known, in a few months Jardim dropped the indecision which tormented him when his name was suggested by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa at the Braga congress and, contradicting those who imagined him to be a regional leader without national ambitions, he has begun to advance openly, aiming his criticism at any military candidacy and, in particular, that of Firmino Miguel.

According to Jardim, a military candidate would be a "grey" candidate," with the "limitations" of his background, and Firmino Miguel "failed the First Provisional Government politically" and also played "a passive and conformist role as a minister of Mario Soares."

It was not by accident that Jardim turned his artillery on Firmino Miguel, who had appeared to be a lost cause within the PSD. Basically, it confirms insistent rumors that Firmino Miguel is not excluded from the range of possibilities under consideration by the new PSD leadership.

In fact, if the first indications seemed to rule out a military candidacy, and specifically a Firmino Miguel candidacy, the flexibility observed later was a good sign that something was changing in the headquarters on Buenos Aires [Street]. Today, strangely, even as pro-civilian a figure as Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa has been thumping less for his Braga candidate and there are even those who insist that there are new hopes for a military candidate, not with the image of moderation and reverence for the balanced formulas of compromise attributed to Firmino Miguel, but with the forcefulness and willingness to fight, if necessary, that is seen as constituting the "service record" of Lemos Ferreira.

In any event, it is clear that Jardim's priority in conducting his "primaries" within the party consists in heading off any potential support for Firmino Miguel.

Proenca de Carvalho is also employing the rhetoric of "change" in the AIP, advocating a presidential candidate who is not compromised by the national degradation of the last decade, "someone outside the party system," capable of making a "democratic break."

To anyone who wishes to interpret this public reappearance as a sign of his availability, Proenca de Carvalho would observe pointedly that his proposed model for a candidate would be easier to find "in the military area." Despite this feeling, he is still regarded as being a candidate capable of uniting the liberal forces of the PSD and of winning the support of the CDS. But why would Proenca de Carvalho be interested in involving himself in this competition? Would the political capital accumulated as head of the RTP [Portuguese Radio-Television System], handling a sensitive post with the authority that others have lacked (despite the reservations which some of his speeches might merit), have been enough to project his image among an electorate which feels it is in the middle of a labyrinth?

Perhaps the correct interpretation of Proenca de Carvalho's activity is more prosaic: it is to influence, but not to put himself in the "line of fire."

Among the prominent PSD presidential possibilities, we have not yet mentioned Mota Amaral and Fernando Amaral. The Azorian leader was a possibility that disappeared in Braga. Fernando Amaral will be seen only as a respectable president of the Assembly of the Republic.

Obviously, the list is not exhausted with the names mentioned most frequently. It is unlikely, however, that, no matter how many changes the PSD may undergo in the coming months, the choice will fall to anyone who is not already on the horizon.

The decision which will come to prevail in the PSD is central, hence we have lingered on it longer. This is not to say, however, that the CDS, the PSD, the PCP and, above all, the PRD are any more at ease, but only that all of them are depending largely on what happens in the PSD. Until the Social Democrats come to a specific decision, the CDS is restricted to cultivating an image of statesmanship in Adriano Moreira. The PCP will cherish Lourdes Pintasilgo from a prudent distance, and the PRD will weave a web of commitment around Lourdes Pintasilgo and the governor of Macao and, unless it manages to unravel it, the PRD could wind up being trapped in it.

All things considered, the idea of a "prior contract" with the presidential candidate is not an invention of Rui Machete. Others would like to make one, but not for the record.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

# PSD'S MACHETE PREPARES PRESIDENTIAL STRATEGY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 pp 1, 20

[Excerpt] Through a decision made yesterday by the Permanent Committee of the PSD [Social Democratic Party], Rui Machete will make an initial selection within the next few days of the party's candidates for the presidential palace by first meeting with various individuals who might be designated by the social democrats for the presidential race. Among the individuals to be contacted by the new PSD leader are Firmino Miguel, Lemos Ferreira and Altino Magalhaes (representing the military sector) and Francisco Balsemao, Fernando Amaral, Mota Amaral, Alberto Joao Jardim and Proenca de Carvalho (representing the civilian sector).

It will be an initial conversation in which Machete will attempt to obtain everyone's support for the selection of a definite candidacy which will possibly be finally ratified by Congress, taking into consideration the results of the referendum. The Permanent Committee also decided that, immediately following the referendum, the chairman of the party would also carry on conversations with political and social organizations with a view to establishing an electoral front.

Thus, the new social-democratic leaders are looking toward Mota Pinto, not even awaiting the results of the Congress in the process of choosing a candidate for the presidential palace.

Meanwhile, when this edition was ready to go to press, Joao Salgueiro's group was meeting at the Lutezia Hotel preparing a strategy of common action for the National Council which is meeting today at the Sheraton. Those in this group who favor a military candidacy expected that this meeting would reveal support for Firmino Miguel. Moreover, seven of its members met last Wednesday with the same intention--namely, Joao Salgueiro, Antonio Capucho, Sande Lemos, Jose Vitorino, Marques Mendes, Silva Marques and Rui Oliveira e Costa.

At the meeting Rui Oliveira e Costa and Marques Mendes spoke out against the idea of a military candidate; this was in addition to Antonio Capucho (who, along with Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa and Helena Roseta, is said to be the staunchest supporter of the civilian concept). Vitorino and Silva

Marques reaffirmed their support for Firmino. Joao Salgueiro, although recently expressing support for Firmino (with whom he met together with other members of his group shortly before the National Council of Bonfim in Porto), preferred not to take any definite stand which would not be adopted by the vast majority of the group as a whole. It should be noted that the JSD [Social Democratic Youth] and Mota Amaral also expressed preference for a civilian candidate--as well as Jardim, although the latter took pains to be nominated as a candidate as the best way to leave the Regional Government of Madeira, which would occur as a result of the budget restrictions which Lisbon will be imposing.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

CAETANO CHARACTERIZES NATIONAL POLITICIANS

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 4 Mar 85 p 24

[Text] Veiga Simao

I was aware of Simao's faults, but I never considered him to be so petty.

Magalhaes Mota

Under the cover of personal likability, he breathed ambition through all his pores.

Joao Salgueiro

He was incapable of carrying out any immediate plan of action, being little sure of himself.

Costa Gomes

Costa Gomes is what he is and nothing can be done about it.

Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo

She is ambitious, intelligent and willful (she will bring virility into Portuguese politics...)

Raul Rego

I have nothing to say about Rego whose talents in the Assembly, and I do not know in how many other public places, no one has yet managed to see.

Vasco da Gama Fernandes

Presumptuous Gama Fernandes, whom not even his coreligionists take seriously, managed in 1974 to obtain an administrative position in a state bank.

Jose Magalhaes Godinho

See how an attorney in the attorney general's office, without inspiration or prestige, filched the function of purveyor of justice.

Mota Amaral

With people of this caliber, purified by holy religion but forgetful of the duties which he contracted on earth, how did the country succeed in escaping tragedy?!...

Mario Soares

He still continues to promise what he cannot fulfill, delighted with the risks of political maneuvering.

Alvaro Cunhal

Whether one likes him or not, he is a man of superior intelligence who has a messianic view of life.

Ramalho Eanes

Dry, wooden countenance, with an air of being permanently annoyed, he represents well the bad conscience of an army in retreat and a regime which ruined Portugal.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

'UNICITY': PRD SEEN PLAYING COMMUNISTS' GAME

Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese 5 Mar 85 p 4

[Article by Manuel Maria Murias]

[Text] "Unicity" is a strange word coined by the communists in their present synonymy. It means unity "against," beyond formal and ideological divergences. Unicity has always been the major strategic motivating force of communist victories. It was unicity "against" the middle class which brought Trotsky to power in October 1917; it was preaching unicity "against" American imperialism which brought about the communization of Eastern Europe, with Soviet tanks at its rear; it was through unicity "against" fascism that the communists seized control of the government during the last 2 years of the civil war in Spain; it was with unicity "against" reaction that 28 September was devised and a subsequent attempt made to control the biggest union "gang" from a centralized standpoint; it is like the spirit of unicity "against" the partidocracy which the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] is now trying to establish, a disordered political assemblage said to be inspired by the president of the republic.

To have unicity it is first necessary to conjure up an enemy. The specter of fascism serves no other purpose, even though it is completely discredited. The communists perceived a long time ago that it is not friendships which unite people--it is enmities. Faced with a universal enemy, believers all unite to defend the collective faith. Now it is the corrupt and degrading partidocratic system; just prior to this time it was reaction, the powerful monopolists and large landowners; in the struggle against the former regime it was fascism and the overseas war.

The MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission] is the legitimate offspring of unicity. It has been coming since the long night... Heir of the defunct MUD [Democratic Union Movement] which was quickly palmed off by the communists, it, in turn, joined the enemies of Salazar for a certain period of time. After 25 April it wanted to survive in a similar manner. It is now trying, incorporated in the PRD and under the possible aegis of Ramalho Eanes, to restore the spirit of unicity to minimize the PS [Socialist Party] and the leftist factions of the PSD [Social Democratic Party], revitalize the MFA to a certain extent and

Portuguese political life to be still more confused, making the country completely ungovernable through the proliferation of parties. The communists live from institutional disorder; despite its unicitarian aspect, the PRD is itself the embodiment of disorder; in the state of anonymity in which our political society finds itself, disorder within disorder is one more step helping the communists seize control of the government.

This does not mean, for certain, that the majority of the founders of the PRD are aware that they are being manipulated. No. It means only that, as of now, the PRD is playing the PCP's game, substantially dividing the electorate of the PS against the crude anticommunism of Comrade Mario Soares, a grotesque symbol of the worst governmental performance, of the most raffish clientelism, of the most sordid corruption.

In the PRD, hunger is coupled with the will to eat and stupidity with the lack of intelligence. First, it incorporated all those who were expelled from the traditional parties of who did not find any positions of leadership in those parties: the most perfect example of this kind is Medeiros Ferreira. Then come those who, sincerely or insincerely, have a socializing presidentialist vision of our political future: this is the case of Pintasilgo and Botequilha. Following that we have an increasing number of opportunists who, however necessary, managed during the past 9 years to live greedily at the expense of the president of the republic. Lastly, in the military sector as a whole the greater part of PC's clandestine apparatus, not being able to completely stifle the new party throughout the years, tried to destroy it by sowing discord among its ranks.

In announcing the organizational Cunhal jumped for joy and his eyes shone with pure delight: after a delay of 10 years he succeeded almost publicly in hitching the head of state to his wagon through a movement which, without principles, is naturally willing to head anywhere. Inasmuch as neither Martinho, nor Pintasilgo, nor Medeiros Ferreira, nor the sone of the late Marcelo Caetano, nor even Eanes know for sure what they want, everything (Cunhal believes) will end up obeying the general principles of any unicity, nothing of nothing, the usual meaningless claptrap of petty politicians, social justice, the rights of the workers, economic development, national independence, the defense of democracy--and other "slogans" without meaning which, anesthetizing the masses, move them forcibly toward servitude.

Obviously, the PRD is a mess. Like any other party, it will serve to politically promote half a dozen ambitious individuals from the extreme left to the extreme Right and will, moreover, serve as an employment agency and qualified lobbyist. Although not all its adherents are politically marginal, nearly all marginal politicians are included in its ranks. The elimination of Mario Soares seems to be its primary objective. Thus, they are already beginning to lay plans to unite "Soarists," "Eanists" and "Machetists" against a common enemy which, naturally, will again be that present Right which, having been Left when it was advantageous to be so, is now trying to occupy the space left empty by

those who, not accepting either the regime or the system, feel inclined to follow anyone who, intellectually or journalistically, contributed to the legality of "Marcelism" and with the complicity of the latter to the achievement and maintenance of the present legality, which is the contrary of legitimacy.

Perhaps Eanes will not be the Trojan horse which the communists are trying to harness. Nor, perhaps, will all the responsibilities be incorporated in the teratological monster now brought to life. However, in politics what appears to be is--and Eanes, having objectively served the interests of the communists, has appeared to be the PC's wide-open door to the regime. As was the MFA. As the MDP/CDE tried to be; as the CGTP/In [General Federation of Portuguese Workers/National Intersindical] wanted to be; and even now, the UGT [General Union of Workers]; as were all those which, joining in the struggle against the former regime, ended up destroying Portugal, democratically opening the city's doors to the tottering revolutionism of Alvaro Cunhal.

In its very nature, partidocratic democracy is a retreat in the city's defenses. The PRD, like the MDP/CDE, like the PC, is the enemy entrenched beyond the ramparts--even though their respective militants do not want to be that enemy.

8568

CSO: 3542/137

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

WEU MEMBERSHIP ASSURED--Portugal will join the WEU (Western European Union), according to a promise made yesterday in Lisbon by the chairman of the committee for general affairs of the organization's legislative body after a meeting with Jaime Gama, minister of foreign affairs. In statements made to the press, Joseph Michel of Belgium's Christian Social Party and chairman of WEU's policy committee pointed out that there is no question concerning Portugal's admission into the organization, although there were different opinions as to the nature of that membership. The deputy prime minister and minister of defense in turn said that he considered it important to have "closer ties" between Portugal and the WEU with regard to the implementation of defense programs. Rui Machete spoke at a meeting attended by 23 WEU representatives at which the principal topics for discussion were Portugal's geostrategic position (continent and autonomous areas) and its relationship with NATO from the military standpoint. The minister of foreign affairs in turn said yesterday at a dinner he hosted for the WEU delegation that the country's membership in this organization would complete the picture of Portugal's membership in NATO, the European Council and the EEC. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 8 Mar 85 p 24] 8568

MAD LEADERS COMMITTEE MEMBERS--The National Plenary Session of the Movement for the Strengthening of Democracy (MAD) was concluded yesterday in Lisbon with the election of the organization's national committee members. The following were elected to serve on the National Coordinating Committee: Alvaro Marques, Armando Pedroso Lima, Carlos Silva, Celio Costa, Claudio Teixeira, Diogo Duarte, Jose Roseira, Mariano Calado and Nuno Fisher Pires. The plenary council's board will consist of Teresa Santa Clara Gomes, Brando da Cruz and Joaquim Brandao. At the closing session Maria de Lourdes Pinheiro stressed MAD's characteristic performance and the need to mobilize the people for the presidential and autarchic elections. The plenary session drew up the movement's guidelines for 1985. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 11 Mar 85 p 20] 8568

CAPUCHO-DE SOUSA ALLIANCE--A rapprochement between Antonio Capucho and Nuno de Sousa is becoming more noticeable every day; the two are carrying up an almost constant conspiracy at the home of the one or the other. It is feared that there will be a loss of influence in the revolutionary group, especially now when that group seems to be leaning

toward a military candidacy. And the "New Hope" is placing its greatest hopes in remaining with the social-democratic parliamentary leadership. It is the formation of the new Estoril/Cascais axis. But the "New Hope" is seeing some of its young values increasingly disillusioned with the policy of this country in general, and of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] in particular. This is the case with Pedro Santana Lopes and Jose Manuel Durao Barroso. The disillusion of Santana Lopes is so great that he even decided not to be a candidate for the Lisbon chamber. Meanwhile, Durao Barroso, who, after a short stay in Lisbon, is to return to his university work in Brussels, denied the news that he was scheduled to take on the duties of secretary of state now being handled by Rui Machete, deputy prime minister; it appears that he is not very enthused about the efficacy of this government which his social-democratic leanings had influenced him to support. [Excerpts] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 p 11-R] 8568

CSO: 3542/137

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

#### BODSTROM CLAIMS NORDIC STABILITY INTACT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Mar 85 p 4

[Op Ed Article by Swedish Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom: "Stability in the Nordic Area"]

[Text] Despite increased military activity from both of the superpower blocs, political stability continues in the Nordic area, according to Swedish Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom in this debate article in which he also emphasizes Sweden's interest in good and stable relations with the superpowers.

The most striking feature of developments in the postwar period in the Nordic area is the many years of stability. Despite periodic strong variations in tension in Europe and cold international winds, the security policy pattern in the Nordic area has proved to have strong resistance to change.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the security policy situation in the Nordic area is once and for all established, invulnerable to all inner and outer changes. The surroundings are not static. Changes happen continuously in the outside world and we must take them into consideration in our security policy judgments.

During recent years the strategic importance of northern Europe has grown. Rivalry and the arms race between the superpowers have also influenced our part of the world. The expansion since the 1960's of the Soviet naval forces and the base complex on the Kola peninsula must be seen in this overall strategic connection. At the same time this expansion, and also the measures which NATO has taken, have had consequences for the Nordic countries. This applies primarily to the increased military activities in peacetime by both superpower blocs. The border violations to which Sweden has been subjected are a link in that activity.

The Nordic countries have gone different ways in their security policies. At the same time these policies have been shaped also with the interests of the whole in mind. In all the Nordic countries, limited superpower activity and temperate superpower military behavior in the region are seen as important

conditions for continued stability in the Nordic area.

In Denmark as well as Norway there has been a lively security policy debate in recent years. The very foundation of both countries' security policy, membership in NATO, has not been questioned.

At the same time Finland's relations with the outside world are marked by continuity and stability. Developments in recent years have strongly supported the often conveyed Finnish feeling that its external relations should not be subordinated to international fluctuations in the economic situation. It is gratifying to see how little Finland is influenced by the cold international climate. The country's political and economic relations have developed favorably in all directions.

In Sweden the security policy discussions have largely been marked by violations of our territory. As to these violations, the Swedish government's attitude has been purposeful and consistent. We have not hesitated and will not hesitate to take forceful action against every intruder. Neither have we hesitated to clarify our position diplomatically when we had convincing proof. Our protests have been forceful.

Sweden has an obvious interest in good and stable relations with the superpowers. Therefore we seek a dialogue even in situations where conflicts arise. We assume that in both the East and the West there continues to be interest in protecting stability in the Nordic area. Neither side can reasonably derive any advantage from tensions and conflict arising in this area.

Sweden's contribution to this stability is a firm and consistent foreign policy which testifies to our definite intention to remain free and unfettered in all situations. This is our first line of defense. At the same time we will have a real ability to maintain our territorial integrity and oppose different threats and challenges. In cooperation our foreign and defense policies create protection for our peace and independence.

In summary it can therefore be claimed that political stability in the Nordic countries exists--despite increased military activity by both superpower blocs. The security policy pattern which was established in the Nordic countries at the end of the 1940's remains unchanged. A part of this pattern is the limitations which Nordic NATO members Denmark and Norway voluntarily adopted--freedom from nuclear weapons and the absence of permanent foreign bases in peacetime. The Swedish neutrality policy, support of defenses which are strong for our circumstances and also Finnish neutrality are all obviously part of the picture. Other stabilizing factors--Nordic cooperation, a feeling of affinity and commonality of values, homogeneity, an important economic and social stability--have gained increased weight through the years.

To state that is not synonymous with claiming that we are not confronted with serious challenges or that stability in our part of the world is unshakeable.

But these challenges can not be defined exclusively in narrow regional terms. On the contrary, the security of the Nordic countries, and thereby also Sweden's security, today perhaps more than before depend on international developments in general, and mostly on East-West relations in Europe. The deep antagonisms between East and West, the apparently unstoppable arms race, the tendency on both sides to equate security with dominant military strength, all this must also be weighed in judging the security policy situation in the Nordic area.

It is important to remember that the way in which we describe reality also influences how others see us. Overexcited conclusions and predictions can in the worst cases be self-fulfilling. Against that background reasons can be found to be careful with words and to maintain a certain degree of calm, even when dark clouds gather on the horizon and cold international winds blow.

9287

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

BODSTROM MEETS PRESS TO DEFEND ROLE IN SUBMARINE DEBATE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 25 Mar 85 p 14

[Interview by correspondent Larserik Haggman with Swedish Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom in Helsinki, date not specified: "Swedish Foreign Minister's Problem--News Journalists Who Are Actors"]

[Text] Sweden's foreign minister has a problem in that some journalists are both news journalists and actors at the same time. His allusion applies to the dinner conversation which he had with six journalists which led to a vote of confidence in the Swedish Riksdag. Bodstrom considers it clear that a government can not express itself about submarine violations without proof. According to Bodstrom there was no proof following Harsfjarden. They all reported that correctly. But now the foreign minister is asking himself how they can claim that he doubted the report about Harsfjarden. It was the newspaper report which caused a unified nonsocialist opposition to demand Bodstrom's removal.

Lennart Bodstrom has difficulty in perceiving any real security policy debate. He sees no clear alternative.

"The Riksdag debate has shown that the nonsocialist parties claim that they stand behind the government's foreign policy. Including behind Olof Palme's speech to the Social Democratic Party congress, including his position on the need of a dialogue with the Soviet Union.

According to Bodstrom the motion of no confidence against him was against the method of conducting foreign policy.

"Next Wednesday the Riksdag debate will again offer an opportunity for the opposition to say whether they accept our foreign policy, or present an alternative."

[Question] "Therefore you say that you have found no alternative?"

[Answer] "In the no-confidence motion there was explanatory criticism, but in connection with the foreign policy declaration of last year there was nothing of importance.

"There was reason to clarify where the parties really stand. That is a democratic right of the voters."

[Question] "The latest opinion poll in Sweden--the one which showed an advance for the Social Democrats--came immediately after your incident. Do you draw any conclusions from that?"

[Answer] "Our support was not affected by the debate, but as things turned out the leader of the Center Party, Thorbjorn Falldin, gave the starting signal for the commotion the same day, at the beginning of February, when he learned of an opinion poll which showed a clear decline for him.

"The scant two percent which the Center Party increased during one month was taken by the party from KDS [Christian Democratic Union], which they will campaign together with in the election."

#### Nervous Climate

[Question] "Were you surprised that Falldin participated in the action against you and practiced bloc politics?"

[Answer] Bodstrom said that he was surprised, and that he does not believe it is always easy to analyze motives.

[Question] "About the role of the press. What do you think about that?"

[Answer] "A large part of the debate takes place in the press. The Riksdag only sometimes discusses foreign policy.

"It appears that in the nervous climate before the election they want to divert attention from the main issues, employment and the domestic economy."

Bodstrom believes that quite simply they were looking for a debate on something else.

He tells of his appearance before the Constitutional Committee in the Riksdag, and believes that an entirely different picture appeared when the report gradually became clear.

"The leading Center Party man on the committee told the press that the questioning was good and clarifying. I just question whether they should not have had a clear picture when they demanded no confidence."

## Different Journalists

[Question] "Then what do you think about the way the press wrote about the affair?"

[Answer] The Swedish foreign minister said that he has mostly a positive impression of the press. But he has noticed a difference between different journalists.

"During my time as a union chairman I met another type of journalist. If I made a demand for a 2-year agreement there was no violent debate whether the members wanted one or three years.

"A demand for an index clause did not bring forth a discussion of the correctness of the viewpoint."

According to Bodstrom some of the problem is due to the fact that some journalists are both news journalists and actors.

## Proof Is Needed

His version of the latest incident in Sweden is that when he said there is no proof of Soviet submarine violations after Harsfjarden he became involved in a reasoning that subsequent violations are also Soviet.

"The government cannot express itself without proof. That should be clear."

Bodstrom finds one thing especially noteworthy. In all the articles written after his meeting with the six journalists it was clear that he said that no Soviet violations took place after Harsfjarden.

"How can they then claim that I doubted the submarine commission's report which concerned just Harsfjarden?"

"My reasoning concerned Soviet violations, not violations in general."

Bodstrom is very surprised that no one requested a real interview and no one checked the information.

"It is difficult to determine the results of this incident as it concerns foreign observers."

## Not Afraid

[Question] "Then do you believe that this incident or the security policy in general will become a central issue in the election campaign?"

[Answer] "Even though the Social Democrats do not want to bring foreign policy into the campaign, we are absolutely not afraid of it."

Bodstrom reminded of a majority of confrontations during the postwar period which the Social Democrats in Sweden had "put aside with confidence": The demand for NATO membership in the 40's, EEC membership in the 60's and 70's, NATO cooperation and own nuclear weapons in the 50's.

"If they want to, we are ready to also debate these questions, in addition to the election campaign issues."

[Question] "Is such a debate negative for Sweden as a nation?"

[Answer] "We can not surrender when it concerns basic elements of the Swedish neutrality policy. The situation continues to be stable and all the Nordic countries are making their contribution to that," said Bodstrom, and referred to his article in HUFVUDSTADSBLADET last Friday when he visited Helsinki.

No Proof

[Question] "In that did you ask for caution in the choice of words if the storm clouds grew closer? Do you believe they are doing that?"

[Answer] "It is clear that we are seeing increased tension in the world and noting increased military activity around the Nordic area. That should still not lead to statements about conclusions for which we can not find proof.

"It is important to keep a cool head and look after one's own house and not make claims about those around you. At least that applies to a responsible government."

Bodstrom said that the conversation with the six journalists was just such a case.

"Naturally journalists have another freedom in certain situations," he added.

No Objections

[Question] "How are you experiencing the Swedish climate and public opinion following the different incidents?"

[Answer] "The government has obtained the approval of the Riksdag. And only a couple of days following the affair I reported to the foreign policy committee, and they had no objections to my report."

To a question of whether the press and public opinion made the government's policy more difficult, Bodstrom replied that in a democracy equal signs cannot be inserted between government statements and press articles. According to him it is natural that the government is more restrained.

[Question] "Do you believe that the Conservatives or circles within them are interested in pushing hard on security questions?"

[Answer] "That is something which time will tell. Almost one year has passed since the last time."

Some Risk

"Opinion polls, however, clearly show that confidence in the Social Democrats on these questions is high. Therefore perhaps those who are thinking of coming forward in favor of decisive changes are running a number of risks," concluded the Swedish foreign minister.

9287

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1 May 1985

## MILITARY

## AUSTRIA

## GOVERNMENT PUBLISHES PLAN OF DEFENSE STRATEGY

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 6 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by Andreas Koller: "Emergency Plans"]

[Text] Vienna—The waves made by the "Frischenschlager affair" have only superficially affected the political parties' consensus on national defense. Even while Frischenschlager was under heavy fire both from the opposition and the coalition partner the national defense plans and guidelines remained untouched by partisan strife.

Proof of this domestic policy consensus can now be obtained in the form of a 227-page book containing the national defense plan published by the chancellor's office. The book costs 95 schillings and may be bought by anyone in any bookstore. The plan goes back to a parliamentary resolution, unanimously agreed upon by the three parliamentary factions in 1975. It has been put together by a subcommittee of the national defense council. The official title is "Basic Plan for Austria's Security" which has now been assembled in an official document for the first time. The plan starts out by sweeping aside a variety of notions about the feasibility of defending our country without the benefit of armed forces. "Exclusively non-violent resistance in place of other, primarily military, defense measures runs counter to current international defense practices," the authors declare. Nonetheless, "military national defense" is only one aspect of the document. It also contains guidelines—in some instances quite brief—on other components of comprehensive national defense strategy such as moral, civil and economic national defense.

#### Emphasis on Defensive Character

Particular emphasis is placed on the purely defensive character of Austrian national defense. "It is the goal of Austrian security policy to protect the population and the basic values of this nation against all threats and to maintain and defend its everlasting neutrality." Among the "basic values" to be defended the document not only lists national independence, territorial integrity and the unity of the Austrian national state. Comprehensive national defense planning also bears a responsibility for the "inner life" of Austria. The document therefore also calls for the defense of

"internal autonomy" among other things; of "pluralistic democracy" and a "maximum quality of life"—even against domestic disturbances. These efforts are subsumed under the heading of a "policy for the maintenance of internal stability."

The plan summarizes the basic strategy to be followed by the national armed forces in a very few words. "In case of a military attack on Austria, the defense struggle [is to] commence at the frontier," the document states. In other words, no part of Austria's territory is to be surrendered to an enemy without a fight—even if that enemy "merely" requires use of such territory to march through which, according to the defense plan, constitutes one of the two possible types of "military threat." The other would be the declared intention of an enemy to occupy parts of Austria—for example for the purpose of "creating political fait d'accomplies," as the document puts it.

Of the 227 pages of the document a mere nine are devoted to the moral aspects of national defense. The most important goal is education for the purpose of awakening a "new, contemporaneous type of patriotism;" a "vital awareness of the Austrian spirit" without "pathos" and "national arrogance." For this purpose, the network of responsible instructors is to be expanded to include "the entire educational system." Instructors to teach the subject of moral national defense are also to be appointed to the universities and teachers colleges.

It is the primary task of civil defense to protect the population and the government institutions "against all presently conceivable threats with the exception of direct, large-scale nuclear aggression." This is to be made possible above all through the construction of shelters and measures to alert the civilian population. "There is much confusion about responsibilities in this field," the document notes. These should be cleared up as rapidly as possible.

One noteworthy detail contained in the plan is that civilian authorities should remain in charge of civil defense operations even in case of a national emergency—with the armed forces merely "providing support." The complaints by the authors about the present state of civil defense are loud and clear. "In this context," they say, "it must be clearly stated that area defense can only be fully effective, if the civilian population is afforded the necessary protection." Military defense, in other words, becomes meaningless unless there is sufficient protection for the civilian population.

The authors are far more satisfied with the state of economic national defense efforts. "The goals of economic national defense," the document notes, "are by and large identical with the classic aims of economic policy in general: full employment, economic growth, monetary stability and a balanced trade balance." The goal in general terms, in other words, is the attainment of economic autarky.

The authors are also satisfied with the "self-sufficiency level" regarding foodstuffs—which is somewhere between 80 and 90 percent—but they do point out that there are "serious gaps in the supply of vegetable oils and fats."

#### Including Civilian Service Draftees

The plan makes a clear case for including civilian service draftees in the comprehensive national defense strategy. This recommendation might well become part of the debate on domestic policy over the next few weeks. For several weeks now, civilian service groups have been fighting against this proposal. It hardly comes as a surprise that the document contains a strong recommendation for the purchase of "at least a limited number" of interceptor aircraft. On the missile issue, the authors come up with a rather elegant formulation by simply stating that "an improvement of the armament of all jet aircraft [is] to be desired."

The secret part of the defense plan may possibly have more to say on this subject. "Some facts and figures" are said not to be contained in the document made available to the public.

But above and beyond that the defense ministry is proud of the fact of having made the national defense plan public. Some newspapers had referred to it as a "secret document." "The defense minister came up with the idea a year ago," said defense ministry press spokesman Sartorius. "The original idea was that public debate could only be fruitful. Foreign agents, at any rate, will have nothing to crow about because the plan "does not contain any top secret information," according to Sartorius.

9478

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1 May 1985

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

## TIGHTER INTEGRATION OF COMBINED GROUND ARMS UNITS PLANNED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Feb 85 pp 29-37

[Article by Lt Gen Werner Schaefer: "Armored Combat Forces--Today and Tomorrow"]

[Text] Planning how the combat forces are to be organized and with what weapons systems they are to be equipped depends on a multitude of factors, for example on the threat, the terrain, the mission. The chief of the General Army Office, Lt Gen Dr Werner Schaefer, in the following article comments on these problems and presents the further development of the armored combat forces as regards structure and equipment in the 90's. It is noteworthy that the idea of combined arms combat was further developed. Thus the combat force battalions are supposed to have tank and armored infantry components in the basic organization.

It is a permanent task of the General Army Office to reflect on the further development of the branches of service so as to be able to adapt in time their equipment, their operational principles and structure to the changing conditions. What is always important hereby in conceptual planning--and that is what is primarily involved here--is to start out from the actual condition of the existing situation. Then the expected development is to be assessed and the means to be selected studied as to their suitability so that the set targets can be attained within the framework of the mainly financially narrowly set limits.

This complex task cannot be fulfilled by individuals and undoubtedly also not by the soldiers only. Tacticians and engineers, soldiers and politicians as well as scientists from the economy and industry are jointly called upon to solve this task. In conceptual planning, the importance of which has increased because of the declining availability of resources, the intellectual base cannot be broad enough. Thus the exchange of ideas, especially in the initial stages of planning must even be intensified.

Finally--since our financial resources are already tight--it is important that we make even better use of our intellectual and innovative capabilities than heretofore. In this point we can agree with the opinion expressed by Lieutenant

General Poeppel, retired, that we should counter more purposefully the trump cards of the East with the advantages of the West: the nimble mind and the inventive genius.

The following observations concern the field of the conceptional planning task related to the armored combat forces, which include the tank force, the armored infantry force, tank destroyer force, and the armored reconnaissance force. All of them, together with the combat support forces, constitute the mainstays of the battle of the combined forces and thus form a significant part of our army, yes it can almost be called its "hard core."

#### Determining Factors of the Concept

It depends on a multitude of factors how armed forces or military services and thus also the branches of service are to be made up, the weapons systems with which they have to be equipped and how they have to be organized. In this connection, the most important factors to be mentioned are:

--Mission

--Threat and pattern of war

--Technological development and

--Socio-economic and ground structure development.

#### Threat

In the first place, the threat and its probable development is to be assessed because it influences the mission. All measures of one's own must be oriented primarily on the capabilities of the potential enemy.

In general, the threat is characterized by an offensive military doctrine, quantitative superiority of military forces and a quality of technology that is becoming more and more alike that of the West, that in some partial fields is already equal to that of the West.

The following scenario should be assumed for a clash in Central Europe: If--and that is to be emphasized--it should come to a military conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, then it must be assumed that (according to Hildebrandt) the Warsaw Pact as attacker will have the initiative and will determine where, when, how, and in what direction it wants to attack. A probability could be "a lightning attack operation with flying start in the depth" (according to Poeppel).

It must be assumed that the Warsaw Pact, taking advantage of its strategically favorable position and of the surprise factor, will try not only to counteract our defensive operations by swift, carefully coordinated attack operations of all its military services and to quickly achieve a breakthrough to the strategic intermediate targets but also to counter the deployment of the NATO forces or to attack it to hit and neutralize the NATO air forces--as much as possible--

still at their air bases, the NATO ground forces in their peacetime quarters or dispersal areas as well as the command centers.

In addition, under simultaneous vertical envelopment in depth, wide-area "bold" thrusts across the inner-German border and the border to the CSSR into the depth of FRG territory are probably intended.

Therefore, our combat forces, combined with other branches of service including those of our allies, must be adjusted to the enemy attack of massed, armored units supported by combat helicopters. This attack will be characterized by uninterrupted operations day and night, taking advantage of the so-called "stagger principle" and employment of the forces in terrain favorable to movement. Moreover, the combat forces must figure on the effect of high fire concentration of enemy artillery and air support in the main attack points.

However, it is just as probable that the Warsaw Pact ground forces in the future, too, in general, except perhaps those deployed in the approaches--here especially those in the GDR--will not be able to carry out large-scale operations without considerable preparations.

#### Terrain and Other Conditions

The large share of built-up and forested terrain in the FRG area restricts the possibilities of movement of armored combat forces despite the existing dense transportation network. Thus the deployment of sizable mechanized units and mobile combat are made more difficult. The effect of the fire has been considerably enhanced by the technical development. While this factor already demands reduction of the target density, the uncontrolled urban spread requires smaller controllable and thus better led units and formations. These findings were taken into account in the concept of our armored combat forces in Army Structure 4 (Heeresstruktur 4). Aside from these factors, conceptional planning is decisively dependent on the basic manpower and financial conditions. Since it must be assumed that the funds of our state will continue to be tight, further development of the armored combat forces, just as other plans for the future, must be oriented on the necessities and limited to the essentials. We must do without the technically feasible or desirable.

Because of the known population development, starting from the end of this decade the number of those fit for military service will no longer meet the demand of the armed forces. To solve this problem, decisions are required even now to make it possible to institute appropriate corrective measures in time. In this connection it must be taken into account that cuts in the mission of the army will hardly be possible in order to maintain an adequate defensive capability according to the alliance commitments we have undertaken and the threat outlined above.

#### Mission

This mission does demand from the armored combat forces that they can successfully carry out the forward defense in close link with the other branches of service of the army and of our allies--as a "big combat community" so-to-speak.

Therefore, forward defense is more than merely a principle ; from the German view it is an indispensable element of the NATO strategy. Its goal is to fight off the aggressor successfully as early as possible and with as little loss of terrain as possible and with the best possible limitation of the damage and to regain the lost terrain. For this purpose the defense must be able to start without delay and with a maximum of combat effectiveness near the border and conducted in a coordinated manner.

### Conclusions

The fact that 30 percent of the FRG population lives in a strip of 100 km along the inner-German border and that 25 percent of the industrial potential is located there makes it evident how important--yes, it can be labeled vital--the forward defense is for us.

It excludes the abandonment without battle of sizable territory of one's own as well as area defense which includes the depth of our own territory. However, forward defense includes using the depth of the defense areas in the forward combat zone for mobile conduct of operations.

To be able to start an integrated defense over the entire width immediately and to conduct it with mobility so that the attacker is denied the thrust into the depth of the FRG territory, adequate forces in operational readiness and combat ready--especially also combat forces--are of decisive importance.

As an experience from the history of war it can be assumed for a future clash, which will be characterized especially also by utilization of the third dimension, that the mass can be overcome only by dynamics, by dynamics that are the result especially of superior tactics and conduct of operations.

For this particular purpose a multitude of smaller, highly mobile units and formations with heavy firepower and qualified leadership are required, as they are already present in the armored combat forces.

### Tactical Capabilities

The four branches of service of the armored combat forces--tank force, armored infantry force, tank destroyer force, and armored reconnaissance force--correspond to these ideas. They combine within themselves high firepower, mobility and armor protection. Without delay they can change day or night between dispersion and concentration, between attacking thrust and fire fight from positions. They can quickly meet the enemy, shift points of main effort and quickly escape from the effect of superior enemy fire by rapid movements into more favorable operating areas or positions. Thus armored combat forces are able to conduct combat mobilely and to maintain and regain freedom of action.

Maneuverability of the command, mobility of the units and formations, the speed with which command measures affect the enemy and good knowledge of the terrain are prerequisites for the ability to apply the means of surprise successfully. The basic idea is to hit and defeat the enemy again and again at an unexpected time, at an unexpected place, and in an unexpected manner.

Thus successes frequently can also be achieved even from an inferior position. However, for this purpose modern command and control facilities are required which permit swift and secure transmittal of information and a short reaction time of the weapons. Such command and control facilities are a prerequisite for mobile leadership which must affect all types of combat to equalize the numerical inferiority. Aside from the close integrated weapons system to be aimed for, this is important especially in the delay to be practiced against a clearly superior enemy. The more skillfully combat the formations and units is carried out in changing between combat from positions with surprising, devastating fire on the one hand and surprise counterattacks on the other hand, the greater the effect on the enemy, the more assured is success.

The principal purpose of the demand for delay is gaining time for subsequent operations and maintaining one's own combat effectiveness as much as possible. In this connection, the idea of destruction has gained special importance for the armored combat forces. The attacker should and can be worn out by the highest possible losses.

In the defense, armored combat forces are to be so led while taking advantage of the depth of their terrain that even a numerically superior enemy time and again meets up with local fire superiority. The defender cannot be equally strong everywhere. Massed concentration makes it necessary to accept gaps to be strong enough at the critical point and at the right time.

Only mobile conduct of operations makes it possible to achieve a limited superiority in terms of place and time. But this does not signify that in the defense against the fire fight we can do without reconnoitered and prepared positions. Moreover, it would be incorrect to adhere stubbornly to these positions and thus to accept unnecessary losses.

Finally in the attack by which the decision is sought by destruction of the enemy and lost terrain is to be regained, only armored combat forces develop the necessary firepower and striking power for deep penetration and breakthrough. Here, too, what is especially important is speed, a swift thrust into the objective.

This does not signify that the shortest, direct road to the objective also promises the biggest success. Especially the intention to direct heavier fire at the enemy at an unexpected target from changing directions and in doing so to underrun the enemy fire demands employment of the forces from changing positions and thus leads to fragmentation of the enemy fire. Armored combat forces, however, will only be able to develop their full effect if they cooperate among themselves and with other branches of service, especially with the combat support troops, i.e. if they conduct combined weapons combat.

While combined weapons combat used to mean "cooperation of various forces and means on the battlefield under the uniform command of a troop commander"--in other words, in general a leader from brigade commander on upwards--we now speak of combined weapons combat if various branches of service cooperate under a uniform command independent of the command echelon.

The present largely autonomous and specialized weapons systems develop maximum effectiveness only in combination with other weapons systems. According to their special performance capability, the individual weapons in this combination complement one another in target engagement and mutually protect one another.

#### Army Structure 4

With the introduction of Army Structure 4, the capabilities and potentials for combined weapons combat have been decisively improved by the smaller, more mobile, better manageable units and formations but also especially by the introduction of new weapons, such as the antitank helicopters. Technical potential and tactical necessities have raised the demands on the ability of the commanders, especially at the lower command echelon.

Even the commanders of elements of the combat forces frequently have to lead combined weapons systems of tanks and armored infantrymen and depend on elements of combat support forces for cooperation, such as engineer reconnaissance detachments or artillery observers.

At company level, the spectrum of combined weapons systems or combined branch of service elements is expanding considerably. Commanders on this level as a rule have to lead different elements of the combat forces and are greatly dependent on cooperation with the combat support forces.

Meanwhile for the battalion commander, combined weapons combat is being taken for granted. In virtually every situation a tactical grouping deviating from the peacetime basic organization takes place. Thus a mixed team is formed adapted to the tactical purpose involved in which different performance components of armored combat forces mutually strengthen one another or balance their weaknesses. Cooperation with combat support and operational support forces, frequently also with antitank helicopters and air defense forces and one's own air forces beyond that, is the rule.

The armored combat forces according to the conceptionally determining factors have been so organized that optimal cooperation for combined weapons combat in the major formation framework with the other elements of the army system is assured. They form the numerically greatest share of the 36 brigades of the field army and of the 12 home defense brigades of the territorial army. Most of our brigades are tank and armored infantry brigades which, in addition to the brigade units, possess 4 line battalions and one armored field artillery battalion as principal carriers of the combat.

With Army Structure 4 we have thus changed from a three-unit organization for the line battalions to a four-unit organization.

Thus the capability for more flexible operations planning and conduct of operations has been clearly improved. As an innovation it must be noted that one of the line battalions, the first, is a mixed battalion, i.e. this battalion includes tanks and armored infantrymen. Its staff and support company is partly staffed, i.e. it will be completely operationally ready following call-up of reservists.

Moreover, the present combat companies of this fourth line battalion are divided up to the three other line battalions. Therefore, this formation must be brought together in exercises and in deployment.

The ideas on the further development of the conduct of operations, equipment and structure of armored combat forces in the 90's had to and have to start from the question whether and how the cited basic conditions will change.

Just as in the previously assessed threat situation, no substantial changes are to be expected in the own military-strategic targets, including the mission of the army. Moreover, the terrain conditions, too, will only change slightly compared to the present conditions.

This signifies that the combat forces required for the fulfillment of the mission in the 90's combined with the other branches of service in the future, too, will mainly have to be able to contain an attacker with present forces by the forward defense, to retain their own terrain and to regain lost terrain by counterattack.

For this purpose, the firepower, survivability, and mobility suitably united in the armored combat forces is to be developed further with cost effectiveness. These three main factors must be adapted to the high demands of future actions which probably will proceed even a great deal faster, more intensively and uninterruptedly than is to be assumed for the present actions. Thus the firepower of the armored combat forces must be composed of different weapons with different tasks and principles of effect, so that no "gaps of effect" occur in combat.

In addition to armor protection, survivability is to be assured above all by firepower and mobility, but also by the configuration. It can and therefore should be increased by a whole series of indirect protective measures, e.g., smaller silhouettes, camouflage features in the visual and infrared range, capability to absorb radar, etc.

Finally the mobility achieved for the LEOPARD 2 battle tank will also be adequate for the future. With this excellent battle tank we have advanced to a zone which also includes ergonomics. Cost effective improvements will hardly be possible.

In general, in the considerations for the further development of the armored combat forces, system thinking is in the foreground according to which the individual elements and factors are not viewed in isolation but in an overall context. Finally the system as a whole is to be adapted to the changing basic conditions so that a suitable integration of its principal elements of personnel, command and employment principles, organization and equipment permits reaching the required performances in orderly cooperation.

For the 90's, this is possible as a further evolutionary development from Army Structure 4.

Nevertheless what was and is involved with regard to the planned equipment according to the system thinking is to divorce oneself from the follow-on

thinking. Beyond that, especially for the weapons systems of the future it will be required that no more complex multipurpose weapons systems be developed as a result of the recognition that in war only the simple thing is successful. Thus also from the aspect of cost effectiveness the individual weapons systems are to be oriented towards the fulfillment of their principal tasks. The technical layout is to be simpler, the availability of the individual components is to be increased. Moreover, leadership at the lowest level is to be simplified.

System thinking under the aspect of cost effectiveness has also logically led to considerations of developing a family of armored carrier vehicles for the main weapons.

Accordingly, the following main weapons systems for the armored combat forces of the 90's are being considered:

--A battle tank with a high-performance gun which can destroy armored targets at great distances;

--APCs with a machine gun that can destroy enemy APCs of the future;

--Antitank armored cars with an effective independent antitank system of the armored infantrymen;

--Armored mortar carrier;

--Tank destroyer/helicopter armored defensive vehicles with an effective weapons system.

In the technical achievement of these future weapons systems the efforts will be directed more than heretofore, aside from the increase in the efficiency of the hardware, at improving its reliability and at facilitating its operation, maintenance and repair.

Since no principal change of the facts and requirements of land warfare for the 90's as compared to the present has emerged, no change in the basic operational and tactical ideas is to be expected either. The principles for command and deployment of armored combat forces probably will also only have to be changed gradually.

However, in the future the capability of the enemy to be able to conduct uninterrupted operations by day and night using the "stagger principle" will have to be met more effectively than heretofore.

#### Equipment and Structure

Equipment and structure of the armored combat forces must be so conceived that they meet these requirements. Since the physical and psychological capability of man is limited, the structures must provide, among other things, for exchange of personnel or relief in place in combat.

Models for the structure provide for an equal number of tank and armored-infantry brigades and an unchanged number of airborne and mountain brigades. The home defense brigades of the territorial army are to be equipped with the weapons systems that become available because of new procurement of the armored combat forces. Thus these large formations will be even better able to perform combined weapons combat. The armored infantrymen share of the tank brigade is to be increased as compared to the present situation and in this connection the dismounted strength of armored infantrymen, i.e. the component of the dismounted infantry combat, will be clearly increased.

The armored reconnaissance battalion of the division--following the present deployment practice--will be developed into a formation that can assume security, control, and delaying tasks in addition to its reconnaissance tasks. The main effort of armored ground and scouting reconnaissance is supposed to be with the brigades.

In the now planned structural model for the tank and armored infantry brigade, the combat force share in the brigade forces is supposed to be identical. Both of them are supposed to get a brigade reconnaissance company and an antitank/helicopter defense company.

Moreover, the combat force battalions of the future even in their basic organization are to be an organic mixture of tank and armored infantry elements.

In this mixture, the "system of armored combat forces" already has its effect on the battalion level even though only the large formation of the brigade comprises the complete system; only at the brigade level are the far-reaching weapons system of tank destroyer/armored helicopter defense vehicles and the weapons systems of the combat support forces included in the plans.

#### Planning Is Art of the Possible

If the present conceptual models and plannings for the armored combat forces can be adequately achieved within the framework of the concept and structure of the army, then these forces will be able to fulfill also in the 90's their function of deterrence and forward defense according to the threat and the mission.

Since planning, just as politics, is an art of the possible, the efforts of many are necessary to maintain and if possible to raise the operational readiness of the armored combat forces and with them of the entire army with the initially sketched complexity of the task in view of the narrowly set financial limits.

12356

CSO: 3620/0271

MILITARY

FINLAND

#### CRUISE MISSILE STUDY PANEL CONTINUING WORK

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 Feb 85 p 7

[Article: "Missile Report Delayed for Yet Another Month"]

[Text] The eight-member Finnish study panel, which has been investigating the remains of the Soviet target missile that fell into Lake Inari, will still continue its work. The information section of the General Staff says that the completion of the report will stretch into March or April.

Pieces of the target missile were initially taken to Tampere and Tikkskoski for investigation. Then they were transferred by truck to Vainikkala and put on a train to be transported to the Soviet Union.

The intent of the study is to confirm the origin of the missile as well as to clarify why the target missile strayed into Finland.

Even though the pieces of the missile are no longer in Finland, it is still a question of a long, drawn-out study. For example, the final report on a Fouga accident in Lohtaja in the beginning of the year was not completed until 2 months after the accident.

After the missile report has been completed, it will first be submitted to Lieutenant General Rauno Merio, commander of the Air Force. He will then submit it to his own superior, General Jaakko Valtanen, commander of the Finnish Defense Forces. The report will then go from Valtanen to the Defense Ministry and to the Foreign Ministry.

A decision on making the report public will not be made until after it has been completed, says the information section of the General Staff.

The incident, which has received extensive publicity, took place on 28 December when a Soviet target missile strayed into Finnish airspace and finally fell into Lake Inari. Information about the route of the missile was not obtained until 2 January from Norway. The pieces of the missiles were finally found in the middle of January after intermittent searches. They were sent back to the Soviet Union on 8 February.

10576  
CSO: 3617/83

MILITARY

FINLAND

ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON NEW HEAVY COAST GUARD BOATS

Helsinki NAVIGATOR in Finnish Feb 85 pp 5-6

[Article by Markku Ranin: "Naval Patrol Becoming More Effective, Report on Last Quarter of 1984 in Shipbuilding Industry"]

[Excerpt] The Border Patrol, which celebrated its 65th anniversary last March, is renewing all of its coast guard equipment.

The fifth ice-breaking long-distance patrol boat and a heavy coast guard boat equipped with modern submarine search equipment were ordered at the end of the year. Light coast guard boats ordered in the fall are already under construction, and procurements of aircraft and helicopter equipment are being planned.

Signals of ever continuing difficulties in navigation and shipbuilding are again being heard in the world. The large Swedish shipping company Salen, which has approximately 20 of its own refrigerated ships and 150 rented ships, slipped irrevocably into bankruptcy before Christmas. Only a little before this Sweden's second largest shipyard announced that it will cease its operations. When Uddevalla closes its doors in 1986, a little less than 3,000 employees will be forced to seek new employment elsewhere. Measures to reduce the operations of Spain's shipyard industry, for its part, are continuing, which will result in a loss of current jobs for more than 15,000 people.



The above heavy coast guard boat is somewhat similar to the missile boat Helsinki, which served as a prototype. In addition to Hollming's prototype, four others will be built.

#### Technical Data

length, max	43.0 m
length, pp	38.5 m
width, kvv	8.0 m
abutment height	3.9 m
draft, max	2.3 m
displacement	270 t
engine capacity	5520 kW
speed	more than 20 kn
price	56.5 million markkaa
construction number	264

10576

CSO: 3617/83

1 May 1985

MILITARY

PORTUGAL

## DEFENSE OFFICIAL REPORTS 'SCARCE MEANS'

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 Mar 85 p 2

[Text] The armed forces are accomplishing their mission with the resources made available to them and these resources, by themselves, constitute a threat to the credible maintenance of these forces, it was remarked yesterday by Figueiredo Lopes, secretary of state for defense, during the closing session of the First Strategy Congress promoted by the International Strategic Studies Institute in Lisbon.

Figueiredo Lopes said that the resources available are scant and that the armed forces are currently facing a worrisome level of equipment expenditures and issues, above all when compared to those that are obligatorily set aside for personnel. "We are reaching a level below which we cannot go," he said.

In taking up the topic of armed forces modernization, the secretary of state for defense stressed the fact that it is necessary on the policy level to tackle this question "head-on." Expressing his personal opinion next, Figueiredo Lopes felt that this modernization must be expressed in a "small, highly equipped and efficient organization."

In the view of this member of the administration, this option will be able to bring the armed forces not only in line with the specific geographic situation but also with the country's vulnerabilities and responsibilities as a country. However, it could also have the consequence of rethinking some of the development and modernization projects.

The speaker also stressed the need for the definition and organization of the kind of national defense the country wants, the personnel force and equipment to be allocated--something which would require a clarification at the conceptual and legal levels. Among the regulations which he considered fundamental, the secretary of state singled out the military planning law (which would permit re-equipment plans over a period of 5 years) and the mandatory military service and conscientious

As for foreign aid, the secretary of state said that the administration has been looking carefully into the repercussions deriving from the obligatory purchase of equipment from the country that gives the loan and ways of counterpart guarantee are now being studied.

## "Zero Naval"

Again on armed forces reorganization and modernization, comments were heard during the last session of the Congress from Adm Fuzeta da Ponte, commandant, of the Naval War College, and BG Antonio Bispo, of the Air Force. After describing the navy's current situation in terms of equipment, Fuzeta da Ponte concluded that "Either we take urgent measures or the intensive phase of building naval units of the 1960's will be followed by the corresponding and inexorable phase where we have to take these units out of the inventory. In 1989, 50 percent of the ships will no longer have any military value and in 1995 this will be true of all vessels, in other words, we will have a zero navy," he said.

The commandant of the Naval War College also stressed the urgency of making decisions on this matter in view of the need for long time spans required for the planning and construction of ships.

Along these same lines, BG Antonio Bispo considered it necessary to bring the goals and the available resources into line "realistically." Maj Virgilio de Carvalho next advocated the idea that national military defense seek to improve its own capability and acceptability by promoting a development aimed at interservice thinking and action as well as the promotion of an efficient military defense industry.

BG Mota Mesquita during this same session analyzed the funds allocated in the government budget to the armed forces, concluding that the shortages that have emerged in recent years do not enable us "to entertain any great hopes as to the possibility of moving forward to the modernization of the armed forces through annual budgets."

Early in the afternoon, Gomes de Pinho, a leader of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] took up the topic of "new dimensions of strategy--cultural and economic factors," concentrating his remarks on an analysis of what he called the "identity crisis" of the Portuguese resulting from profound changes in the concept of "people, territory, and state."

5058

CSO: 3542/145

MILITARY

PORTUGAL

# GENERAL STAFF CHIEF SUPPORTS 'STAR WARS' CONCEPT

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 3 Mar 85 p 28

/Text/ The strategic defense program SDI ("Star Wars"), initiated by the North American president, was defended by Gen Lemos Ferreira, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, on his return yesterday to Lisbon, following a visit to Belgium. The space-based antimissile defense program, which has caused scepticism on the part of European members of NATO, and even open opposition, translates--according to Lemos Ferreira in statements of NP /Portuguese News/--"the concern about advanced technology, and may allow us to find solutions that are more in keeping with the times."

"The SDI also means emerging or new technologies which allow us to maintain the status quo, the possibility of disarmament, and the adoption of a firm, logical, and coherent stance by NATO and its allies with regard to Russia and its partners in the Warsaw Pact"--emphasized the chief of staff.

Weighing the "extraordinary growth in recent years of the military potential of Russia and the Warsaw Pact nations," Lemos Ferreira called attention to the danger of the two alliances playing an extended game of chess where the desired result is that one player concede due to the foreseen victory of the adversary.

Alluding to the apprehension existing in several sectors of NATO over the enormous costs of "Star Wars"--more than \$26 billion over the next 5 years--Lemos Ferreira argued that what is achieved in high technology allows for advancements in other areas, and is intrinsic to progress, a point which he illustrated with the advances achieved in electronics based upon North American space efforts in the 1950's.

The differences among allies of the United States with regard to "Star Wars" have more to do with "Who is going to do what, and who gets to participate," says Lemos Ferreira.

The chief of staff revealed, on his arrival from Brussels, the possibility that Portugal and Belgium may exchange defense industry technologies within their NATO relationship.

Gen Lemos Ferreira admitted, "We are no worse off than before."

Lemos Ferreira's schedule in Belgium included a 2-day visit to SHAPE, NATO's European headquarters, in Mons, at the invitation of Gen Bernard Rogers, commander of the allied forces in Europe.

MILITARY

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

**GENERAL AWAITS REASSIGNMENT--** The former chief of the army general staff, Gen Garcia Dos Santos, who has been waiting for a new assignment for about a year and a half, said today that "Nobody wants to assume responsibility" for his situation. Garcia Dos Santos confirmed that he had been contacted by Defense Minister Mota Pinto in June of last year to chair the committee that is to draft the national electronics and data processing plan. The defense minister, he added, then transferred the entire matter to the Ministry of Industry. "I talked to the minister of industry for 7 months," he emphasized, "and I think that that was too much." "I dissociated myself from the entire affair on 11 February," he concluded. [Text] [Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 15 Mar 85 p 3] 5058

**INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL BENEFITS PROTESTED--** The bill on the status and benefits for members of the future intelligence services which the administration is drafting ran into opposition in military circles where there is insistent talk about the need for clearing up and straightening out the situation of all government employees. The military continues to express a firm readiness not to allow the government proposal "to pass" because they feel that this bill is aimed at the institutional establishment of exaggerated benefits for some government employees. In particular they point to the "higher risk" subsidies (which they say they cannot understand), the representation allowances for undifferentiated assignments in the case of those services that will remain under the control of MAI [Minister of Interior], or on personnel detached for duty with the secretary of state in the case of those individuals who will remain under the Ministry of Defense and, among other examples, the allocation of mobile homes by the state to directors. "The military will not permit the introduction of such benefits in their intelligence services and will fight to clean this situation up," one of the sources consulted told A TARDE. The position of the military was communicated yesterday by Gen Lemos Ferreira to Rui Machete, Almeida Santos, and Eduardo Pereira, who are in charge of the bill. Another meeting between the CEMGFA [armed forces chief of staff] and those members of the administration for today, late in the afternoon. [Text] [Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 13 Mar 85 p 1] 5058

CSO: 3542/145

ECONOMIC

FINLAND

# SORSA URGES IMPROVEMENTS IN EAST BLOC TRADE MECHANISMS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 2 Apr 85 p 13

[Article by Matts Dumell: "Sorsa Wants Mechanism for Effective Imports From the East"]

[Text] "Our task is now to build just as effective a mechanism for imports from the Soviet Union as the machinery which has been created for increasing exports there," said Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa. Sorsa said that Finns in their own interest should come at least half way toward the Soviet Union in the effort to increase the demand for Soviet products in Finland.

The prime minister spoke yesterday in his capacity as chairman of the Finnish-Soviet Joint Economic Commission at a seminar in Finlandia House.

In his introduction, Sorsa pointed out that Finland will continue to buy oil from the Soviet Union far into the future, and will increase its import of natural gas.

"That is the backbone of the trade between the countries now and in the future."

Since 1982, when the world market price of petroleum products began to decline, the machinery which for 10 years had increased Finland's exports to the Soviet Union, suddenly stagnated.

"That caused us to realize that things could be managed better," said Sorsa.

## New Mechanism

He said that trade has reached a stage when we must find growth factors outside the traditional energy sector.

"Coming to the point, one could say that when Finland, in cooperation with the Soviet purchasers, has built up very effective machinery for 10 years, the purpose of which has been to realize export to the Soviet Union, it is now our job to create machinery which will function in the opposite direction."

Sorsa said that it is partly a question of investigating what potential the Soviet Union has for exporting to Finland, and partly of considering what new forms the trade can take.

"The premise for the trade remaining at the same level or growing is the development of the Soviet Union's export offerings and Finland's demands for imports."

#### New Forms

"It is clear that the Soviet Union can not always supply the goods which Finland wants to purchase," said the prime minister.

Experiences of this kind have caused talk of coming compensation projects.

But that involves building production installations in cooperation, and that payment for Finnish work is accomplished in the form of finished goods which Finland wants to buy. The big problem so far has been financing.

Although the clearing statement last year could almost be balanced, the new project will not fit within the framework for the traditional trade in exchange of goods.

The same problem exists in the so-called cooperative production, even though the Soviet side has gone in for borrowing convertible currencies with other Western countries.

The Soviet Union's vice foreign trade minister A. N. Manzhulo said that suitable compensation projects for the future could be offshore geological investigation, chemistry, paper and color metallurgy.

Sorsa said that since the project is intended to strengthen clearing-import the financing should also be handled within the framework of the clearing system.

#### Clearing

To a question of what the Soviet Union considers is increased trade in convertible currency, Manzhulo replied:

"So far we have not found the advantages of using two different systems. We prefer to remain with the one, clearing.

"We are ready to investigate the issue, but the principle is that big projects are always handled with loans and goods exchange. Another question is then how loans can be arranged so that the Finnish offers are competitive."

9287

CSO: 3650/224

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

DIVERSIFICATION NEEDED IN TRADE WITH CUBA

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 Mar 85 p 4

[Text] The need to diversify products traded between Portugal and Cuba was one of the principal topics discussed at the Sixth Conference of the Joint Portuguese-Cuban Commission held in Lisbon.

In the opinion of Raquel Ferreira, secretary of state for foreign trade, who headed the Portuguese delegation at the 3-day conference, it is no longer possible for our country to continue to import sugar from Cuba in view of existing agreements between Portugal and the EEC. In keeping with those agreements, Portugal has certain commitments, such as giving preference to sugar coming from the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific), which "brings us to the point where we have neither the interest nor the possibility of importing that product from Cuba," Raquel Ferreira said. In this context, "we need to find other forms of cooperation between the two countries, such as an increase in the exchange of products which are traditionally accepted and the marketing of new products, both Cuban and Portuguese."

Alberto Betancourt, Cuba's deputy minister of foreign trade, who headed the Cuban delegation, corroborated the contention that it was not "possible to reach an agreement on this product which plays such an important role in the economy" of his country.

Consistently showing a trade deficit in its dealings with Cuba, Portugal imports the following products from that country: sugar, oils derived from the refining of petroleum and fresh fish, refrigerated and frozen. Portugal's principal exports are footwear, cork, stoves, ready-made clothing and textiles.

8568

CSO: 3542/146

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

PARALLEL ECONOMY'S PERCENTAGE--Parallel economy in Portugal represents about 22 percent of the GDR, involves a tax evasion of 95 million contos and "employs" about 1 million workers, according to a technical study made by the Ministry of Labor. By "parallel economy" we mean the entire range of "economic activities which, although lawful, are not included in the national accounting system," excluding smuggling and prostitution. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 16 Mar 85 p 16] 8568

INCREASE IN BANKRUPTCIES--The number of bankruptcies filed last year showed an increase of 33.3 percent over 1983 and involved a total of 172 companies, according to the Credit Insurance Company (COSEC). The capital involved in the bankrupt companies was about 559,000 contos and the companies employed an average of 50 people. The greatest incidence of bankruptcies continued to occur in the converting industries. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Mar 85 p 5] 8568

CSO: 3542/146

ECONOMIC

SPAIN

#### CAUSES OF SLUMP IN PRODUCTIVITY DESCRIBED

Madrid CUENTA Y RAZON in Spanish Jul-Dec 84 pp 75-83

[Article by Juergen B. Donges]

[Text] The economic crisis that has been plaguing Spain so severely in the last few years reflects the aging of the productive apparatus, which is based primarily on the industrial sector. Though this sector was the driving force behind the rapid economic development that took place in this country during the 1960s and early 1970s, in recent years it was more responsible than other sectors for the persistent, widespread stagnation. Though Spain's industry was much more dynamic during those years than that of the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a whole, now it has been left behind by world economic growth. And though this industry had provided a steady supply of new jobs during the period of rapid growth, recently it has been losing them at a spectacular rate. Since 1983 Spain's industry has shown a certain improvement in its levels of activity, but special factors (such as the opening of a new General Motors automobile plant in Zaragoza) and the cyclical recovery of the world economy (which facilitated a significant increase in exports) have contributed to this development, so it would be premature to speak of an end to the crisis.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the major labor and management organizations and the government itself have made overcoming the industrial crisis a top priority in their efforts to revitalize the Spanish economy and raise employment levels. There are abundant proposals for "industrial reconversion," "positive adjustments," "reindustrializing" the country, promoting "cutting edge" industries. But there are clear differences of opinion regarding the causes of the crisis and the responsibilities of the different private and public sectors in solving the problem. Since the situation is so complex, it lends itself to partial interpretations; since it affects most of Spanish society, it is easily politicized, and invites debate from ideological points of view; and since it is paralleled in other European countries, it inspires pessimism and feelings of impotence. Although the problems that beset Spain's industry are many and great, they are not insuperable, as long as we are aware of the fundamental causes of the crisis and more effective adjustments are made to adapt to them.

## Insufficient Productivity

An economy is dynamic when the productivity of available resources increases rapidly. Since 1975, the annual productivity growth rate has hovered around 5 percent. Although it is 2 points below the average rate for the period from 1960 to 1975, these results are not so bad. Whereas before 1975 productivity had progressed rapidly, along with a steady growth of jobs, in recent years it has been accompanied by a strong rise in unemployment. As a consequence, what we perceive as advances in productivity is more apparent than real. To a great extent, it reflects the increasing number of jobless workers and bankrupt companies, that is, the displacement of the relatively less productive factors of production (manpower and capital). If the level of employment registered in 1975 (3.6 million workers in industry) had been maintained in recent years, the real growth of the industrial product would have translated into a much slower increase in productivity: a cumulative rate of 1.5 percent between 1975 and 1984. From an international perspective, Spanish industry has been surpassed, in terms of efficiency, by the industry of the OECD countries, despite a tendency toward similar rates in the years before the crisis.

The problems of efficiency are complex and diverse, depending on the area of activity. In virtually all sectors, competitive companies (or companies that could be competitive if they tried) coexist with others that are not (and never will be) and that survive only with the help of substantial state aid, including protection from foreign trade. There are well-known examples in the steel and metallurgy industries, the shipyards, the automotive industry, the textiles and shoe sectors, the home appliance and capital goods industries. Despite these differences, there are indeed a number of deficiencies that are common to Spanish industry in general. One of them is related to the atomized productive structure. The problem does not lie, as many believe, in the fact that the vast majority (more than 95 percent) of the companies employ fewer than 500 workers; a similar predominance of small and medium firms is also seen in the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States. The problem is that, unlike their counterparts abroad, the Spanish small and medium companies operate with more outdated equipment, are less innovative in terms of products and manufacturing processes, and participate less in vertical specialization.

As a counterpoint, the so-called large enterprises in Spain are still far from the productive capacity of their equivalents in the EEC, the United States or Japan, despite an industrial policy that provides continual support for the process of concentration that Spanish business has been undergoing for decades. Insufficient plant dimensions prevent these firms from taking advantage of the technological potential of economies of scale, which can only drive up per-unit production costs. It is no surprise that this situation has arisen. It happens in all countries where most products are aimed at the domestic market and this market is too narrow. Thanks to protection from competitive imports, the companies in question remain afloat. They neglect, however, to seize opportunities to specialize, both horizontally and vertically, in exchange for simply multiplying the number of models or lines of production in each sector.

Moreover, it is well known that nearly all industrial sectors have bloated payrolls. Current labor legislation forces companies to employ more people than they need, considering the development of the market, or forces them to pay almost prohibitive compensation if they do discharge workers. To make matters worse, it should be noted that public enterprises are also instructed to maintain obsolete jobs at prevailing real wages. In both cases, the result is covert unemployment, which may mitigate the unemployment problem but does so at the cost of worsening the prospects of those who are looking for work. The impact on productivity can only be negative, certainly at the level of individual companies, but also in the context of industry in general, because there are fewer mergers, fewer expansions of productive capital and fewer new companies created than there would be if hiring and firing could be more flexible. In addition, the attitude of the worker himself is somewhat distorted, given that failing to produce as high a yield as possible does not endanger his job.

Another factor in the deterioration of productivity is the scarce attention Spanish firms give to technological research and development. In recent years, spending on this item has been around 0.3 percent of the GDP (compared to 2 percent in the advanced countries of the OECD), and the number of people employed in such activities was barely more than 1 percent of the workforce (as opposed to 10 percent in the OECD). Contrary to what is often asserted, the problem is not so much that the "dependency" of Spanish industry on imported technology is perpetuated; in the final analysis, it can be just as advantageous to participate in the international technology trade as it is to participate in the exchange of goods and services. The problem is that a low rate of research activity inevitably reduces the purchasing firms' ability to evaluate technological alternatives, to analyze the suitability of certain techniques for their own productive structure, and to imitate successful innovations that have taken place in other countries. All this translates into a clear disadvantage in product innovations and manufacturing methods, and Spain has been behind in this area for several years.

The low industrial productivity clearly slows reaction time during a period like the present when such profound and irreversible economic changes are taking place, whether due to sharp rises in energy prices, the dissemination of new technologies or the emergence of aggressive competitors on the world market, all of which have been prevalent since the early 1970s. Under these circumstances, the economic stagnation is perpetuated, unemployment climbs still higher, and the population's standard of living declines. Is low productivity a fact of life, a foregone conclusion? No, but it is clear that advances in productivity do not fall from heaven; they are the fruit of a continuous process of investment in fixed capital, the creation of new firms and the training and recycling of workers and business executives. In this regard, things have taken a turn for the worse in Spain.

#### Atrophe of Productive Investment

Gross fixed capital formation has declined for several years in a row, something that has not happened in any other OECD country. In 1975, fixed capital investments constituted 23.3 percent of the GDP; in 1983, that portion had

fallen to 17.9 percent. If we exclude construction, the historical development of this trend is no less depressing; the investment rate falls from 8.9 to 5.8 percent. This level of investment is substantially lower than that of the EEC, and is not enough to revitalize the economy, as several empirical studies have revealed. A good part of the (private) investment that has been made has been directed at rationalizing production (in order to cut wage costs) or at replacing old facilities. Investments designed to expand productive capacity in anticipation of future demand have been relegated to second place. These investments are the true driving force of economic growth and productivity advances, and they also improve international competitiveness and create many new, well-paying jobs.

Among the factors that dampened productive investment most in recent years, and to a certain extent still prevail, are the following:

- high levels of inflation, which create a climate of insecurity for investors, hinder the feasibility estimates of specific projects, and shorten the terms of the external financing that businesses obtain;

- a disproportionate increase in the wages and Social Security contributions that businesses must pay, which shrinks profit margins, decapitalizes labor-intensive companies and stimulates the replacement of human resources with mechanized resources;

- a continuously increasing tax pressure that is high in comparison with available family income ("fiscal effort"), and thus discourages those who might be willing to start up new businesses, or diverts them to the "underground economy;"

- a disproportionate rise in the public debt, spurred by the apparently unstoppable expansion of wasteful spending, which makes credit for the private sector scarce and expensive, in addition to limiting the formation of new and promising productive capacities in favor of greater investments in financial assets, including public debt bonds that can guarantee both high liquidity and substantial yields (especially those which are tax-free);

- an underdeveloped capital market in terms of the supply of social capital and above all risk capital, which severely impedes the development of new businesses in technologically innovative areas;

- a tangle of administrative requirements and regulations aimed at determining the number, location, size and type of new businesses, which creates uncertainty, generates costly red-tape and causes significant delays in the planning and execution of projects;

- a poor image of business throughout society, accompanied in some regions by violence and terrorism, which leads to frustration and discouragement among businessmen and causes them to abandon productive activities.

We could go on enumerating the firmly-rooted and persistent obstacles to productive investment. We should also mention the propensity of the various post-Franco democratic governments to try to redistribute income through

subsidies and social benefits, which is not the most appropriate action when there is such a great need to promote private initiative, risk-taking and a sense of individual responsibility. If these obstacles are not overcome, the Spanish economy will continue to see its vitality sapped, with all the ensuing social and political problems this entails for the country.

#### Adjustment and Reindustrialization

The loss of economic vitality is especially serious for the sectors that are threatened by an enormous potential for production and exportation in the industrial sectors of the so-called "new industrialized countries" of Asia and Latin America. These industries are labor-intensive, and labor unit-costs are decisive in determining competitiveness and growth rates.

The Spanish textile, clothing, fur and shoe industries, as well as the lumber manufacturing and processing, domestic appliance and toy industries, to name a few, are simply no longer able to compete on an equal footing with those countries, because of the relatively high wages that now prevail in Spain. (When labor was comparatively cheap in Spain, in the 1960s, for example, these industries were able to expand rapidly, at the expense of their counterparts in the more advanced countries where wage costs far exceeded Spain's.) A similar phenomenon can be seen in the shipbuilding industry, specifically with regard to oil tankers and cargo ships, where technology is highly standardized internationally and countries such as South Korea and Taiwan can easily exploit the advantages of their relatively low wage costs. The situation is even worse in the iron and steel industry, because new competitors are emerging during a time when world demand for steel is growing more slowly than the GDP, and excess productive capacity in the world is therefore huge. All these trends in the international division of labor do not mean that the aforementioned industries will disappear from Spain. There will continue to be successful companies in each of these sectors. But these industries as a whole will probably not provide any impetus for economic growth. In any case, it is imperative that the supply of goods be adjusted to demand (both domestic and foreign) and that productivity be increased.

As the industrial crisis heightened, various notions of industrial reconversion based on administrative planning and orientation of the productive apparatus toward adaptation to new economic circumstances gained acceptance. The OECD seemed to have the magic solution, labeled "positive adjustment," to galvanize industrial policymakers into action. Thus, in 1980 Spain began its first state program for industrial reconversion, which was embraced by 11 subsectors and five isolated companies, all in desperate straits. The sectors and businesses covered under the Reconversion Plans account for 7 percent of industrial employment, but their impact on industry as a whole is much greater because of their connection to other sectors of the Spanish economy as suppliers and demanders of goods and services.

This program, which is scheduled to expire in 1985, basically consists of a bail-out of problem businesses (for which the government grants hefty subsidies, official loans and various tax breaks, totaling more than 100 billion pesetas altogether) and a payroll adjustment (direct job losses are estimated at 10 percent of the sectors). On the other hand, no real restructuring has

taken place in terms of eliminating unprofitable businesses, completely dismantling obsolete production facilities, providing job training for laid-off workers or making new investments to create new, high-quality products and new, competitive jobs. The reconversion program actually reflects a defensive stance on the part of the government, aimed more at maintaining than adapting productive structures. Consequently, as experience has shown in other European countries, the government treats the symptoms of the problems without eliminating their causes; the industrial crisis thus does not recede but continues unabated, while society grows poorer and the inevitable adjustment becomes unnecessarily harsh and costly.

The present administration has even decided to play a role in the structural readjustment of Spanish industry, drawing on the infamous "White Book on Reindustrialization" published by the Ministry of Industry and Energy in 1983 to propose the idea of a "new industrial policy," following the lead of social democratic and labor officials in the United States and Europe. The objective is no longer merely to breathe new life into the depressed sectors and businesses; it goes beyond simple financial house-cleaning and employment adjustment to include promoting the reindustrialization of the country through new "cutting edge" industries, which to a large extent involve very advanced and complex technology such as microelectronics and related fields, data processing, robotics, biotechnology and aeronautics.

There is no doubt that Spanish industry must incorporate the latest technological advances as much as possible in order to recover its dynamism and competitiveness. But it is naive to think that these future-oriented promotional activities can be selected more effectively by the state, which operates from an administrative point of view, than by business, which is close to the market. Politicians and bureaucrats normally do not suffer any loss of assets if they err in the selection of activities for the future, while private investors can go bankrupt. For this reason, they study the real economic prospects (as opposed to the desired ones) of proposed investments much more carefully.

In this world of uncertainty, where technological processes, the availability of natural resources, the international division of labor and the juridical-political context tend to undergo unforeseeable changes, there is no scientific method for accurately predicting the future. This has always been so. As in the past, today's government cannot eliminate the problem of uncertainty, no matter how hard it tries, because it does not have superhuman powers (regardless of its political stripe). We cannot fail to note in this context the curious fact that several of today's depressed industries in Spain were considered by the government in the 1960s to be the engines of economic development (today we would call them "cutting edge" industries), such as shipyards, steel mills and auto plants. If the state defines the industries of the future for the purposes of development, it will most likely look at trends in investment, production and exportation in other more advanced countries. Thus, imitation rather than real innovation would be encouraged. If private enterprise regards imitation as promising, it has no reason to receive government aid.

But if the state compiles a series of measures designed to promote certain activities, to which it assigns its own priorities according to sector, it assumes the responsibility that the corresponding investments to be made by these firms will be successful. If they fail, these businesses will exert pressure for more aid, and will ultimately succeed in socializing the losses, at the expense of the taxpayer. In addition, any public assistance provided to certain activities inevitably amounts to a "tax" levied on others, something which is generally overlooked, but the funds earmarked for such selective promotion have to come from somewhere in the economy. Among the companies that face discrimination are usually those that operate dynamically, that innovate, that export, that maintain jobs and could create new ones. Making life difficult for these firms, as the "new industrial policy" would likely do (even if unintentionally), does not seem to yield much promise for the future.

### Final Observations

In a (social) market economy, as defined by the Spanish Constitution of 1978, the responsibility for expanding productive capacity, readapting the range of products and improving technical manufacturing processes does not lie with the state, but rather with businesses themselves. They must assume uninsurable risks, and must have creativity and imagination. They must delegate planning and decision-making functions to professionals, stimulate initiatives in the lower echelons of the firm, know how to apply marketing strategies, and realize the potential of technological research. They will also have to change management practices in many cases, showing more sensitivity to the market and abandoning mere bureaucratic and habitual procedures. This may seem like an idealistic interpretation of what the dynamic businessman should be, especially in Spain, where recent surveys reveal that less than one-fifth of the workforce is interested in going into business. But if Spanish society is not convinced of the urgent need to develop its vocation and capacity for business management to higher levels of professionalism and creativity, it will be very difficult to resolve the economic problems that plague the country now or may arise in the future, despite the government's efforts. Spanish industry will have serious difficulties in coping with the new conditions that result from Spain's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) and taking advantage of that membership for its own growth, regardless of how long a transition period is granted.

To spur the formation of fixed capital for the long term, it is imperative to increase the expected yield of future investments. In this regard, the state has an important role to play. Its areas of activity are very diverse, but their common denominator should be an orientation toward improving efficiency, strengthening the mechanism of relative pricing, making markets more flexible, controlling inflation, easing tax pressures, and resisting utopian demands for the egalitarian distribution of wealth. It is not as important to promote businesses as it is to provide a propitious environment in which business can be conducted. Voluntarism, of course, cannot serve as a guide for an economic policy aimed at revitalizing the country. Nonetheless, even if an effective strategy, that is, a pro-market strategy, is pursued to overcome the crisis, it would be unrealistic to expect any short-term results. Indeed, any improvement in the economic and social climate in which productive investment is made takes a long time to appear, and the search for new areas of investment also takes time.

ENERGY

FINLAND

RECORD COAL IMPORTS FROM USSR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 23 Feb 85 p 36

[Article: "Record Amount of Coal from USSR"]

[Text] Last year a record 900,000 tons of coal were imported to Finland from the Soviet Union, which was thus Finland's second largest source of coal after Poland. The proportion of Soviet coal was one-fourth of total coal imports.

According to the data compiled by Aspo [not further identified], total imports of solid fuels from the Soviet Union or coke, anthracite, and coal amounted to 1.6 million tons or one-third of Finland's imports. Coal was purchased primarily for the capital city area.

The record amounts for 1984 will probably be exceeded in a year since to date Aspo has concluded an agreement for the delivery of 1.5 million tons of solid fuels. The value will increase from last year's 600 million markkaa.

The record amount of coal will be exceeded for the reason that Imatra Power has ordered 1 million tons of coal from the Soviet Union.

Finland's annual consumption is approximately 4 million tons. Finnish coal reserves are significantly greater than the amount of annual consumption.

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ENERGY

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

OIL IMPORTS DECREASE--Portuguese oil imports dropped 2.5 percent in 1984 compared with the previous year, totaling 7.586 million tons, according to figures released by the General Directorate of Energy. The biggest supplier of oil to Portugal, Saudi Arabia, increased its sales by 5.3 percent, totaling more than 1.9 million tons or more than one-quarter of Portugal's total oil purchases. The biggest decreases occurred in the purchases from Libya (47.7 percent) and Iran (31 percent), whereas imports from Venezuela increased by 20 percent and those from Iraq increased by 19 percent. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 Mar 85 p 5] 8568

CSO: 3542/146

1 May 1985

ENERGY

SWEDEN

## BRIEFS

NATURAL GAS RESERVES LEGISLATION--On 1 January 1986 we will get a new law which will determine how large the preparedness stores of natural gas will be. This is proposed by the government in a bill. The problem is that there is still no suitable method of storing natural gas. Therefore the government is proposing provisional solutions because Sydgasprojektet is starting it on 1 June of this year. The proposal says that large consumers of natural gas, meaning industry, will store oil instead of natural gas, and suitable combustion equipment. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Apr 85 p 8] 9287

CSO: 3650/224

OCEAN/POLAR ISSUES

NETHERLANDS

INTEREST IN ANTARCTIC RESEARCH, ENVIRONMENT

The Hague INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR in Dutch Feb 85 pp 87-91

[Article by G.A.A. Drieman, affiliated until recently with the University of Amsterdam as lecturer in Civil Law, now engaged in studying the issues surrounding the problem of Antarctica: "The Netherlands and the Treaty of Antarctica"]

[Excerpts] A conference on Antarctica was held in Amsterdam on 1-2 November 1984. This conference was organized by the Antarctica Work Group of the Steering Committee for IUCN Member Relations, a deliberating body made up of Dutch organizations which are members of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.

The aim of the conference was, among other things, to bring together scientists, policy makers, and interested parties for the purpose of exchanging ideas on Dutch research and policy in Antarctica, as well as the development of short-term and long-term strategies for furthering scientific research.<sup>1</sup> The problem of environmental protection in this very vulnerable region and the role which the Netherlands might be able to play in that regard were also discussed in detail during the conference.

As appears from an answer to congressional questioning in March 1983 with regard to the protection of the Antarctic environment, Minister Van den Broek stated on behalf of the Dutch government that she considered adequate protection of the Antarctic environment a matter of worldwide importance and also of worldwide responsibility. The government demonstrated that it was prepared to call for renewed attention in appropriate international forums to protecting the Antarctic environment against pollution resulting from mining.<sup>2</sup>

Thus the Netherlands called attention to the environmental problem in Antarctica at the eleventh session of the Administrative Council of the United Nations Environment Program in May 1983. The issue was also placed on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly at the request of Malaysia and Antigua and Bermuda.<sup>3</sup>

The matter was discussed for the first time as the "Question of Antarctica" in November 1983 in the First Committee of the General Assembly.<sup>4</sup> In a

plenary resolution of the General Assembly, the secretary general was called upon to report on Antarctica within a year; at the same time it was decided to place the Antarctica question on the agenda of the General Assembly once more.<sup>5</sup> The matter was taken up at the United Nations again from 28-30 November 1984, at which time no progress was recorded. The Netherlands was not heard from during the discussions. The matter is to be discussed again this year.<sup>6</sup>

#### The Threats to the Antarctic Environment

The following article will consider the opportunities which the Treaty of Antarctica offers the Netherlands to play a prominent role in protecting the Antarctic environment. The environment of Antarctica is being threatened on various sides. Well-known is the ruthless hunting of whales and seals that has taken place in the past; but in recent years new threats have come to the fore, such as krill fishing and the potential future exploitation of mineral resources.

#### The Netherlands

The Dutch government now intends to make 300,000 guilders as well as several researchers available on an annual basis for the establishment of a national research program in Antarctica. The Netherlands will be looking for cooperation from other countries in this effort; it is primarily West Germany that comes to mind in this regard.<sup>45</sup> It is being emphasized that Antarctic research is above all important for political reasons, since the continent must be protected from international conflicts and from environmental pollution. Therefore the Netherlands must not be allowed to lag behind in the international cooperation that various countries have already entered into.<sup>46</sup> The only way the Netherlands will be able to do this now is by securing consultant status.

Although it is not entirely clear what the specific meaning of "substantial scientific research" is, one can assume that the Netherlands will not be considered for consultant status in the very near future. Given the efforts which Poland, West Germany, Brazil and India have made to be admitted as consultant members, the very limited financial contribution from the Dutch government is clearly insufficient. "Substantial" research is absolutely impossible on such an amount. The amount contrasts sharply with the 420 million guilders which West Germany has invested in South Pole research.<sup>47</sup> But then, according to the Dutch government, this amount is only intended to make possible a prudent beginning in South Pole research.<sup>48</sup>

If the Netherlands wants to be admitted as a consultant member, then it will have to make considerably larger financial sacrifices in order to meet the requirement of substantial research. If the Dutch government is really serious about its position that the protection of the Antarctic environment is a matter of worldwide significance, then it should do everything possible to obtain consultant status.

It is thus also to be hoped that the Dutch government will make more money available for South Pole research in the near future. Besides increasing

scientific knowledge of the South Pole region, it would at the same time give the Netherlands the right to participate as a full-fledged member in decision making. In that case, the Netherlands could exercise considerable influence in efforts to avoid disastrous exploitation of this very vulnerable region.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Antarctica: Onderzoek, Politiek, Natuurbescherming" [Antarctica: Research, Politics, Environmental Protection], Steering Committee for IUCN Member Relations, Antarctica Work Group.
2. Tweede Kamer, 1982-83 session, p 1275.
3. G.A. A/38/193.
4. See W. Thomassen, "Antarctica: nu, in 1991, later" [Antarctica: Now, In 1991, Later], ICUN Member Relations, 1984.
5. G.A. A/Res/38/77.
6. THE ECONOMIST, 8 Dec 1984, p 58.
45. DE VOLKSKRANT, 3 Nov 1984.
46. See the NEDERLANDSE STAATSCOURANT No 216, 5 Nov 1984.
47. Ir. Bergman, "Nederlands Antarctisch Onderzoek" [Dutch Antarctic Research], p 30.
48. NEDERLANDSE STAATSCOURANT No 216, 5 Nov 1984.

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toward a military candidacy. And the "New Hope" is placing its greatest hopes in remaining with the social-democratic parliamentary leadership. It is the formation of the new Estoril/Cascais axis. But the "New Hope" is seeing some of its young values increasingly disillusioned with the policy of this country in general, and of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] in particular. This is the case with Pedro Santana Lopes and Jose Manuel Durao Barroso. The disillusion of Santana Lopes is so great that he even decided not to be a candidate for the Lisbon chamber. Meanwhile, Durao Barroso, who, after a short stay in Lisbon, is to return to his university work in Brussels, denied the news that he was scheduled to take on the duties of secretary of state now being handled by Rui Machete, deputy prime minister; it appears that he is not very enthused about the efficacy of this government which his social-democratic leanings had influenced him to support. [Excerpts] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 p 11-R] 8568

CSO: 3542/137

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

# BODSTROM CLAIMS NORDIC STABILITY INTACT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Mar 85 p 4

[Op Ed Article by Swedish Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom: "Stability in the Nordic Area"]

[Text] Despite increased military activity from both of the superpower blocs, political stability continues in the Nordic area, according to Swedish Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom in this debate article in which he also emphasizes Sweden's interest in good and stable relations with the superpowers.

The most striking feature of developments in the postwar period in the Nordic area is the many years of stability. Despite periodic strong variations in tension in Europe and cold international winds, the security policy pattern in the Nordic area has proved to have strong resistance to change.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the security policy situation in the Nordic area is once and for all established, invulnerable to all inner and outer changes. The surroundings are not static. Changes happen continuously in the outside world and we must take them into consideration in our security policy judgments.

During recent years the strategic importance of northern Europe has grown. Rivalry and the arms race between the superpowers have also influenced our part of the world. The expansion since the 1960's of the Soviet naval forces and the base complex on the Kola peninsula must be seen in this overall strategic connection. At the same time this expansion, and also the measures which NATO has taken, have had consequences for the Nordic countries. This applies primarily to the increased military activities in peacetime by both superpower blocs. The border violations to which Sweden has been subjected are a link in that activity.

The Nordic countries have gone different ways in their security policies. At the same time these policies have been shaped also with the interests of the whole in mind. In all the Nordic countries, limited superpower activity and temperate superpower military behavior in the region are seen as important

conditions for continued stability in the Nordic area.

In Denmark as well as Norway there has been a lively security policy debate in recent years. The very foundation of both countries' security policy, membership in NATO, has not been questioned.

At the same time Finland's relations with the outside world are marked by continuity and stability. Developments in recent years have strongly supported the often conveyed Finnish feeling that its external relations should not be subordinated to international fluctuations in the economic situation. It is gratifying to see how little Finland is influenced by the cold international climate. The country's political and economic relations have developed favorably in all directions.

In Sweden the security policy discussions have largely been marked by violations of our territory. As to these violations, the Swedish government's attitude has been purposeful and consistent. We have not hesitated and will not hesitate to take forceful action against every intruder. Neither have we hesitated to clarify our position diplomatically when we had convincing proof. Our protests have been forceful.

Sweden has an obvious interest in good and stable relations with the superpowers. Therefore we seek a dialogue even in situations where conflicts arise. We assume that in both the East and the West there continues to be interest in protecting stability in the Nordic area. Neither side can reasonably derive any advantage from tensions and conflict arising in this area.

Sweden's contribution to this stability is a firm and consistent foreign policy which testifies to our definite intention to remain free and unfettered in all situations. This is our first line of defense. At the same time we will have a real ability to maintain our territorial integrity and oppose different threats and challenges. In cooperation our foreign and defense policies create protection for our peace and independence.

In summary it can therefore be claimed that political stability in the Nordic countries exists--despite increased military activity by both superpower blocs. The security policy pattern which was established in the Nordic countries at the end of the 1940's remains unchanged. A part of this pattern is the limitations which Nordic NATO members Denmark and Norway voluntarily adopted--freedom from nuclear weapons and the absence of permanent foreign bases in peacetime. The Swedish neutrality policy, support of defenses which are strong for our circumstances and also Finnish neutrality are all obviously part of the picture. Other stabilizing factors--Nordic cooperation, a feeling of affinity and commonality of values, homogeneity, an important economic and social stability--have gained increased weight through the years.

To state that is not synonymous with claiming that we are not confronted with serious challenges or that stability in our part of the world is unshakeable.

But these challenges can not be defined exclusively in narrow regional terms. On the contrary, the security of the Nordic countries, and thereby also Sweden's security, today perhaps more than before depend on international developments in general, and mostly on East-West relations in Europe. The deep antagonisms between East and West, the apparently unstoppable arms race, the tendency on both sides to equate security with dominant military strength, all this must also be weighed in judging the security policy situation in the Nordic area.

It is important to remember that the way in which we describe reality also influences how others see us. Overexcited conclusions and predictions can in the worst cases be self-fulfilling. Against that background reasons can be found to be careful with words and to maintain a certain degree of calm, even when dark clouds gather on the horizon and cold international winds blow.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

BODSTROM MEETS PRESS TO DEFEND ROLE IN SUBMARINE DEBATE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 25 Mar 85 p 14

[Interview by correspondent Larserik Haggman with Swedish Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom in Helsinki, date not specified: "Swedish Foreign Minister's Problem--News Journalists Who Are Actors"]

[Text] Sweden's foreign minister has a problem in that some journalists are both news journalists and actors at the same time. His allusion applies to the dinner conversation which he had with six journalists which led to a vote of confidence in the Swedish Riksdag. Bodstrom considers it clear that a government can not express itself about submarine violations without proof. According to Bodstrom there was no proof following Harsfjarden. They all reported that correctly. But now the foreign minister is asking himself how they can claim that he doubted the report about Harsfjarden. It was the newspaper report which caused a unified nonsocialist opposition to demand Bodstrom's removal.

Lennart Bodstrom has difficulty in perceiving any real security policy debate. He sees no clear alternative.

"The Riksdag debate has shown that the nonsocialist parties claim that they stand behind the government's foreign policy. Including behind Olof Palme's speech to the Social Democratic Party congress, including his position on the need of a dialogue with the Soviet Union.

According to Bodstrom the motion of no confidence against him was against the method of conducting foreign policy.

"Next Wednesday the Riksdag debate will again offer an opportunity for the opposition to say whether they accept our foreign policy, or present an alternative."

[Question] "Therefore you say that you have found no alternative?"

[Answer] "In the no-confidence motion there was explanatory criticism, but in connection with the foreign policy declaration of last year there was nothing of importance.

"There was reason to clarify where the parties really stand. That is a democratic right of the voters."

[Question] "The latest opinion poll in Sweden--the one which showed an advance for the Social Democrats--came immediately after your incident. Do you draw any conclusions from that?"

[Answer] "Our support was not affected by the debate, but as things turned out the leader of the Center Party, Thorbjorn Falldin, gave the starting signal for the commotion the same day, at the beginning of February, when he learned of an opinion poll which showed a clear decline for him.

"The scant two percent which the Center Party increased during one month was taken by the party from KDS [Christian Democratic Union], which they will campaign together with in the election."

#### Nervous Climate

[Question] "Were you surprised that Falldin participated in the action against you and practiced bloc politics?"

[Answer] Bodstrom said that he was surprised, and that he does not believe it is always easy to analyze motives.

[Question] "About the role of the press. What do you think about that?"

[Answer] "A large part of the debate takes place in the press. The Riksdag only sometimes discusses foreign policy.

"It appears that in the nervous climate before the election they want to divert attention from the main issues, employment and the domestic economy."

Bodstrom believes that quite simply they were looking for a debate on something else.

He tells of his appearance before the Constitutional Committee in the Riksdag, and believes that an entirely different picture appeared when the report gradually became clear.

"The leading Center Party man on the committee told the press that the questioning was good and clarifying. I just question whether they should not have had a clear picture when they demanded no confidence."

## Different Journalists

[Question] "Then what do you think about the way the press wrote about the affair?"

[Answer] The Swedish foreign minister said that he has mostly a positive impression of the press. But he has noticed a difference between different journalists.

"During my time as a union chairman I met another type of journalist. If I made a demand for a 2-year agreement there was no violent debate whether the members wanted one or three years.

"A demand for an index clause did not bring forth a discussion of the correctness of the viewpoint."

According to Bodstrom some of the problem is due to the fact that some journalists are both news journalists and actors.

## Proof Is Needed

His version of the latest incident in Sweden is that when he said there is no proof of Soviet submarine violations after Harsfjarden he became involved in a reasoning that subsequent violations are also Soviet.

"The government cannot express itself without proof. That should be clear."

Bodstrom finds one thing especially noteworthy. In all the articles written after his meeting with the six journalists it was clear that he said that no Soviet violations took place after Harsfjarden.

"How can they then claim that I doubted the submarine commission's report which concerned just Harsfjarden?"

"My reasoning concerned Soviet violations, not violations in general."

Bodstrom is very surprised that no one requested a real interview and no one checked the information.

"It is difficult to determine the results of this incident as it concerns foreign observers."

## Not Afraid

[Question] "Then do you believe that this incident or the security policy in general will become a central issue in the election campaign?"

[Answer] "Even though the Social Democrats do not want to bring foreign policy into the campaign, we are absolutely not afraid of it."

Bodstrom reminded of a majority of confrontations during the postwar period which the Social Democrats in Sweden had "put aside with confidence": The demand for NATO membership in the 40's, EEC membership in the 60's and 70's, NATO cooperation and own nuclear weapons in the 50's.

"If they want to, we are ready to also debate these questions, in addition to the election campaign issues."

[Question] "Is such a debate negative for Sweden as a nation?"

[Answer] "We can not surrender when it concerns basic elements of the Swedish neutrality policy. The situation continues to be stable and all the Nordic countries are making their contribution to that," said Bodstrom, and referred to his article in HUFVUDSTADSBLADET last Friday when he visited Helsinki.

No Proof

[Question] "In that did you ask for caution in the choice of words if the storm clouds grew closer? Do you believe they are doing that?"

[Answer] "It is clear that we are seeing increased tension in the world and noting increased military activity around the Nordic area. That should still not lead to statements about conclusions for which we can not find proof.

"It is important to keep a cool head and look after one's own house and not make claims about those around you. At least that applies to a responsible government."

Bodstrom said that the conversation with the six journalists was just such a case.

"Naturally journalists have another freedom in certain situations," he added.

No Objections

[Question] "How are you experiencing the Swedish climate and public opinion following the different incidents?"

[Answer] "The government has obtained the approval of the Riksdag. And only a couple of days following the affair I reported to the foreign policy committee, and they had no objections to my report."

To a question of whether the press and public opinion made the government's policy more difficult, Bodstrom replied that in a democracy equal signs cannot be inserted between government statements and press articles. According to him it is natural that the government is more restrained.

[Question] "Do you believe that the Conservatives or circles within them are interested in pushing hard on security questions?"

[Answer] "That is something which time will tell. Almost one year has passed since the last time."

Some Risk

"Opinion polls, however, clearly show that confidence in the Social Democrats on these questions is high. Therefore perhaps those who are thinking of coming forward in favor of decisive changes are running a number of risks," concluded the Swedish foreign minister.

9287

CSO: 3650/224

1 May 1985

MILITARY

AUSTRIA

## GOVERNMENT PUBLISHES PLAN OF DEFENSE STRATEGY

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 6 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by Andreas Koller: "Emergency Plans"]

[Text] Vienna--The waves made by the "Frischenschlager affair" have only superficially affected the political parties' consensus on national defense. Even while Frischenschlager was under heavy fire both from the opposition and the coalition partner the national defense plans and guidelines remained untouched by partisan strife.

Proof of this domestic policy consensus can now be obtained in the form of a 227-page book containing the national defense plan published by the chancellor's office. The book costs 95 schillings and may be bought by anyone in any bookstore. The plan goes back to a parliamentary resolution, unanimously agreed upon by the three parliamentary factions in 1975. It has been put together by a subcommittee of the national defense council. The official title is "Basic Plan for Austria's Security" which has now been assembled in an official document for the first time. The plan starts out by sweeping aside a variety of notions about the feasibility of defending our country without the benefit of armed forces. "Exclusively non-violent resistance in place of other, primarily military, defense measures runs counter to current international defense practices," the authors declare. Nonetheless, "military national defense" is only one aspect of the document. It also contains guidelines--in some instances quite brief--on other components of comprehensive national defense strategy such as moral, civil and economic national defense.

## Emphasis on Defensive Character

Particular emphasis is placed on the purely defensive character of Austrian national defense. "It is the goal of Austrian security policy to protect the population and the basic values of this nation against all threats and to maintain and defend its everlasting neutrality." Among the "basic values" to be defended the document not only lists national independence, territorial integrity and the unity of the Austrian national state. Comprehensive national defense planning also bears a responsibility for the "inner life" of Austria. The document therefore also calls for the defense of

"internal autonomy" among other things; of "pluralistic democracy" and a "maximum quality of life"—even against domestic disturbances. These efforts are subsumed under the heading of a "policy for the maintenance of internal stability."

The plan summarizes the basic strategy to be followed by the national armed forces in a very few words. "In case of a military attack on Austria, the defense struggle [is to] commence at the frontier," the document states. In other words, no part of Austria's territory is to be surrendered to an enemy without a fight—even if that enemy "merely" requires use of such territory to march through which, according to the defense plan, constitutes one of the two possible types of "military threat." The other would be the declared intention of an enemy to occupy parts of Austria—for example for the purpose of "creating political fait d'accomplies," as the document puts it.

Of the 227 pages of the document a mere nine are devoted to the moral aspects of national defense. The most important goal is education for the purpose of awakening a "new, contemporaneous type of patriotism;" a "vital awareness of the Austrian spirit" without "pathos" and "national arrogance." For this purpose, the network of responsible instructors is to be expanded to include "the entire educational system." Instructors to teach the subject of moral national defense are also to be appointed to the universities and teachers colleges.

It is the primary task of civil defense to protect the population and the government institutions "against all presently conceivable threats with the exception of direct, large-scale nuclear aggression." This is to be made possible above all through the construction of shelters and measures to alert the civilian population. "There is much confusion about responsibilities in this field," the document notes. These should be cleared up as rapidly as possible.

One noteworthy detail contained in the plan is that civilian authorities should remain in charge of civil defense operations even in case of a national emergency—with the armed forces merely "providing support." The complaints by the authors about the present state of civil defense are loud and clear. "In this context," they say, "it must be clearly stated that area defense can only be fully effective, if the civilian population is afforded the necessary protection." Military defense, in other words, becomes meaningless unless there is sufficient protection for the civilian population.

The authors are far more satisfied with the state of economic national defense efforts. "The goals of economic national defense," the document notes, "are by and large identical with the classic aims of economic policy in general: full employment, economic growth, monetary stability and a balanced trade balance." The goal in general terms, in other words, is the attainment of economic autarky.

The authors are also satisfied with the "self-sufficiency level" regarding foodstuffs—which is somewhere between 80 and 90 percent—but they do point out that there are "serious gaps in the supply of vegetable oils and fats."

#### Including Civilian Service Draftees

The plan makes a clear case for including civilian service draftees in the comprehensive national defense strategy. This recommendation might well become part of the debate on domestic policy over the next few weeks. For several weeks now, civilian service groups have been fighting against this proposal. It hardly comes as a surprise that the document contains a strong recommendation for the purchase of "at least a limited number" of interceptor aircraft. On the missile issue, the authors come up with a rather elegant formulation by simply stating that "an improvement of the armament of all jet aircraft [is] to be desired."

The secret part of the defense plan may possibly have more to say on this subject. "Some facts and figures" are said not to be contained in the document made available to the public.

But above and beyond that the defense ministry is proud of the fact of having made the national defense plan public. Some newspapers had referred to it as a "secret document." "The defense minister came up with the idea a year ago," said defense ministry press spokesman Sartorius. The original idea was that public debate could only be fruitful. Foreign agents, at any rate, will have nothing to crow about because the plan "does not contain any top secret information," according to Sartorius.

9478

CSO: 3620/312

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

TIGHTER INTEGRATION OF COMBINED GROUND ARMS UNITS PLANNED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Feb 85 pp 29-37

[Article by Lt Gen Werner Schaefer: "Armored Combat Forces--Today and Tomorrow"]

[Text] Planning how the combat forces are to be organized and with what weapons systems they are to be equipped depends on a multitude of factors, for example on the threat, the terrain, the mission. The chief of the General Army Office, Lt Gen Dr Werner Schaefer, in the following article comments on these problems and presents the further development of the armored combat forces as regards structure and equipment in the 90's. It is noteworthy that the idea of combined arms combat was further developed. Thus the combat force battalions are supposed to have tank and armored infantry components in the basic organization.

It is a permanent task of the General Army Office to reflect on the further development of the branches of service so as to be able to adapt in time their equipment, their operational principles and structure to the changing conditions. What is always important hereby in conceptual planning--and that is what is primarily involved here--is to start out from the actual condition of the existing situation. Then the expected development is to be assessed and the means to be selected studied as to their suitability so that the set targets can be attained within the framework of the mainly financially narrowly set limits.

This complex task cannot be fulfilled by individuals and undoubtedly also not by the soldiers only. Tacticians and engineers, soldiers and politicians as well as scientists from the economy and industry are jointly called upon to solve this task. In conceptual planning, the importance of which has increased because of the declining availability of resources, the intellectual base cannot be broad enough. Thus the exchange of ideas, especially in the initial stages of planning must even be intensified.

Finally--since our financial resources are already tight--it is important that we make even better use of our intellectual and innovative capabilities than heretofore. In this point we can agree with the opinion expressed by Lieutenant

General Poeppel, retired, that we should counter more purposefully the trump cards of the East with the advantages of the West: the nimble mind and the inventive genius.

The following observations concern the field of the conceptional planning task related to the armored combat forces, which include the tank force, the armored infantry force, tank destroyer force, and the armored reconnaissance force. All of them, together with the combat support forces, constitute the mainstays of the battle of the combined forces and thus form a significant part of our army, yes it can almost be called its "hard core."

#### Determining Factors of the Concept

It depends on a multitude of factors how armed forces or military services and thus also the branches of service are to be made up, the weapons systems with which they have to be equipped and how they have to be organized. In this connection, the most important factors to be mentioned are:

--Mission

--Threat and pattern of war

--Technological development and

--Socio-economic and ground structure development.

#### Threat

In the first place, the threat and its probable development is to be assessed because it influences the mission. All measures of one's own must be oriented primarily on the capabilities of the potential enemy.

In general, the threat is characterized by an offensive military doctrine, quantitative superiority of military forces and a quality of technology that is becoming more and more alike that of the West, that in some partial fields is already equal to that of the West.

The following scenario should be assumed for a clash in Central Europe: If--and that is to be emphasized--it should come to a military conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, then it must be assumed that (according to Hildebrandt) the Warsaw Pact as attacker will have the initiative and will determine where, when, how, and in what direction it wants to attack. A probability could be "a lightning attack operation with flying start in the depth" (according to Poeppel).

It must be assumed that the Warsaw Pact, taking advantage of its strategically favorable position and of the surprise factor, will try not only to counteract our defensive operations by swift, carefully coordinated attack operations of all its military services and to quickly achieve a breakthrough to the strategic intermediate targets but also to counter the deployment of the NATO forces or to attack it to hit and neutralize the NATO air forces--as much as possible--

still at their air bases, the NATO ground forces in their peacetime quarters or dispersal areas as well as the command centers.

In addition, under simultaneous vertical envelopment in depth, wide-area "bold" thrusts across the inner-German border and the border to the CSSR into the depth of FRG territory are probably intended.

Therefore, our combat forces, combined with other branches of service including those of our allies, must be adjusted to the enemy attack of massed, armored units supported by combat helicopters. This attack will be characterized by uninterrupted operations day and night, taking advantage of the so-called "stagger principle" and employment of the forces in terrain favorable to movement. Moreover, the combat forces must figure on the effect of high fire concentration of enemy artillery and air support in the main attack points.

However, it is just as probable that the Warsaw Pact ground forces in the future, too, in general, except perhaps those deployed in the approaches--here especially those in the GDR--will not be able to carry out large-scale operations without considerable preparations.

#### Terrain and Other Conditions

The large share of built-up and forested terrain in the FRG area restricts the possibilities of movement of armored combat forces despite the existing dense transportation network. Thus the deployment of sizable mechanized units and mobile combat are made more difficult. The effect of the fire has been considerably enhanced by the technical development. While this factor already demands reduction of the target density, the uncontrolled urban spread requires smaller controllable and thus better led units and formations. These findings were taken into account in the concept of our armored combat forces in Army Structure 4 (Heeresstruktur 4). Aside from these factors, conceptional planning is decisively dependent on the basic manpower and financial conditions. Since it must be assumed that the funds of our state will continue to be tight, further development of the armored combat forces, just as other plans for the future, must be oriented on the necessities and limited to the essentials. We must do without the technically feasible or desirable.

Because of the known population development, starting from the end of this decade the number of those fit for military service will no longer meet the demand of the armed forces. To solve this problem, decisions are required even now to make it possible to institute appropriate corrective measures in time. In this connection it must be taken into account that cuts in the mission of the army will hardly be possible in order to maintain an adequate defensive capability according to the alliance commitments we have undertaken and the threat outlined above.

#### Mission

This mission does demand from the armored combat forces that they can successfully carry out the forward defense in close link with the other branches of service of the army and of our allies--as a "big combat community" so-to-speak.

Therefore, forward defense is more than merely a principle ; from the German view it is an indispensable element of the NATO strategy. Its goal is to fight off the aggressor successfully as early as possible and with as little loss of terrain as possible and with the best possible limitation of the damage and to regain the lost terrain. For this purpose the defense must be able to start without delay and with a maximum of combat effectiveness near the border and conducted in a coordinated manner.

### Conclusions

The fact that 30 percent of the FRG population lives in a strip of 100 km along the inner-German border and that 25 percent of the industrial potential is located there makes it evident how important--yes, it can be labeled vital--the forward defense is for us.

It excludes the abandonment without battle of sizable territory of one's own as well as area defense which includes the depth of our own territory. However, forward defense includes using the depth of the defense areas in the forward combat zone for mobile conduct of operations.

To be able to start an integrated defense over the entire width immediately and to conduct it with mobility so that the attacker is denied the thrust into the depth of the FRG territory, adequate forces in operational readiness and combat ready--especially also combat forces--are of decisive importance.

As an experience from the history of war it can be assumed for a future clash, which will be characterized especially also by utilization of the third dimension, that the mass can be overcome only by dynamics, by dynamics that are the result especially of superior tactics and conduct of operations.

For this particular purpose a multitude of smaller, highly mobile units and formations with heavy firepower and qualified leadership are required, as they are already present in the armored combat forces.

### Tactical Capabilities

The four branches of service of the armored combat forces--tank force, armored infantry force, tank destroyer force, and armored reconnaissance force--correspond to these ideas. They combine within themselves high firepower, mobility and armor protection. Without delay they can change day or night between dispersion and concentration, between attacking thrust and fire fight from positions. They can quickly meet the enemy, shift points of main effort and quickly escape from the effect of superior enemy fire by rapid movements into more favorable operating areas or positions. Thus armored combat forces are able to conduct combat mobilely and to maintain and regain freedom of action.

Maneuverability of the command, mobility of the units and formations, the speed with which command measures affect the enemy and good knowledge of the terrain are prerequisites for the ability to apply the means of surprise successfully. The basic idea is to hit and defeat the enemy again and again at an unexpected time, at an unexpected place, and in an unexpected manner.

Thus successes frequently can also be achieved even from an inferior position. However, for this purpose modern command and control facilities are required which permit swift and secure transmittal of information and a short reaction time of the weapons. Such command and control facilities are a prerequisite for mobile leadership which must affect all types of combat to equalize the numerical inferiority. Aside from the close integrated weapons system to be aimed for, this is important especially in the delay to be practiced against a clearly superior enemy. The more skillfully combat the formations and units is carried out in changing between combat from positions with surprising, devastating fire on the one hand and surprise counterattacks on the other hand, the greater the effect on the enemy, the more assured is success.

The principal purpose of the demand for delay is gaining time for subsequent operations and maintaining one's own combat effectiveness as much as possible. In this connection, the idea of destruction has gained special importance for the armored combat forces. The attacker should and can be worn out by the highest possible losses.

In the defense, armored combat forces are to be so led while taking advantage of the depth of their terrain that even a numerically superior enemy time and again meets up with local fire superiority. The defender cannot be equally strong everywhere. Massed concentration makes it necessary to accept gaps to be strong enough at the critical point and at the right time.

Only mobile conduct of operations makes it possible to achieve a limited superiority in terms of place and time. But this does not signify that in the defense against the fire fight we can do without reconnoitered and prepared positions. Moreover, it would be incorrect to adhere stubbornly to these positions and thus to accept unnecessary losses.

Finally in the attack by which the decision is sought by destruction of the enemy and lost terrain is to be regained, only armored combat forces develop the necessary firepower and striking power for deep penetration and breakthrough. Here, too, what is especially important is speed, a swift thrust into the objective.

This does not signify that the shortest, direct road to the objective also promises the biggest success. Especially the intention to direct heavier fire at the enemy at an unexpected target from changing directions and in doing so to underrun the enemy fire demands employment of the forces from changing positions and thus leads to fragmentation of the enemy fire. Armored combat forces, however, will only be able to develop their full effect if they cooperate among themselves and with other branches of service, especially with the combat support troops, i.e. if they conduct combined weapons combat.

While combined weapons combat used to mean "cooperation of various forces and means on the battlefield under the uniform command of a troop commander"--in other words, in general a leader from brigade commander on upwards--we now speak of combined weapons combat if various branches of service cooperate under a uniform command independent of the command echelon.

The present largely autonomous and specialized weapons systems develop maximum effectiveness only in combination with other weapons systems. According to their special performance capability, the individual weapons in this combination complement one another in target engagement and mutually protect one another.

#### Army Structure 4

With the introduction of Army Structure 4, the capabilities and potentials for combined weapons combat have been decisively improved by the smaller, more mobile, better manageable units and formations but also especially by the introduction of new weapons, such as the antitank helicopters. Technical potential and tactical necessities have raised the demands on the ability of the commanders, especially at the lower command echelon.

Even the commanders of elements of the combat forces frequently have to lead combined weapons systems of tanks and armored infantrymen and depend on elements of combat support forces for cooperation, such as engineer reconnaissance detachments or artillery observers.

At company level, the spectrum of combined weapons systems or combined branch of service elements is expanding considerably. Commanders on this level as a rule have to lead different elements of the combat forces and are greatly dependent on cooperation with the combat support forces.

Meanwhile for the battalion commander, combined weapons combat is being taken for granted. In virtually every situation a tactical grouping deviating from the peacetime basic organization takes place. Thus a mixed team is formed adapted to the tactical purpose involved in which different performance components of armored combat forces mutually strengthen one another or balance their weaknesses. Cooperation with combat support and operational support forces, frequently also with antitank helicopters and air defense forces and one's own air forces beyond that, is the rule.

The armored combat forces according to the conceptionally determining factors have been so organized that optimal cooperation for combined weapons combat in the major formation framework with the other elements of the army system is assured. They form the numerically greatest share of the 36 brigades of the field army and of the 12 home defense brigades of the territorial army. Most of our brigades are tank and armored infantry brigades which, in addition to the brigade units, possess 4 line battalions and one armored field artillery battalion as principal carriers of the combat.

With Army Structure 4 we have thus changed from a three-unit organization for the line battalions to a four-unit organization.

Thus the capability for more flexible operations planning and conduct of operations has been clearly improved. As an innovation it must be noted that one of the line battalions, the first, is a mixed battalion, i.e. this battalion includes tanks and armored infantrymen. Its staff and support company is partly staffed, i.e. it will be completely operationally ready following call-up of reservists.

Moreover, the present combat companies of this fourth line battalion are divided up to the three other line battalions. Therefore, this formation must be brought together in exercises and in deployment.

The ideas on the further development of the conduct of operations, equipment and structure of armored combat forces in the 90's had to and have to start from the question whether and how the cited basic conditions will change.

Just as in the previously assessed threat situation, no substantial changes are to be expected in the own military-strategic targets, including the mission of the army. Moreover, the terrain conditions, too, will only change slightly compared to the present conditions.

This signifies that the combat forces required for the fulfillment of the mission in the 90's combined with the other branches of service in the future, too, will mainly have to be able to contain an attacker with present forces by the forward defense, to retain their own terrain and to regain lost terrain by counterattack.

For this purpose, the firepower, survivability, and mobility suitably united in the armored combat forces is to be developed further with cost effectiveness. These three main factors must be adapted to the high demands of future actions which probably will proceed even a great deal faster, more intensively and uninterruptedly than is to be assumed for the present actions. Thus the firepower of the armored combat forces must be composed of different weapons with different tasks and principles of effect, so that no "gaps of effect" occur in combat.

In addition to armor protection, survivability is to be assured above all by firepower and mobility, but also by the configuration. It can and therefore should be increased by a whole series of indirect protective measures, e.g., smaller silhouettes, camouflage features in the visual and infrared range, capability to absorb radar, etc.

Finally the mobility achieved for the LEOPARD 2 battle tank will also be adequate for the future. With this excellent battle tank we have advanced to a zone which also includes ergonomics. Cost effective improvements will hardly be possible.

In general, in the considerations for the further development of the armored combat forces, system thinking is in the foreground according to which the individual elements and factors are not viewed in isolation but in an overall context. Finally the system as a whole is to be adapted to the changing basic conditions so that a suitable integration of its principal elements of personnel, command and employment principles, organization and equipment permits reaching the required performances in orderly cooperation.

For the 90's, this is possible as a further evolutionary development from Army Structure 4.

Nevertheless what was and is involved with regard to the planned equipment according to the system thinking is to divorce oneself from the follow-on

thinking. Beyond that, especially for the weapons systems of the future it will be required that no more complex multipurpose weapons systems be developed as a result of the recognition that in war only the simple thing is successful. Thus also from the aspect of cost effectiveness the individual weapons systems are to be oriented towards the fulfillment of their principal tasks. The technical layout is to be simpler, the availability of the individual components is to be increased. Moreover, leadership at the lowest level is to be simplified.

System thinking under the aspect of cost effectiveness has also logically led to considerations of developing a family of armored carrier vehicles for the main weapons.

Accordingly, the following main weapons systems for the armored combat forces of the 90's are being considered:

--A battle tank with a high-performance gun which can destroy armored targets at great distances;

--APCs with a machine gun that can destroy enemy APCs of the future;

--Antitank armored cars with an effective independent antitank system of the armored infantrymen;

--Armored mortar carrier;

--Tank destroyer/helicopter armored defensive vehicles with an effective weapons system;

In the technical achievement of these future weapons systems the efforts will be directed more than heretofore, aside from the increase in the efficiency of the hardware, at improving its reliability and at facilitating its operation, maintenance and repair.

Since no principal change of the facts and requirements of land warfare for the 90's as compared to the present has emerged, no change in the basic operational and tactical ideas is to be expected either. The principles for command and deployment of armored combat forces probably will also only have to be changed gradually.

However, in the future the capability of the enemy to be able to conduct uninterrupted operations by day and night using the "stagger principle" will have to be met more effectively than heretofore.

#### Equipment and Structure

Equipment and structure of the armored combat forces must be so conceived that they meet these requirements. Since the physical and psychological capability of man is limited, the structures must provide, among other things, for exchange of personnel or relief in place in combat.

Models for the structure provide for an equal number of tank and armored-infantry brigades and an unchanged number of airborne and mountain brigades. The home defense brigades of the territorial army are to be equipped with the weapons systems that become available because of new procurement of the armored combat forces. Thus these large formations will be even better able to perform combined weapons combat. The armored infantrymen share of the tank brigade is to be increased as compared to the present situation and in this connection the dismounted strength of armored infantrymen, i.e. the component of the dismounted infantry combat, will be clearly increased.

The armored reconnaissance battalion of the division--following the present deployment practice--will be developed into a formation that can assume security, control, and delaying tasks in addition to its reconnaissance tasks. The main effort of armored ground and scouting reconnaissance is supposed to be with the brigades.

In the now planned structural model for the tank and armored infantry brigade, the combat force share in the brigade forces is supposed to be identical. Both of them are supposed to get a brigade reconnaissance company and an antitank/helicopter defense company.

Moreover, the combat force battalions of the future even in their basic organization are to be an organic mixture of tank and armored infantry elements.

In this mixture, the "system of armored combat forces" already has its effect on the battalion level even though only the large formation of the brigade comprises the complete system; only at the brigade level are the far-reaching weapons system of tank destroyer/armored helicopter defense vehicles and the weapons systems of the combat support forces included in the plans.

#### Planning Is Art of the Possible

If the present conceptual models and plannings for the armored combat forces can be adequately achieved within the framework of the concept and structure of the army, then these forces will be able to fulfill also in the 90's their function of deterrence and forward defense according to the threat and the mission.

Since planning, just as politics, is an art of the possible, the efforts of many are necessary to maintain and if possible to raise the operational readiness of the armored combat forces and with them of the entire army with the initially sketched complexity of the task in view of the narrowly set financial limits.

12356

CSO: 3620/0271

MILITARY

FINLAND

#### CRUISE MISSILE STUDY PANEL CONTINUING WORK

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 Feb 85 p 7

[Article: "Missile Report Delayed for Yet Another Month"]

[Text] The eight-member Finnish study panel, which has been investigating the remains of the Soviet target missile that fell into Lake Inari, will still continue its work. The information section of the General Staff says that the completion of the report will stretch into March or April.

Pieces of the target missile were initially taken to Tampere and Tikkskoski for investigation. Then they were transferred by truck to Vainikkala and put on a train to be transported to the Soviet Union.

The intent of the study is to confirm the origin of the missile as well as to clarify why the target missile strayed into Finland.

Even though the pieces of the missile are no longer in Finland, it is still a question of a long, drawn-out study. For example, the final report on a Fouga accident in Lohtaja in the beginning of the year was not completed until 2 months after the accident.

After the missile report has been completed, it will first be submitted to Lieutenant General Rauno Merio, commander of the Air Force. He will then submit it to his own superior, General Jaakko Valtanen, commander of the Finnish Defense Forces. The report will then go from Valtanen to the Defense Ministry and to the Foreign Ministry.

A decision on making the report public will not be made until after it has been completed, says the information section of the General Staff.

The incident, which has received extensive publicity, took place on 28 December when a Soviet target missile strayed into Finnish airspace and finally fell into Lake Inari. Information about the route of the missile was not obtained until 2 January from Norway. The pieces of the missiles were finally found in the middle of January after intermittent searches. They were sent back to the Soviet Union on 8 February.

10576

CSO: 3617/83

MILITARY

FINLAND

#### ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON NEW HEAVY COAST GUARD BOATS

Helsinki NAVIGATOR in Finnish Feb 85 pp 5-6


[Article by Markku Ranin: "Naval Patrol Becoming More Effective, Report on Last Quarter of 1984 in Shipbuilding Industry"]

[Excerpt] The Border Patrol, which celebrated its 65th anniversary last March, is renewing all of its coast guard equipment.

The fifth ice-breaking long-distance patrol boat and a heavy coast guard boat equipped with modern submarine search equipment were ordered at the end of the year. Light coast guard boats ordered in the fall are already under construction, and procurements of aircraft and helicopter equipment are being planned.

Signals of ever continuing difficulties in navigation and shipbuilding are again being heard in the world. The large Swedish shipping company Salen, which has approximately 20 of its own refrigerated ships and 150 rented ships, slipped irrevocably into bankruptcy before Christmas. Only a little before this Sweden's second largest shipyard announced that it will cease its operations. When Uddevalla closes its doors in 1986, a little less than 3,000 employees will be forced to seek new employment elsewhere. Measures to reduce the operations of Spain's shipyard industry, for its part, are continuing, which will result in a loss of current jobs for more than 15,000 people.

Rakas rannikkovartiolaivamme muistuttaa hieman esikuvana ollutta ohjusvene Helsinkiä. Hollmingin prototyyppiin lisäksi rakennettaneen aikanaan neljä muuta.



The above heavy coast guard boat is somewhat similar to the missile boat Helsinki, which served as a prototype. In addition to Hollming's prototype, four others will be built.

#### Technical Data

length, max	43.0 m
length, pp	38.5 m
width, kvv	8.0 m
abutment height	3.9 m
draft, max	2.3 m
displacement	270 t
engine capacity	5520 kW
speed	more than 20 kn
price	56.5 million markkaa
construction number	264

10576

CSO: 3617/83

1 May 1985

MILITARY

PORTUGAL

## DEFENSE OFFICIAL REPORTS 'SCARCE MEANS'

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 Mar 85 p 2

[Text] The armed forces are accomplishing their mission with the resources made available to them and these resources, by themselves, constitute a threat to the credible maintenance of these forces, it was remarked yesterday by Figueiredo Lopes, secretary of state for defense, during the closing session of the First Strategy Congress promoted by the International Strategic Studies Institute in Lisbon.

Figueiredo Lopes said that the resources available are scant and that the armed forces are currently facing a worrisome level of equipment expenditures and issues, above all when compared to those that are obligatorily set aside for personnel. "We are reaching a level below which we cannot go," he said.

In taking up the topic of armed forces modernization, the secretary of state for defense stressed the fact that it is necessary on the policy level to tackle this question "head-on." Expressing his personal opinion next, Figueiredo Lopes felt that this modernization must be expressed in a "small, highly equipped and efficient organization."

In the view of this member of the administration, this option will be able to bring the armed forces not only in line with the specific geographic situation but also with the country's vulnerabilities and responsibilities as a country. However, it could also have the consequence of rethinking some of the development and modernization projects.

The speaker also stressed the need for the definition and organization of the kind of national defense the country wants, the personnel force and equipment to be allocated--something which would require a clarification at the conceptual and legal levels. Among the regulations which he considered fundamental, the secretary of state singled out the military planning law (which would permit re-equipment plans over a period of 5 years) and the mandatory military service and conscientious

As for foreign aid, the secretary of state said that the administration has been looking carefully into the repercussions deriving from the obligatory purchase of equipment from the country that gives the loan and ways of counterpart guarantee are now being studied.

## "Zero Naval"

Again on armed forces reorganization and modernization, comments were heard during the last session of the Congress from Adm Fuzeta da Ponte, commandant, of the Naval War College, and BG Antonio Bispo, of the Air Force. After describing the navy's current situation in terms of equipment, Fuzeta da Ponte concluded that "Either we take urgent measures or the intensive phase of building naval units of the 1960's will be followed by the corresponding and inexorable phase where we have to take these units out of the inventory. In 1989, 50 percent of the ships will no longer have any military value and in 1995 this will be true of all vessels, in other words, we will have a zero navy," he said.

The commandant of the Naval War College also stressed the urgency of making decisions on this matter in view of the need for long time spans required for the planning and construction of ships.

Along these same lines, BG Antonio Bispo considered it necessary to bring the goals and the available resources into line "realistically." Maj Virgilio de Carvalho next advocated the idea that national military defense seek to improve its own capability and acceptability by promoting a development aimed at interservice thinking and action as well as the promotion of an efficient military defense industry.

BG Mota Mesquita during this same session analyzed the funds allocated in the government budget to the armed forces, concluding that the shortages that have emerged in recent years do not enable us "to entertain any great hopes as to the possibility of moving forward to the modernization of the armed forces through annual budgets."

Early in the afternoon, Gomes de Pinho, a leader of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] took up the topic of "new dimensions of strategy--cultural and economic factors," concentrating his remarks on an analysis of what he called the "identity crisis" of the Portuguese resulting from profound changes in the concept of "people, territory, and state."

5058

CSO: 3542/145

MILITARY

PORTUGAL

# GENERAL STAFF CHIEF SUPPORTS 'STAR WARS' CONCEPT

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 3 Mar 85 p 28

/Text/ The strategic defense program SDI ("Star Wars"), initiated by the North American president, was defended by Gen Lemos Ferreira, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, on his return yesterday to Lisbon, following a visit to Belgium. The space-based antimissile defense program, which has caused scepticism on the part of European members of NATO, and even open opposition, translates--according to Lemos Ferreira in statements of NP /Portuguese News/--"the concern about advanced technology, and may allow us to find solutions that are more in keeping with the times."

"The SDI also means emerging or new technologies which allow us to maintain the status quo, the possibility of disarmament, and the adoption of a firm, logical, and coherent stance by NATO and its allies with regard to Russia and its partners in the Warsaw Pact"--emphasized the chief of staff.

Weighing the "extraordinary growth in recent years of the military potential of Russia and the Warsaw Pact nations," Lemos Ferreira called attention to the danger of the two alliances playing an extended game of chess where the desired result is that one player concede due to the foreseen victory of the adversary.

Alluding to the apprehension existing in several sectors of NATO over the enormous costs of "Star Wars"--more than \$26 billion over the next 5 years--Lemos Ferreira argued that what is achieved in high technology allows for advancements in other areas, and is intrinsic to progress, a point which he illustrated with the advances achieved in electronics based upon North American space efforts in the 1950's.

The differences among allies of the United States with regard to "Star Wars" have more to do with "Who is going to do what, and who gets to participate," says Lemos Ferreira.

The chief of staff revealed, on his arrival from Brussels, the possibility that Portugal and Belgium may exchange defense industry technologies within their NATO relationship.

Gen Lemos Ferreira admitted, "We are no worse off than before."

Lemos Ferreira's schedule in Belgium included a 2-day visit to SHAPE, NATO's European headquarters, in Mons, at the invitation of Gen Bernard Rogers, commander of the allied forces in Europe.

MILITARY

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

GENERAL AWAITS REASSIGNMENT-- The former chief of the army general staff, Gen Garcia Dos Santos, who has been waiting for a new assignment for about a year and a half, said today that "Nobody wants to assume responsibility" for his situation. Garcia Dos Santos confirmed that he had been contacted by Defense Minister Mota Pinto in June of last year to chair the committee that is to draft the national electronics and data processing plan. The defense minister, he added, then transferred the entire matter to the Ministry of Industry. "I talked to the minister of industry for 7 months," he emphasized, "and I think that that was too much." "I dissociated myself from the entire affair on 11 February," he concluded. [Text] [Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 15 Mar 85 p 3] 5058

INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL BENEFITS PROTESTED--The bill on the status and benefits for members of the future intelligence services which the administration is drafting ran into opposition in military circles where there is insistent talk about the need for clearing up and straightening out the situation of all government employees. The military continues to express a firm readiness not to allow the government proposal "to pass" because they feel that this bill is aimed at the institutional establishment of exaggerated benefits for some government employees. In particular they point to the "higher risk" subsidies (which they say they cannot understand), the representation allowances for undifferentiated assignments in the case of those services that will remain under the control of MAI [Minister of Interior], or on personnel detached for duty with the secretary of state in the case of those individuals who will remain under the Ministry of Defense and, among other examples, the allocation of mobile homes by the state to directors. "The military will not permit the introduction of such benefits in their intelligence services and will fight to clean this situation up," one of the sources consulted told A TARDE. The position of the military was communicated yesterday by Gen Lemos Ferreira to Rui Machete, Almeida Santos, and Eduardo Pereira, who are in charge of the bill. Another meeting between the CEMGFA [armed forces chief of staff] and those members of the administration for today, late in the afternoon. [Text] [Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 13 Mar 85 p 1] 5058

CSO: 3542/145

ECONOMIC

FINLAND

# SORSA URGES IMPROVEMENTS IN EAST BLOC TRADE MECHANISMS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 2 Apr 85 p 13

[Article by Matts Dumell: "Sorsa Wants Mechanism for Effective Imports From the East"]

[Text] "Our task is now to build just as effective a mechanism for imports from the Soviet Union as the machinery which has been created for increasing exports there," said Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa. Sorsa said that Finns in their own interest should come at least half way toward the Soviet Union in the effort to increase the demand for Soviet products in Finland.

The prime minister spoke yesterday in his capacity as chairman of the Finnish-Soviet Joint Economic Commission at a seminar in Finlandia House.

In his introduction, Sorsa pointed out that Finland will continue to buy oil from the Soviet Union far into the future, and will increase its import of natural gas.

"That is the backbone of the trade between the countries now and in the future."

Since 1982, when the world market price of petroleum products began to decline, the machinery which for 10 years had increased Finland's exports to the Soviet Union, suddenly stagnated.

"That caused us to realize that things could be managed better," said Sorsa.

## New Mechanism

He said that trade has reached a stage when we must find growth factors outside the traditional energy sector.

"Coming to the point, one could say that when Finland, in cooperation with the Soviet purchasers, has built up very effective machinery for 10 years, the purpose of which has been to realize export to the Soviet Union, it is now our job to create machinery which will function in the opposite direction."

Sorsa said that it is partly a question of investigating what potential the Soviet Union has for exporting to Finland, and partly of considering what new forms the trade can take.

"The premise for the trade remaining at the same level or growing is the development of the Soviet Union's export offerings and Finland's demands for imports."

#### New Forms

"It is clear that the Soviet Union can not always supply the goods which Finland wants to purchase," said the prime minister.

Experiences of this kind have caused talk of coming compensation projects.

But that involves building production installations in cooperation, and that payment for Finnish work is accomplished in the form of finished goods which Finland wants to buy. The big problem so far has been financing.

Although the clearing statement last year could almost be balanced, the new project will not fit within the framework for the traditional trade in exchange of goods.

The same problem exists in the so-called cooperative production, even though the Soviet side has gone in for borrowing convertible currencies with other Western countries.

The Soviet Union's vice foreign trade minister A. N. Manzhulo said that suitable compensation projects for the future could be offshore geological investigation, chemistry, paper and color metallurgy.

Sorsa said that since the project is intended to strengthen clearing-import the financing should also be handled within the framework of the clearing system.

#### Clearing

To a question of what the Soviet Union considers is increased trade in convertible currency, Manzhulo replied:

"So far we have not found the advantages of using two different systems. We prefer to remain with the one, clearing.

"We are ready to investigate the issue, but the principle is that big projects are always handled with loans and goods exchange. Another question is then how loans can be arranged so that the Finnish offers are competitive."

9287

CSO: 3650/224

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

#### DIVERSIFICATION NEEDED IN TRADE WITH CUBA

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 Mar 85 p 4

[Text] The need to diversify products traded between Portugal and Cuba was one of the principal topics discussed at the Sixth Conference of the Joint Portuguese-Cuban Commission held in Lisbon.

In the opinion of Raquel Ferreira, secretary of state for foreign trade, who headed the Portuguese delegation at the 3-day conference, it is no longer possible for our country to continue to import sugar from Cuba in view of existing agreements between Portugal and the EEC. In keeping with those agreements, Portugal has certain commitments, such as giving preference to sugar coming from the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific), which "brings us to the point where we have neither the interest nor the possibility of importing that product from Cuba," Raquel Ferreira said. In this context, "we need to find other forms of cooperation between the two countries, such as an increase in the exchange of products which are traditionally accepted and the marketing of new products, both Cuban and Portuguese."

Alberto Betancourt, Cuba's deputy minister of foreign trade, who headed the Cuban delegation, corroborated the contention that it was not "possible to reach an agreement on this product which plays such an important role in the economy" of his country.

Consistently showing a trade deficit in its dealings with Cuba, Portugal imports the following products from that country: sugar, oils derived from the refining of petroleum and fresh fish, refrigerated and frozen. Portugal's principal exports are footwear, cork, stoves, ready-made clothing and textiles.

8568

CSO: 3542/146

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

PARALLEL ECONOMY'S PERCENTAGE--Parallel economy in Portugal represents about 22 percent of the GDR, involves a tax evasion of 95 million contos and "employs" about 1 million workers, according to a technical study made by the Ministry of Labor. By "parallel economy" we mean the entire range of "economic activities which, although lawful, are not included in the national accounting system," excluding smuggling and prostitution. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 16 Mar 85 p 16] 8568

INCREASE IN BANKRUPTCIES--The number of bankruptcies filed last year showed an increase of 33.3 percent over 1983 and involved a total of 172 companies, according to the Credit Insurance Company (COSEC). The capital involved in the bankrupt companies was about 559,000 contos and the companies employed an average of 50 people. The greatest incidence of bankruptcies continued to occur in the converting industries. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Mar 85 p 5] 8568

CSO: 3542/146

ECONOMIC

SPAIN

#### CAUSES OF SLUMP IN PRODUCTIVITY DESCRIBED

Madrid CUENTA Y RAZON in Spanish Jul-Dec 84 pp 75-83

[Article by Juergen B. Donges]

[Text] The economic crisis that has been plaguing Spain so severely in the last few years reflects the aging of the productive apparatus, which is based primarily on the industrial sector. Though this sector was the driving force behind the rapid economic development that took place in this country during the 1960s and early 1970s, in recent years it was more responsible than other sectors for the persistent, widespread stagnation. Though Spain's industry was much more dynamic during those years than that of the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a whole, now it has been left behind by world economic growth. And though this industry had provided a steady supply of new jobs during the period of rapid growth, recently it has been losing them at a spectacular rate. Since 1983 Spain's industry has shown a certain improvement in its levels of activity, but special factors (such as the opening of a new General Motors automobile plant in Zaragoza) and the cyclical recovery of the world economy (which facilitated a significant increase in exports) have contributed to this development, so it would be premature to speak of an end to the crisis.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the major labor and management organizations and the government itself have made overcoming the industrial crisis a top priority in their efforts to revitalize the Spanish economy and raise employment levels. There are abundant proposals for "industrial reconversion," "positive adjustments," "reindustrializing" the country, promoting "cutting edge" industries. But there are clear differences of opinion regarding the causes of the crisis and the responsibilities of the different private and public sectors in solving the problem. Since the situation is so complex, it lends itself to partial interpretations; since it affects most of Spanish society, it is easily politicized, and invites debate from ideological points of view; and since it is paralleled in other European countries, it inspires pessimism and feelings of impotence. Although the problems that beset Spain's industry are many and great, they are not insuperable, as long as we are aware of the fundamental causes of the crisis and more effective adjustments are made to adapt to them.

## Insufficient Productivity

An economy is dynamic when the productivity of available resources increases rapidly. Since 1975, the annual productivity growth rate has hovered around 5 percent. Although it is 2 points below the average rate for the period from 1960 to 1975, these results are not so bad. Whereas before 1975 productivity had progressed rapidly, along with a steady growth of jobs, in recent years it has been accompanied by a strong rise in unemployment. As a consequence, what we perceive as advances in productivity is more apparent than real. To a great extent, it reflects the increasing number of jobless workers and bankrupt companies, that is, the displacement of the relatively less productive factors of production (manpower and capital). If the level of employment registered in 1975 (3.6 million workers in industry) had been maintained in recent years, the real growth of the industrial product would have translated into a much slower increase in productivity: a cumulative rate of 1.5 percent between 1975 and 1984. From an international perspective, Spanish industry has been surpassed, in terms of efficiency, by the industry of the OECD countries, despite a tendency toward similar rates in the years before the crisis.

The problems of efficiency are complex and diverse, depending on the area of activity. In virtually all sectors, competitive companies (or companies that could be competitive if they tried) coexist with others that are not (and never will be) and that survive only with the help of substantial state aid, including protection from foreign trade. There are well-known examples in the steel and metallurgy industries, the shipyards, the automotive industry, the textiles and shoe sectors, the home appliance and capital goods industries. Despite these differences, there are indeed a number of deficiencies that are common to Spanish industry in general. One of them is related to the atomized productive structure. The problem does not lie, as many believe, in the fact that the vast majority (more than 95 percent) of the companies employ fewer than 500 workers; a similar predominance of small and medium firms is also seen in the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States. The problem is that, unlike their counterparts abroad, the Spanish small and medium companies operate with more outdated equipment, are less innovative in terms of products and manufacturing processes, and participate less in vertical specialization.

As a counterpoint, the so-called large enterprises in Spain are still far from the productive capacity of their equivalents in the EEC, the United States or Japan, despite an industrial policy that provides continual support for the process of concentration that Spanish business has been undergoing for decades. Insufficient plant dimensions prevent these firms from taking advantage of the technological potential of economies of scale, which can only drive up per-unit production costs. It is no surprise that this situation has arisen. It happens in all countries where most products are aimed at the domestic market and this market is too narrow. Thanks to protection from competitive imports, the companies in question remain afloat. They neglect, however, to seize opportunities to specialize, both horizontally and vertically, in exchange for simply multiplying the number of models or lines of production in each sector.

Moreover, it is well known that nearly all industrial sectors have bloated payrolls. Current labor legislation forces companies to employ more people than they need, considering the development of the market, or forces them to pay almost prohibitive compensation if they do discharge workers. To make matters worse, it should be noted that public enterprises are also instructed to maintain obsolete jobs at prevailing real wages. In both cases, the result is covert unemployment, which may mitigate the unemployment problem but does so at the cost of worsening the prospects of those who are looking for work. The impact on productivity can only be negative, certainly at the level of individual companies, but also in the context of industry in general, because there are fewer mergers, fewer expansions of productive capital and fewer new companies created than there would be if hiring and firing could be more flexible. In addition, the attitude of the worker himself is somewhat distorted, given that failing to produce as high a yield as possible does not endanger his job.

Another factor in the deterioration of productivity is the scarce attention Spanish firms give to technological research and development. In recent years, spending on this item has been around 0.3 percent of the GDP (compared to 2 percent in the advanced countries of the OECD), and the number of people employed in such activities was barely more than 1 percent of the workforce (as opposed to 10 percent in the OECD). Contrary to what is often asserted, the problem is not so much that the "dependency" of Spanish industry on imported technology is perpetuated; in the final analysis, it can be just as advantageous to participate in the international technology trade as it is to participate in the exchange of goods and services. The problem is that a low rate of research activity inevitably reduces the purchasing firms' ability to evaluate technological alternatives, to analyze the suitability of certain techniques for their own productive structure, and to imitate successful innovations that have taken place in other countries. All this translates into a clear disadvantage in product innovations and manufacturing methods, and Spain has been behind in this area for several years.

The low industrial productivity clearly slows reaction time during a period like the present when such profound and irreversible economic changes are taking place, whether due to sharp rises in energy prices, the dissemination of new technologies or the emergence of aggressive competitors on the world market, all of which have been prevalent since the early 1970s. Under these circumstances, the economic stagnation is perpetuated, unemployment climbs still higher, and the population's standard of living declines. Is low productivity a fact of life, a foregone conclusion? No, but it is clear that advances in productivity do not fall from heaven; they are the fruit of a continuous process of investment in fixed capital, the creation of new firms and the training and recycling of workers and business executives. In this regard, things have taken a turn for the worse in Spain.

#### Atrophy of Productive Investment

Gross fixed capital formation has declined for several years in a row, something that has not happened in any other OECD country. In 1975, fixed capital investments constituted 23.3 percent of the GDP; in 1983, that portion had

fallen to 17.9 percent. If we exclude construction, the historical development of this trend is no less depressing; the investment rate falls from 8.9 to 5.8 percent. This level of investment is substantially lower than that of the EEC, and is not enough to revitalize the economy, as several empirical studies have revealed. A good part of the (private) investment that has been made has been directed at rationalizing production (in order to cut wage costs) or at replacing old facilities. Investments designed to expand productive capacity in anticipation of future demand have been relegated to second place. These investments are the true driving force of economic growth and productivity advances, and they also improve international competitiveness and create many new, well-paying jobs.

Among the factors that dampened productive investment most in recent years, and to a certain extent still prevail, are the following:

- high levels of inflation, which create a climate of insecurity for investors, hinder the feasibility estimates of specific projects, and shorten the terms of the external financing that businesses obtain;
- a disproportionate increase in the wages and Social Security contributions that businesses must pay, which shrinks profit margins, decapitalizes labor-intensive companies and stimulates the replacement of human resources with mechanized resources;
- a continuously increasing tax pressure that is high in comparison with available family income ("fiscal effort"), and thus discourages those who might be willing to start up new businesses, or diverts them to the "underground economy;"
- a disproportionate rise in the public debt, spurred by the apparently unstoppable expansion of wasteful spending, which makes credit for the private sector scarce and expensive, in addition to limiting the formation of new and promising productive capacities in favor of greater investments in financial assets, including public debt bonds that can guarantee both high liquidity and substantial yields (especially those which are tax-free);
- an underdeveloped capital market in terms of the supply of social capital and above all risk capital, which severely impedes the development of new businesses in technologically innovative areas;
- a tangle of administrative requirements and regulations aimed at determining the number, location, size and type of new businesses, which creates uncertainty, generates costly red-tape and causes significant delays in the planning and execution of projects;
- a poor image of business throughout society, accompanied in some regions by violence and terrorism, which leads to frustration and discouragement among businessmen and causes them to abandon productive activities.

We could go on enumerating the firmly-rooted and persistent obstacles to productive investment. We should also mention the propensity of the various post-Franco democratic governments to try to redistribute income through

subsidies and social benefits, which is not the most appropriate action when there is such a great need to promote private initiative, risk-taking and a sense of individual responsibility. If these obstacles are not overcome, the Spanish economy will continue to see its vitality sapped, with all the ensuing social and political problems this entails for the country.

#### Adjustment and Reindustrialization

The loss of economic vitality is especially serious for the sectors that are threatened by an enormous potential for production and exportation in the industrial sectors of the so-called "new industrialized countries" of Asia and Latin America. These industries are labor-intensive, and labor unit-costs are decisive in determining competitiveness and growth rates.

The Spanish textile, clothing, fur and shoe industries, as well as the lumber manufacturing and processing, domestic appliance and toy industries, to name a few, are simply no longer able to compete on an equal footing with those countries, because of the relatively high wages that now prevail in Spain. (When labor was comparatively cheap in Spain, in the 1960s, for example, these industries were able to expand rapidly, at the expense of their counterparts in the more advanced countries where wage costs far exceeded Spain's.) A similar phenomenon can be seen in the shipbuilding industry, specifically with regard to oil tankers and cargo ships, where technology is highly standardized internationally and countries such as South Korea and Taiwan can easily exploit the advantages of their relatively low wage costs. The situation is even worse in the iron and steel industry, because new competitors are emerging during a time when world demand for steel is growing more slowly than the GDP, and excess productive capacity in the world is therefore huge. All these trends in the international division of labor do not mean that the aforementioned industries will disappear from Spain. There will continue to be successful companies in each of these sectors. But these industries as a whole will probably not provide any impetus for economic growth. In any case, it is imperative that the supply of goods be adjusted to demand (both domestic and foreign) and that productivity be increased.

As the industrial crisis heightened, various notions of industrial reconversion based on administrative planning and orientation of the productive apparatus toward adaptation to new economic circumstances gained acceptance. The OECD seemed to have the magic solution, labeled "positive adjustment," to galvanize industrial policymakers into action. Thus, in 1980 Spain began its first state program for industrial reconversion, which was embraced by 11 subsectors and five isolated companies, all in desperate straits. The sectors and businesses covered under the Reconversion Plans account for 7 percent of industrial employment, but their impact on industry as a whole is much greater because of their connection to other sectors of the Spanish economy as suppliers and demanders of goods and services.

This program, which is scheduled to expire in 1985, basically consists of a bail-out of problem businesses (for which the government grants hefty subsidies, official loans and various tax breaks, totaling more than 100 billion pesetas altogether) and a payroll adjustment (direct job losses are estimated at 10 percent of the sectors). On the other hand, no real restructuring has

taken place in terms of eliminating unprofitable businesses, completely dismantling obsolete production facilities, providing job training for laid-off workers or making new investments to create new, high-quality products and new, competitive jobs. The reconversion program actually reflects a defensive stance on the part of the government, aimed more at maintaining than adapting productive structures. Consequently, as experience has shown in other European countries, the government treats the symptoms of the problems without eliminating their causes; the industrial crisis thus does not recede but continues unabated, while society grows poorer and the inevitable adjustment becomes unnecessarily harsh and costly.

The present administration has even decided to play a role in the structural readjustment of Spanish industry, drawing on the infamous "White Book on Reindustrialization" published by the Ministry of Industry and Energy in 1983 to propose the idea of a "new industrial policy," following the lead of social democratic and labor officials in the United States and Europe. The objective is no longer merely to breathe new life into the depressed sectors and businesses; it goes beyond simple financial house-cleaning and employment adjustment to include promoting the reindustrialization of the country through new "cutting edge" industries, which to a large extent involve very advanced and complex technology such as microelectronics and related fields, data processing, robotics, biotechnology and aeronautics.

There is no doubt that Spanish industry must incorporate the latest technological advances as much as possible in order to recover its dynamism and competitiveness. But it is naive to think that these future-oriented promotional activities can be selected more effectively by the state, which operates from an administrative point of view, than by business, which is close to the market. Politicians and bureaucrats normally do not suffer any loss of assets if they err in the selection of activities for the future, while private investors can go bankrupt. For this reason, they study the real economic prospects (as opposed to the desired ones) of proposed investments much more carefully.

In this world of uncertainty, where technological processes, the availability of natural resources, the international division of labor and the juridical-political context tend to undergo unforeseeable changes, there is no scientific method for accurately predicting the future. This has always been so. As in the past, today's government cannot eliminate the problem of uncertainty, no matter how hard it tries, because it does not have superhuman powers (regardless of its political stripe). We cannot fail to note in this context the curious fact that several of today's depressed industries in Spain were considered by the government in the 1960s to be the engines of economic development (today we would call them "cutting edge" industries), such as shipyards, steel mills and auto plants. If the state defines the industries of the future for the purposes of development, it will most likely look at trends in investment, production and exportation in other more advanced countries. Thus, imitation rather than real innovation would be encouraged. If private enterprise regards imitation as promising, it has no reason to receive government aid.

But if the state compiles a series of measures designed to promote certain activities, to which it assigns its own priorities according to sector, it assumes the responsibility that the corresponding investments to be made by these firms will be successful. If they fail, these businesses will exert pressure for more aid, and will ultimately succeed in socializing the losses, at the expense of the taxpayer. In addition, any public assistance provided to certain activities inevitably amounts to a "tax" levied on others, something which is generally overlooked, but the funds earmarked for such selective promotion have to come from somewhere in the economy. Among the companies that face discrimination are usually those that operate dynamically, that innovate, that export, that maintain jobs and could create new ones. Making life difficult for these firms, as the "new industrial policy" would likely do (even if unintentionally), does not seem to yield much promise for the future.

### Final Observations

In a (social) market economy, as defined by the Spanish Constitution of 1978, the responsibility for expanding productive capacity, readapting the range of products and improving technical manufacturing processes does not lie with the state, but rather with businesses themselves. They must assume uninsurable risks, and must have creativity and imagination. They must delegate planning and decision-making functions to professionals, stimulate initiatives in the lower echelons of the firm, know how to apply marketing strategies, and realize the potential of technological research. They will also have to change management practices in many cases, showing more sensitivity to the market and abandoning mere bureaucratic and habitual procedures. This may seem like an idealistic interpretation of what the dynamic businessman should be, especially in Spain, where recent surveys reveal that less than one-fifth of the workforce is interested in going into business. But if Spanish society is not convinced of the urgent need to develop its vocation and capacity for business management to higher levels of professionalism and creativity, it will be very difficult to resolve the economic problems that plague the country now or may arise in the future, despite the government's efforts. Spanish industry will have serious difficulties in coping with the new conditions that result from Spain's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) and taking advantage of that membership for its own growth, regardless of how long a transition period is granted.

To spur the formation of fixed capital for the long term, it is imperative to increase the expected yield of future investments. In this regard, the state has an important role to play. Its areas of activity are very diverse, but their common denominator should be an orientation toward improving efficiency, strengthening the mechanism of relative pricing, making markets more flexible, controlling inflation, easing tax pressures, and resisting utopian demands for the egalitarian distribution of wealth. It is not as important to promote businesses as it is to provide a propitious environment in which business can be conducted. Voluntarism, of course, cannot serve as a guide for an economic policy aimed at revitalizing the country. Nonetheless, even if an effective strategy, that is, a pro-market strategy, is pursued to overcome the crisis, it would be unrealistic to expect any short-term results. Indeed, any improvement in the economic and social climate in which productive investment is made takes a long time to appear, and the search for new areas of investment also takes time.

ENERGY

FINLAND

RECORD COAL IMPORTS FROM USSR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 23 Feb 85 p 36

[Article: "Record Amount of Coal from USSR"]

[Text] Last year a record 900,000 tons of coal were imported to Finland from the Soviet Union, which was thus Finland's second largest source of coal after Poland. The proportion of Soviet coal was one-fourth of total coal imports.

According to the data compiled by Aspo [not further identified], total imports of solid fuels from the Soviet Union or coke, anthracite, and coal amounted to 1.6 million tons or one-third of Finland's imports. Coal was purchased primarily for the capital city area.

The record amounts for 1984 will probably be exceeded in a year since to date Aspo has concluded an agreement for the delivery of 1.5 million tons of solid fuels. The value will increase from last year's 600 million markkaa.

The record amount of coal will be exceeded for the reason that Imatra Power has ordered 1 million tons of coal from the Soviet Union.

Finland's annual consumption is approximately 4 million tons. Finnish coal reserves are significantly greater than the amount of annual consumption.

10576  
CSO: 3617/83

ENERGY

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

OIL IMPORTS DECREASE--Portuguese oil imports dropped 2.5 percent in 1984 compared with the previous year, totaling 7.586 million tons, according to figures released by the General Directorate of Energy. The biggest supplier of oil to Portugal, Saudi Arabia, increased its sales by 5.3 percent, totaling more than 1.9 million tons or more than one-quarter of Portugal's total oil purchases. The biggest decreases occurred in the purchases from Libya (47.7 percent) and Iran (31 percent), whereas imports from Venezuela increased by 20 percent and those from Iraq increased by 19 percent. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 Mar 85 p 5] 8568

CSO: 3542/146

ENERGY

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

NATURAL GAS RESERVES LEGISLATION--On 1 January 1986 we will get a new law which will determine how large the preparedness stores of natural gas will be. This is proposed by the government in a bill. The problem is that there is still no suitable method of storing natural gas. Therefore the government is proposing provisional solutions because Sydgasprojektet is starting it on 1 June of this year. The proposal says that large consumers of natural gas, meaning industry, will store oil instead of natural gas, and suitable combustion equipment. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Apr 85 p 8] 9287

CSO: 3650/224

OCEAN/POLAR ISSUES

NETHERLANDS

INTEREST IN ANTARCTIC RESEARCH, ENVIRONMENT

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[Article by G.A.A. Drieman, affiliated until recently with the University of Amsterdam as lecturer in Civil Law, now engaged in studying the issues surrounding the problem of Antarctica: "The Netherlands and the Treaty of Antarctica"]

[Excerpts] A conference on Antarctica was held in Amsterdam on 1-2 November 1984. This conference was organized by the Antarctica Work Group of the Steering Committee for IUCN Member Relations, a deliberating body made up of Dutch organizations which are members of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.

The aim of the conference was, among other things, to bring together scientists, policy makers, and interested parties for the purpose of exchanging ideas on Dutch research and policy in Antarctica, as well as the development of short-term and long-term strategies for furthering scientific research.<sup>1</sup> The problem of environmental protection in this very vulnerable region and the role which the Netherlands might be able to play in that regard were also discussed in detail during the conference.

As appears from an answer to congressional questioning in March 1983 with regard to the protection of the Antarctic environment, Minister Van den Broek stated on behalf of the Dutch government that she considered adequate protection of the Antarctic environment a matter of worldwide importance and also of worldwide responsibility. The government demonstrated that it was prepared to call for renewed attention in appropriate international forums to protecting the Antarctic environment against pollution resulting from mining.<sup>2</sup>

Thus the Netherlands called attention to the environmental problem in Antarctica at the eleventh session of the Administrative Council of the United Nations Environment Program in May 1983. The issue was also placed on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly at the request of Malaysia and Antigua and Bermuda.<sup>3</sup>

The matter was discussed for the first time as the "Question of Antarctica" in November 1983 in the First Committee of the General Assembly.<sup>4</sup> In a

plenary resolution of the General Assembly, the secretary general was called upon to report on Antarctica within a year; at the same time it was decided to place the Antarctica question on the agenda of the General Assembly once more.<sup>5</sup> The matter was taken up at the United Nations again from 28-30 November 1984, at which time no progress was recorded. The Netherlands was not heard from during the discussions. The matter is to be discussed again this year.<sup>6</sup>

#### The Threats to the Antarctic Environment

The following article will consider the opportunities which the Treaty of Antarctica offers the Netherlands to play a prominent role in protecting the Antarctic environment. The environment of Antarctica is being threatened on various sides. Well-known is the ruthless hunting of whales and seals that has taken place in the past; but in recent years new threats have come to the fore, such as krill fishing and the potential future exploitation of mineral resources.

#### The Netherlands

The Dutch government now intends to make 300,000 guilders as well as several researchers available on an annual basis for the establishment of a national research program in Antarctica. The Netherlands will be looking for cooperation from other countries in this effort; it is primarily West Germany that comes to mind in this regard.<sup>45</sup> It is being emphasized that Antarctic research is above all important for political reasons, since the continent must be protected from international conflicts and from environmental pollution. Therefore the Netherlands must not be allowed to lag behind in the international cooperation that various countries have already entered into.<sup>46</sup> The only way the Netherlands will be able to do this now is by securing consultant status.

Although it is not entirely clear what the specific meaning of "substantial scientific research" is, one can assume that the Netherlands will not be considered for consultant status in the very near future. Given the efforts which Poland, West Germany, Brazil and India have made to be admitted as consultant members, the very limited financial contribution from the Dutch government is clearly insufficient. "Substantial" research is absolutely impossible on such an amount. The amount contrasts sharply with the 420 million guilders which West Germany has invested in South Pole research.<sup>47</sup> But then, according to the Dutch government, this amount is only intended to make possible a prudent beginning in South Pole research.<sup>48</sup>

If the Netherlands wants to be admitted as a consultant member, then it will have to make considerably larger financial sacrifices in order to meet the requirement of substantial research. If the Dutch government is really serious about its position that the protection of the Antarctic environment is a matter of worldwide significance, then it should do everything possible to obtain consultant status.

It is thus also to be hoped that the Dutch government will make more money available for South Pole research in the near future. Besides increasing

scientific knowledge of the South Pole region, it would at the same time give the Netherlands the right to participate as a full-fledged member in decision making. In that case, the Netherlands could exercise considerable influence in efforts to avoid disastrous exploitation of this very vulnerable region.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Antarctica: Onderzoek, Politiek, Natuurbescherming" [Antarctica: Research, Politics, Environmental Protection"], Steering Committee for IUCN Member Relations, Antarctica Work Group.
2. Tweede Kamer, 1982-83 session, p 1275.
3. G.A. A/38/193.
4. See W. Thomassen, "Antarctica: nu, in 1991, later" [Antarctica: Now, In 1991, Later], ICUN Member Relations, 1984.
5. G.A. A/Res/38/77.
6. THE ECONOMIST, 8 Dec 1984, p 58.
45. DE VOLKSKRANT, 3 Nov 1984.
46. See the NEDERLANDSE STAATSCOURANT No 216, 5 Nov 1984.
47. Ir. Bergman, "Nederlands Antarctisch Onderzoek" [Dutch Antarctic Research], p 30.
48. NEDERLANDSE STAATSCOURANT No 216, 5 Nov 1984.

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